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This study examines the relationship between popular support for the 
Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK), which is an ethnic insurgent and terrorist 
organization mainly operating in Turkey, and its terrorist activities during the pre-
and post-election periods in Turkey . Popular support has been measured 
through popular votes for the political party affiliated with the PKK in 1999 
general, 2004 local and 2007 general elections. Two leading theories of social 
movements, Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) and Relative Deprivation 
Theory (RD), were used as theoretical approach. 
The study uses secondary data and constructs a longitudinal design. An 
advanced statistical analysis technique, a generalized hierarchical linear model: 
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time nested within subjects (or GHLM repeated measures) was employed in this 
study.  
Findings indicate that popular support is positively related to terrorist 
attacks of the PKK in Turkey.  More popular support for the insurgent leads to 
more terrorist attacks.  Furthermore, terrorist attacks gradually increased over the 
pre-election period of general elections. However, terrorist attacks abruptly 
increased upon the election but then subsequent terrorist attacks decline over 
the post-election periods. 
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CHAPTER I.INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction 
For over 30 years, Turkey has suffered from the effects of terrorism that has 
resulted in over 30,000 casualties attributed to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s 
(hereafter the PKK). Founded in 1978, the PKK is an ethnic insurgent and 
terrorist organization that originated in the Diyarbakir province of Turkey with the 
main goal of establishing an independent Kurdish state in the Middle East 
covering parts of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The terrorist organization has 
adopted the “protracted war strategy” of Mao and Marxist-Leninist ideology.  
One of the most significant reasons why the PKK remains in existence is 
due to the popular support for both sides (government and insurgent) that is 
acknowledged and viewed by both scholars and practitioners alike as being the 
determining factor in defeating counterinsurgency warfare. Among other reasons, 
popular support is credited primarily to logistical concerns, the nature of guerrilla 
warfare strategy, and legitimacy (Jordan, 1962; U.S. Army, 2006). First, in terms 
of logistics, supporters provide insurgents with safe havens, freedom of 
movement, logistical and financial support, intelligence, and new recruits (U.S. 
Army, 2006). Second, the existence of insurgency indicates at least some degree 
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of popular support for the insurgent; otherwise, there would be no insurgency. 
Finally, popular support generates a feeling of legitimacy that may attract foreign 
help and thus afford the insurgent an opportunity to major safe heavens abroad 
and receive support from Diaspora.  
In brief, popular support relates to resources that increase the insurgent’s 
capabilities. For these reasons, the insurgent must make every effort to obtain 
popular support in order to win the population over to its side. Insurgency and 
social movement literature indicate that if popular support is nonexistent or is not 
voluntarily given, it will be acquired through the use of political violence (Galula, 
2006; Jordan, 1962; Sarma, 2007; Trinquier, 2006).  
In this study, the primary hypothesis assumes that the insurgent’s need for 
popular support may lead to committing political violence. In addition, it is 
hypothesized that political violence varies depending on the degree of popular 
support. Similar to other studies that have measured popular support for 
insurgent groups through electoral or polling data (Berrebi & Klor, 2008; 
Douglass & Zulaika, 1990; Guelke & Smyth, 1992), this study measures the 
support for PKK through popular voting for its political party and examines the 
influence that this support has had on PKK terrorism over pre- and post election 
periods. 
The findings of this study could help get insights in to the PKK terrorism in 
Turkey and how it is related to the elections. In 1990, the PKK established its first 
legal political party known as the People’s Labor Party (HEP) and has continued 
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to engage in electoral politics ever since. Until the local elections the general 
elections of 2007, votes for PKK’s legal Democratic Society Party (DTP) steadily 
increased; however, the vote share dramatically shifted in favor of the 
government’s party. For example, the vote share of PKK’s political party declined 
across the country from 6.2% in the general elections of 2002 to 3% in the 
general elections of 2007. In other words, PKK’s political party lost its popular 
support by almost 50% in the general elections. Similarly, vote shares of the 
insurgent’s affiliated DTP party declined from 26% to 21% in the Kurdish 
dominated regions. If popular support is actually of crucial importance for 
insurgent groups, this relative decline should affect PKK’s political violence. 
Thus, it would be of interest for the Turkish government to understand how the 
relative decline in votes affects the violence characterized by the PKK.  
Two leading sociological theories, relative deprivation theory (RDT) and 
resource mobilization theory (RMT) were used to address how changes in vote 
share of the PKK’s political party are related to the PKK terrorism. Although their 
theoretical backgrounds differ and lead in different directions, they can still shed 
light on the various aspects of political violence.  
The relative deprivation theory (RDT) is based on grievances and views the 
differences between an organization’s achieved and expected results as a 
source of relative deprivation that leads to political violence. Derived from this 
approach, in this study the relative decline in popular votes for the insurgent’s 
political party is considered as the source of relative deprivation that is expected 
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to increase political violence. On the other hand, resource mobilization theory 
(RMT) views an organization’s resources rather than grievances as being the 
most important determinant factor associated with an insurgency in reaching its 
goals. From the perspective of RMT, a positive relationship between popular 
support and insurgent violence is expected; therefore, it is hypothesized that as 
the PKK achieves more popular support, the group will acquire more resources 
and will consequently be able to carry out more terrorist attacks. Similarly, when 
the PKK loses popular support, its ability to carry out more terrorist attacks are 
expected to decrease due to lack of resources. Similarly, when the PKK loses 
popular support, its ability to carry out more terrorist attacks are expected to 
decrease due to lack of resources. Although the assumptions of both theories 
differ, they still offer insight that can assist in understanding where the insurgent 
will direct its violence in an effort to mobilize the population. 
The dependent variable of the study is the “number of PKK’s terrorist 
incidents” that have occurred within individual provinces of Turkey, and the main 
independent variable is the vote share of the political party affiliated with the 
insurgent (PKK), which is assumed to represent the degree of popular support 
from the province. In addition to the vote share variable, there are three time 
variables to determine whether the elections have any impact on the terrorist 
attacks. 
This dissertation has a longitudinal study design, and employs a 
“discontinuous growth model” using a random coefficient model (RCM) with a 
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repeated measures design. Within a longitudinal design, RCM is an intuitive and 
efficient way to estimate individual change curves as well as capable of 
separating changes over time within individual provinces and differences in-
between provinces at initial status (Tate & Hokanson, 2006). According to Lang 
and Bliese (2009), discontinuous growth models represent a specific form of 
multilevel mixed-effects models with multiple time variables to model transition 
processes over time and individual differences in transition processes. Thus, by 
employing this model, the researcher will first be able to analyze terrorism 
patterns in each pre- and post election period and across provinces by testing 
whether terrorism significantly increases or decreases as a function of time 
during these election periods. Second, the researcher will be able to examine 
whether there are identifiable differences in patterns of terrorism over time during 
the pre- and post election periods (e.g., some provinces may worsen whereas 
others may remain the same).  
Briefly, the insurgent’s political violence is expected effected by the election 
and vary depending upon the level of popular votes in a constituency (province). 
If evidence is found suggesting that a relationship exists between popular votes 
and political violence, this may help to better understand the insurgent group’s 
internal dynamics in terms of political violence as well as identify vulnerable 
provinces that may be prone to terrorist attacks during election periods. If 
findings suggest that the resource mobilization theory (RMT) is correct, then the 
researcher will conclude that insurgent violence varies according to the degree of 
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popular votes in support of the PKK political party. In this case, the government 
should then focus on “winning hearts and minds” policies to win the population 
over to its side and thus erode popular support for the PKK. Furthermore, the 
government should position its counterinsurgent forces in provinces where the 
PKK’s political party has retained or increased its popular votes.  
On the other hand, if findings suggest that the relative deprivation (RD) 
theory is correct, the researcher will assume that a decline in popular votes 
generates relative deprivation that leads to political violence. If this is the case, 
then the government should position its counterinsurgent forces in provinces 
where voting for the PKK’s political party have declined, because this would 
indicate that failure in elections generates relative deprivation. In this way, not 
only can the government use its forces effectively, but it can also predict where 
the most vulnerable provinces would be located. Finally, the findings of the study 
could be applied to other countries that suffer from ethnic insurgent violence, 
namely the IRA in the United Kingdom, the ETA in Spain, and others that engage 
in electoral politics. 
Problem Statement 
Existing literature related to insurgencies suggest that popular support is the 
key factor in counterinsurgency warfare. The majority of researchers in this field 
have focused on the terrorist’s choice of target and type of attack plan (Galula, 
2006; Sarma, 2007; Trinquer, 2006), whereas others have focused on whether 
the population supports or disapproves of insurgent violence (Hayes & McAllister; 
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2001; 2005). Basically, scholars argue that selective terrorism against selected 
targets, namely, soldiers, police officers, and informants, increases the popular 
support of insurgency amongst the population while indiscriminate terrorism 
erodes its popularity. Although difficult to quantify, various researchers have 
measured popular support for the insurgent through electoral data or polling data 
on its particular political party and  examined the influence of political violence on 
electoral outcomes (Bali, 2007; Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin, & Mierau, 2008). 
However, there remains only scant literature regarding the opposite direction that 
examines the impact of the electoral outcomes on terrorism during the post-
election period (Berrebi & Klor, 2008; Guelke & Smyth, 1992). Furthermore, most 
research concerning the link between popular votes and terrorism is cross-
sectional that does not take heterogeneousity among the subjects and changes 
over time into consideration. Therefore, this study is an attempt to thoroughly 
examine this linkage between election outcomes and political violence through 
longitudinal data by using a discontinuous model with random effects, or the 
random coefficient model (RCM) repeated measures.  
Purpose of the Study 
The primary purpose of this study is to examine whether there is a 
relationship between popular support for the insurgent (PKK) and terrorist 
incidents carried by the PKK in provinces of Turkey. And a secondary purpose is 
whether elections have any impact on those terrorist incidents. In order to do so, 
the researcher tests whether terrorist attacks significantly increases or decreases 
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as a function of time during pre- and post election periods, and whether popular 
votes for the political party affiliated with the PKK is related to these terrorist 
attacks.  
Research Questions 
In order to reach its goals, this dissertation seeks answers to two main 
questions:  
1) Is popular support associated with the PKK’s terrorist attacks in 
Turkey?” 
2) Are the elections associated with the PKK’s terrorist attacks in Turkey? 
Hypotheses of the Study 
Two main hypotheses and several sub-hypotheses are proposed to answer 
these questions:  
H1:   “Terrorist attacks are associated with its popular support”.  
With regards to impact of electoral support, the RMT and RD theoretical 
approaches have different expectation, so we have two sub hypotheses:  
H1a: “Popular support is positively associated with terrorist attacks”.  
H1b: “Popular support is ‘negatively’ associated with terrorist attacks”. 
The second main hypothesis of the study is that: 
H2: “Terrorist attacks are associated with elections”.  
H2a: “Terrorist attacks will increase during the pre-election period”. 
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The PKK could intentionally increase its terrorist attacks over the pre-election 
period to discredit the government, to discourage electorates to cast their votes, 
and increase its popular support among the Kurdish population.  
As some scholars pointed out post election violent events as quick and 
short-lived events that starts right or soon after the results are announced and 
ends in a short period of time (Amerasinghe , 1989). Therefore we expect an 
increase soon after the election and a decline in a short period of time and 
propose the following hypotheses: 
H2b: “Terrorist attacks will increase abruptly upon the election”. 
H2c: Subsequent terrorist attacks will decline over the post-election period. 
Significance of the Study 
From theoretical approach, if the study finds evidence to support that 
popular votes and elections influence terrorism, this may help to better 
understand the insurgent group’s internal dynamics in terms of political violence 
and identify possible vulnerable provinces during election periods. If findings 
support the resource mobilization theory (RMT) is correct, indicating insurgent 
violence varies according to the degree of popular votes in support of the PKK 
political party, and it will be suggested then the government should then focus on 
“winning hearts and minds” policies to win the population over to its side to erode 
popular support for the PKK. In addition, the government should position its 
counterinsurgent forces in provinces where the PKK’s political party has retained 
or increased its popular votes.  
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On the other hand, if findings support the relative deprivation (RD) theory, 
indicating a decline in popular votes generates relative deprivation that leads to 
political violence, thus the government should position its counterinsurgent forces 
in provinces where voting for the PKK’s political party have declined. In this way, 
not only can the government use its forces effectively, but it can also predict 
where the most vulnerable provinces would be located.  
Finally, although this study focuses on the PKK in Turkey, due to the fact 
that ethnic insurgencies share some features and all need for popular support, 
the findings of the study could be provide some insights into other countries that 
suffer from ethnic insurgent violence, namely the IRA in the United Kingdom, the 
ETA in Spain, and other insurgent organizations that engage in electoral politics. 
Definitions of the Terms in the Study 
Insurgency:  
‘Insurgency’ is defined as the attempt an attempt to overthrow or oppose a 
state or regime by force of arms (Joes, 2004). U.S 2006 Counterinsurgency 
doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the 
overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed 
conflict (p:13). Since the PKK is an armed organized movement that aims to 
create an independent Kurdish homeland in the Middle East, the PKK is viewed 
as an insurgent organization; and because of using terrorism strategy that targets 
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both civilians and security forces to achieve its goal, the PKK is identified as an 
insurgent terrorist organization. 
Dominantly Kurdish Populated Region (here after the DKPR):  
The PKK considers certain provinces as a part of “Kurdistan” that its claims 
to fight for its independence. These provinces are located in the Southeastern 
and Eastern regions of Turkey. However, not all provinces in those regions are 
considered as a province of Kurdistan by the PKK. In this study, these provinces 
are named as “dominantly Kurdish populated region” (here after the DKPR). 
Province: 
Currently there are 81 provinces in Turkey. They are governed by appointed 
provincial governors. Each province has certain number of districts, which are 
governed by district governors, governmental employees appointed by the 
Ministry of Interior. Districts have certain number of villages and might have 
certain number of towns.  
The PKK Terrorism in Turkey 
Good counterinsurgency policies erode popular support for the insurgent 
where poor ones contribute to popular support (Parker, 2007). Thus, it is in the 
interest of this study to determine whether Turkey’s current or past 
counterinsurgency policies helped the PKK inadvertently gain popularity amongst 
the Kurdish population or eroded a considerable proportion of it. The main 
purpose of this section is to review what the government did and did not to 
12 
 
 
 
acquire support from the population. Having chronologically explored the history 
of the PKK, this section investigates on the past and current counterinsurgency 
policies of Turkey against the PKK in terms of their ability to acquire popular 
support from Kurdish population. Finally, its experience on electoral politics will 
be chronologically surveyed.  
History, Strategy, and Structure of the PKK 
The PKK was founded during a meeting of Abdullah Ocalan and his 
associates in the city of Diyarbakir on 27 November 1978. This meeting is more 
commonly known as the First Congress of the PKK, and in its Foundation 
Statement the PKK made reference to the liberation of Kurds scattered in Turkey, 
Syria, Iran, and Iraq, and the formation of a “Greater Kurdistan” (see Map 1) in 
this region as its long-term objective (Roth & Sever, 2007).   
 
Map 1: the allegedly Kurdistan that the PKK aims to establish.  
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 Note: Taken from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Web page: 
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/pkk.htm  
 
The statement also suggested that in order to reach its goals, the PKK 
adopted Mao’s “Protracted War Strategy” and Marxist-Leninist Ideology. Mao’s 
formula of the people’s war consisted of seven components of which three are 
directly derived from Lenin’s strategy of revolutionary insurrection (Joes, 2004): 
(1) the people’s war must be led by a Communist Party, 2) must have a military 
force strictly controlled by the Party, 3) must have a united front to broaden the 
people’s war base of support, 4) must champion the mass line to gain the 
people’s support, 5) should set up base areas for support, regrouping and pilot 
demonstrations of the revolutionary future, 6) must, to every extent possible, be 
self-reliant lest it lose touch with the people−its ultimate source of strength and 
support, and 7) the people must rely on three-staged  military strategies of 
protracted war: defensive, stalemate, and offensive stages. During each phase, a 
particular form of warfare drives the dynamic (Marks & Palmer, 2005). During the 
strategic defensive, terror and guerrilla actions lead. During the strategic 
stalemate, mobile warfare is dominant and sees insurgent main force units, 
equivalents of government formations, take the field, but not seek to hold 
territory. At the strategic offensive or ‘war of position’, seeks to hold what is 
gained. Mao’s protracted war strategy insist that guerrilla is only an interim phase 
of the struggle, intended to enable the insurgents to build a regular army which 
will, eventually, win through conventional warfare (Merari, 1993). Mao’s strategy 
attaches great importance to popular support from the population and guerrilla 
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warfare strategy. The foundation statement explicitly declared that as the 
protracted war strategy requires it has adopted a party-front-army approach as 
his organizational structure and has chosen ‘guerrilla warfare’ strategy as his 
main activity. 
The PKK publicized itself eight months after his foundation, on July 31st of 
1979 through an armed attack on a Parliamentary Member, Mehmet Celal 
Bucak. It declared its foundation and his goals across Turkey to attract the 
Kurdish population to join and support the PKK. In order to reach his goals, the 
PKK sent its selected members into the Palestinian training camps to get military 
training. First terrorists to have arrive in Palestine and started their training under 
the supervision of Palestinian instructors in September 1979 (Kalkan, 2007). 
Sending its militants to be trained in Palestinian camps has continued until the 
PKK establish its own camps in Beka Valley in Syria. 
Turkey’s unstable situation, which the PKK and various Turkish left wing 
terrorist organizations were a part of it, resulted in a military coup in September 
12th 1980.After the military coup, Chief of General Staff of Military, Kenan Evren 
took over the presidency; the National Security Council ruled the country until the 
parliamentary elections held on November 6th of 1983. Right after the military 
coup, under the military command, the Turkish army launched an offensive 
counter terrorism campaign against all type terrorist organizations which resulted 
in arrest of thousands of people. Under these strict military conditions, the PKK 
organized its Second Congress in Damascus, Syria from 20–25 August 1982. It 
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was during this meeting that the group decided to initiate a violent armed 
campaign in order to establish a Kurdish state (Roth & Sever, 2007); and the 
following month, September of 1982, the PKK began sending its trained militants 
to Turkey (Kalkan, 2006). 
Having completed its military cadre, the PKK also declared the foundation 
of its first guerrilla army named People’s Liberation Army of Kurdistan (ARGK) 
through very sensational simultaneous attacks on two gendarmerie stations on 
August 15th of 1984 in Semdinli and Eruh districts of Turkey. Kalkan (2006) stated 
that those stations were intentionally selected because they were small enough 
to succeed and would represent the PKK’s war zone. The impact of the terrorist 
attacks was huge on the public, the government and other countries. The PKK 
still argues that these attacks have determinant impact on aware of Kurdish 
problem at the international level (Bayik, 2007). 
Early Counterinsurgency Policies: The Coercive Period (1985-2000) 
According to Duran Kalkan (2006) at the beginning, government had 
considered it as a military problem and expected to suppress the PKK within a 
couple days, therefore preferred to respond to these attacks with a three-day 
military operation in 1984 and then with a comprehensive military operation in 
1985. Furthermore, it was after the 1987 third congress of the PKK that the 
Turkish government realized that it would take longer than expected to defeat 
PKK terrorism. Then the government implemented a comprehensive 
counterterrorism campaign which is derived from the British counterinsurgency 
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experience in its colonial countries during the 1950s and 1960s, especially in 
Malaya and Kenya: 1) single leadership; 2) turned insurgents; 3) resettlement; 4) 
village guards; and 5) winning hearts and mind policies (Hoffman & Taw, 1991).  
These counterinsurgency policies lasted until the early 2000s.  
Turkey gave little attention to the winning hearts and minds policies, which 
refer to social, economic, health, education and other policies to acquire popular 
support from the population trough promoting living conditions of the population 
that the PKK relies on. And unfortunately some counter terrorism policies, in 
particular a resettlement policy backfired and alienated a considerable proportion 
of the Kurdish population from the government and contributed the cause of the 
PKK. These poor counterproductive policies could be the main underlying 
reasons behind the relative increase in popular votes for the PKK’s political party 
in the elections between 1995 and 2002. In his reply to a legislative inquiry 
submitted by parliamentary member M. Riza Yalcinkaya, on July 14, 2008 
Ministery of Interior Besir Atalay reported that resettlement policy was 
implemented in 14 provinces. As a consequence of the resettlement policy, 
386,360 individuals left from a total of 62,448 households due to PKK terrorism. 
However, it seems that these are numbers are much more than the government’s 
claims. According to a recent survey published by Hacettepe University Institute 
of Population Studies (2006) found that the number of individuals, who 
immigrated from those 14 provinces, is estimated at between 953,680 and 
1,201,000. The number is at best three times higher than the official numbers 
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stated by the Government. The study also provides the estimated numbers of 
immigrants according to years. The study reports that 300,000-380,000 (31.6%) 
during 1986-1990, 585,000-735,000 (61.3%) during 1991-1995, 47,000-60,000 
(5%) during 1996-2000, and 20,000-25,000 (2.1%) individuals voluntarily or 
involuntarily left their homes due to security reasons during 2001-2005 years. 
Figure 1 indicates these numbers and percentages during those periods. As 
seen, 93% of individuals left their homes between 1986 and 1995.  
 
Figure 1: Number and percentages of individuals who left their homes 
Individuals Left Their Homes Due to PKK Terrorism / 
Resettlement Program
2001--2005, 2.1%
20.000-25.000 1996--2000, 5%
47.000-60.000 
1986--1990, 31.6%
300.000-380,000 
1991--1995, 61.3%
585.000-735.000 
1986--1990
1991--1995
1996--2000
2001--2005
 
 
Winning hearts and minds policies: Cohesive period (2000-present) 
 
The leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured by Turkish Security 
Forces in Kenya in 1999 and the PKK declared a cease fire which lasted till 
2004. During this period, a new government led by the Justice and Development 
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Party (here after the AKP), came to the power in Parliamentary elections of 2002. 
New government opened a new era in counter terrorism. The government did not 
favor early coercive counter terrorism and implemented a series of cohesive 
counter terrorism policies. When the government stopped implementing them 
and has implemented new policies in 2000s, the popular support shifted from the 
PKK to the government. Although these new policies are not direct counter 
terrorism policies in their nature, they helped to generate a considerable amount 
of popular support for the government and eroded a considerable proportion of 
the popular support for the PKK. These types of policies are referred as “winning 
hearts and minds policies” in the literature. The most distinguished feature of the 
new government’s policies is that they targeted the population rather than 
terrorists themselves, and sought non military solutions such as health, social 
welfare, education and others while securing the local population from the 
terrorism.  
With regards to new counterterrorism policies, the first effort of the new 
government was to repeal the state of emergency and regional governorship 
policy, which was being implemented in two provinces. This action removed the 
strict rules being implemented in those cities and pressuring on the population 
living within eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey, which the PKK 
considers them as parts of “Greater Kurdistan.” The government also repealed 
the resettlement policy. After 2002, not a single a village has been evacuated 
due to security reasons. In 2002, and 2008, the government took further steps to 
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promote cultural diversity and made several legal adjustments and removed the 
barriers in front of broadcasting in other languages (Dundar, 2006). Furthermore, 
in December of 2004, legislatures passed a law which permits the teaching of 
local languages; after January 19th of 2004, many courses started to teach 
Kurdish language, however, most of them were closed in a short time due to lack 
of demand. 
The new government’s comprehensive counter terrorism policies have been 
identified and described in the “Counter terrorism Action Plan” and approved by 
Counter Terrorism High Council (Terorle Mucadele Yuksek Kurulu) on December 
29th of 2005. The consequences of the plan have been evaluated after two-year 
implementation period in December, 2007. Although the document is classified 
and the entire document is not published, some parts of the report have been 
leaked out. The plan is consisted of 61 clauses to be implemented in 23 cities 
located in the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey. According to the plan, 
the government adopted a long term, unarmed counter terrorism policy alongside 
the armed one; however, the armed counter measures are subordinate to long 
term and unarmed policies. The action plan identifies the counter measures in 
education, health, sports, employment, immigration, religion, and other fields. 
The results of the action plan are pleasing and give hope for the future. Şen 
(2007) reported the consequences of the plan as follows: To promote the living 
conditions of the Kurdish populated regions, the government has spent one 
billion dollars for KOY-DES project (Support Villages-Project) to establish a 
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drinking water system in 8,000 villages, and built 8,500 kilometers of stabilized 
roads, and asphalted 13,500 village roads in the regions.  
In the education field, only in 2007, 24,500 of new teachers have been 
assigned to and 292 schools built in the designated provinces. Furthermore, 
quota of successful students without any costs in private teaching institutions 
offering university preparation courses was increased from 2% to 3%. As a 
consequence 5,500 students attended these courses with no cost.  
In the health field, the number of doctors and other health professionals were 
redoubled compared to 2002-2007 period. Only in 2007, more than 1,200 
medical doctors and 8,100 health professionals have been assigned to those 
provinces. Recep Akdag, the ministry of health, reported that only in Sirnak, 
which is a poor city located at the border both with Iraq and Syria, the number of 
specialist doctors increased by three times compared to 2002.  
Regarding economic measures, the Government has implemented a law to 
encourage economic investments such as tax reduction, appropriation of land 
with no cost, exemption from worker’s insurance premiums and others. Only in 
2007, approximately 3 billion US$ (3 Billion 217 million 105 thousand 696 YTL) 
and 11,103 new employment were projected in those regions trough this law. 
Within the last four months of 2007, 950 cattle and 2,600 small cattle have been 
donated to individuals in need. The government also has implemented a program 
to compensate those individuals who have suffered from terrorist acts or 
activities undertaken during the fight against terror through passing the Law No. 
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5233 on the “Compensation of Damages that Occurred due to Terror and the 
Fight against Terrorism” in July 2004 (Brookings, 2009). According to ministry of 
interior records, between 2004 and July 30th of 2008, 341,429 individuals applied 
to the government to benefit from the law. Commissions have revived the 
applications and decided to pay 89,695 of the applicants (EkoNews, 
2008).Furthermore, a total of 280 million US$ (390 million YTL) was paid as of 
2007 and was decided to pay extra 270 million US$ (374 million YTL).  
In addition to these winning hearts and mind efforts, the government made 
some adjustments in the criminal justice and diplomacy field. For instance, the 
government abolished the state security courts, which trials suspected terrorists 
under more restrict criminal procedures. The government also increased the 
cooperation between the EU and U.S. The U.S is supporting Turkish security 
forces through providing timely intelligence against the PKK targets. This study 
argues that it was these cohesive, good counterinsurgency/counterterrorism 
policies since 2000s that eroded the popular support for the PKK and generated 
the popular support for the government. On the other hand, early 
counterinsurgency/counterterrorism policies between 1985 and 2000 have 
eroded the support for the government and alienated the Kurdistan population 
from the government. The electoral data reflects the impact of these poor policies 
on Kurdish population. During early counterinsurgency policies, which 
corresponds the elections of 1991 to 2002, the votes for political party of the PKK 
were on the rise whereas it has declined in the general elections of 2007 after the 
22 
 
 
 
new government redesigned its policies. In conclusion, the new 
counterinsurgency/counterterrorism approached shifted popular support from the 
PKK to the government. 
Electoral Politics and the PKK 
The PKK acknowledges the importance of popular support since the 
beginning, in 1970s, but in early 1990s, did become aware of potential of a legal 
political party in generating popular support and control over the population. 
Therefore it began to engage in electoral politics as soon as it formed its political 
cadre and obtained sufficient popular support. It formed his first legal party 
named HEP (People’s Labor Party) on June the 7th of 1990. The main purpose of 
the PKK in engaging electoral politics is to acquire popular support for its cause, 
to gain legitimacy and to control over the population. However, this was neither 
the ultimate goal of the PKK nor super ordinate to the PKK. Instead, it is only a 
tool to help reach its goals. As declared in the foundation manifesto of the PKK, 
the ultimate goal was to create ‘Greater Kurdistan” and this could be achieved 
through only armed struggle. 
Due to the fact that the government has intentionally rearranged the date 
of general elections to be held a week earlier than the actual date the HEP was 
caught unready for the elections, therefore made a coalition with the SHP (Social 
Democratic Populist Party). The HEP candidates ran for elections under the SHP 
within the Eastern and Southeastern regions of Turkey, which dominantly 
Kurdish populated provinces and considered as the “Kurdistan” by the PKK. 
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However, the PKK’s candidates won the elections and 22 HEP candidates 
became parliamentary members in the parliamentary elections of 1991.HEP’s 
candidates almost obtained 50% of vote proportion of each province that they ran 
for the election.  This was a political victory for the PKK as well as the SHP. The 
SHP became the third party in general elections and came to the power through 
a coalition government with the DYP (True Path Party). In other words, with the 
help of SHP, the PKK became an invisible partner of the government. However, 
the Supreme Court of Appeals opened a banning case against the HEP party 
claiming having links to the PKK. Then another party was founded named DEP 
(Democracy Party) in 1993 and all parliamentary members of the HEP joined into 
the DEP.  However, this electoral victory was ended by the Constitutional Court’s 
decision those parliamentary members were convicted and incarcerated due to 
the party’s affiliation with the PKK. 
Upon the Constitutional Court banning decision, again another new party, 
the HADEP (People’s Democracy Party) was founded in 1994 and ran in the 
general elections of 1995 and 1999 and local elections of 1999. As seen in the 
Figure 2, at the national level, HADEP obtained 4.2% in 1995 and 4.7% of all 
votes (Turkish Statistical Institute, General Election of Representatives). Not 
surprisingly, the Supreme Court of Appeals opened a case against the HADEP 
on January 29th of 1999 then the Constitutional Court decided to shut down The 
HADEP Party in March 2003 (Bal, 2003). The PKK again formed a new political 
party which was named as the DEHAP (Democratic People’s Party). The DEHAP 
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party ran for the parliamentary elections of 2002 in which he increased its vote 
rates from 4.7% to even 6.2% across the country (see Figure 2). This was the 
highest vote rate that the PKK’s political party has ever had; however due to a 
10% proportional barrier in front of political parties in general elections, unlike the 
general elections of 1991, which its coalition party the SHP got 20.8% and 
passed the barrier, none of the his candidates became parliament members and 
took seat in the General Assembly of Turkey (TBMM). However in the 2007 
general elections, the PKK has lost some proportion of electoral support both in 
the dominantly Kurdish and non-Kurdish populated regions (see figure 1). 
 
Figure 2: Vote rates for the Political Party of the PKK at corresponding election. 
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In April 2003, the Supreme Court of Appeals prepared another report and 
submitted it to the Constitutional Court to shut down the DEHAP. However this 
time, the DEHAP dissolved itself before the Court’s decision and immediately 
transferred all of its resources to the DTP (Democratic Society Party), which was 
established in October 2005 on an order from Abdullah Ocalan (Gundem, 2008). 
It was argued that the actual reason of the new party was not the fear of banning 
by the Constitutional Court, but it was because of the fact that DEHAP did not 
compete enough with the AKP, the ruling party, and did not receive sufficient 
votes from the Kurdish population in municipality elections in 2004 (Gundem, 
2008). In the parliamentary election of 2007 only 3.4% of the electorate voted for 
the DTP, which indicates a clear defeat of the PKK in terms of popular support; it 
was 6.2% in the previous general elections in 2002.  Both the municipality 
elections of 2004 and parliamentary elections of 2007 signaled that the PKK has 
lost a considerable proportion of his popular support. However expectations in 
elections were higher than the achieved results.In an interview with his lawyers in 
May 2007, two months before the 2007 parliamentary elections, the leader of the 
PKK, Abdullah Ocalan stated that their votes for the DTP were 6% across Turkey 
in the 2002 parliamentary elections therefore expecting at least 6.5% of popular 
votes in 2007 elections. Due to the fact that the popular votes for its political 
party, DTP has declined from 6.2% to 3.4% across the country and 22.86% to 
16.17% in the Kurdish populated regions in the general elections of 2007. 
Election results of this election were shocking; it was the first time that the vote 
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share of the PKK’s political party has moved backward in a general election. 
Electoral preferences of the Kurdish population definitely disappointed the PKK. 
This dissatisfaction was declared soon by top leaders of the PKK. After the 
general elections of 2007, both the Kurdish population and incumbent 
government (the AKP) were blamed for the election results. For instance 
Abdullah Ocalan, the founder and current leader of the PKK, stated that “the 
incumbent government bought votes of the Kurdish electorate” (ANF news 
agency, August 11th of 2007). Likewise, A. Haydar Kaytan, another top leader 
and one of the founders of the PKK, called newly elected Kurdish parliamentary 
members of the ruling party (AKP) as “betrayers”; furthermore stated that “for 
those who voted for the incumbent party, it means that leaving their rights to live 
and dishonoring themselves” (ozgur gundem newspaper, August 6th of 2007). 
 Thus this study argues that both the election outcomes of general elections 
of 2007 and intimidating statements to the public by PKK leaders indicates that a 
significant gap must have occurred between PKK’s expectations and achieved 
results of the elections. Since a gap occurred between the previous and current 
parliamentary election results this decline may cause a relative deprivation and 
thereby lead to an increase in the level of the PKK violence in the post-election 
period. However from the resource mobilization theory (RMT) perspective, the 
election outcomes indicate support of the Kurdish population for the government 
rather than the insurgent PKK. According to the RMT approach success of the 
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insurgent depends upon ability to mobilize resources of the population to sustain 
a social conflict (Zald & Berger, 1978). Since popular support is essential for 
insurgent groups in terms of logistics, nature of the insurgency and legitimacy, 
from the RMT perspective it would mean a decline in resources of the insurgent 
thereby lead to decline in terrorist attacks across the country but to more surgical 
use of violence in certain provinces. Thus this study considers both situations 
and examines the PKK terrorism over the time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
 
CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
 
The main focus of the literature review addressed popular support, use of 
political violence for obtaining popular support, and debates concerning the 
resource mobilization theory (RMT) and relative deprivation theory (RDT) as well 
as political violence related to elections. The researcher reviewed three main 
sources of literature consisting of insurgency, social movement and political 
science for the following reasons: first, the PKK of Turkey is viewed as an ethnic 
insurgency using terrorist tactics, second, insurgencies are categorized in the 
literature as revolutionary social movements (Locher, 2002); and finally there are 
valuable literature on elections in the political science field. 
The literature review consists of four sections. In the first section, literature 
that addresses the importance of popular support in an insurgency situation is 
discussed. In the second section, use of political violence to acquire popular 
support from the population is surveyed. The third section establishes the study’s 
theoretical framework by analyzing RDT and RMT, two leading theories related 
to the social movement literature. The final section investigates why insurgent 
organizations engage in electoral politics and examines the literature regarding 
elections and political violence as well. 
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The main purpose of the literature review is to examine the importance of 
popular support for the insurgent organizations, and what they do to acquire 
popular support and how they react to a relative decline in their popular support. 
The existing literature argue that due to especially needs for logistics, intelligence 
and other organizational resources, popular support is vital important for the 
insurgent organizations, without sufficient popular support from the local 
population, the insurgent would not achieve its main goals , therefore if they do 
not have sufficient support from the population, they often resort violence to 
acquire it 
Popular Support 
Importance of popular support of the insurgency has been pointed out by 
both scholars (Galula, 2006; Taber, 2002) and practitioners (Guevara, 1962; Mao 
Zedong, 2000). Popular support is vitally important for three main reasons: (a) 
Logistical concerns (Jordan, 1962; U.S. Army, 2006). (b) Nature of the 
insurgency (Jordan, 1962), and (c) Legitimacy (Jordan, 1962; U.S. Army, 2006).  
Logistical concerns 
In order to reach political goals, the insurgent must have logistical support 
that is typically provided by the population, namely, safe heavens, freedom of 
movement, financial support, logistics, information, recruits, supplies, food, and 
funds (Jordan, 1962; U.S. Army, 2006). For example, intelligence regarding the 
movement of counterinsurgent forces is a necessary element for successful 
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guerrilla operations given that the element of surprise and raids against the 
counterinsurgent are achieved through a sympathetic population (Jordan, 1962). 
However, when the local population withdraws its support from the insurgent, this 
new situation is most likely to result in not only lack of logistics for the insurgent, 
but also providing aid in government’s counterinsurgency/counterterrorism 
efforts, thus it would increase the efficiency of the government and diminish of 
the insurgent’s control over the population (Mesquita, 2005). Furthermore, it may 
lead to abandon the struggle and end the insurgent violence (Weinberg, 
1991).For instance, when the Maoist insurgents, the Communist Party of Nepal-
Maoist (CPN-M) launched a bloody campaign against the Nepal government to 
achieve communist revolution, due to lack of popular support, especially from 
urban middle-class— which the insurgent identified them as the main source to 
tap their resources in to insurgent organization— it ended its violent strategy and 
joined the mainstream political parties upon an agreement between the insurgent 
and government on November 21st of 2006 (Gobyn, 2009). In other words, if the 
insurgent lacks logistical support, successful guerrilla warfare against the 
government cannot be carried out effectively. 
Nature of the insurgency 
Since the guerrilla fighter is a civilian who has taken up arms and alienates 
himself from the people, the insurgent must have popular support (Jordan, 1962). 
Without the consent and active aide of supporters, the guerrilla would be merely 
a bandit who could not survive; therefore, if the government could claim this 
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same popular support, the guerrilla would not exist, because there would be no 
war, and thus no insurgency (Taber, 2002). In other words, if there is an 
insurgency, there must be some degree of popular support for the insurgent 
Legitimacy 
Popular support can provide the insurgent movement a feeling of legitimacy 
(Gerrits, 1992, as cited in Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin, & Mierau, 2008), and such 
legitimacy for the insurgent can be generated by political goals (Hayes & 
McAllister, 2005; 2001). For instance, when the IRA’s political party Sinn Fein 
won the British Parliamentary elections of 1918 on a separatist forum in Ireland it 
represented the popular mandate that justified the Irish War of independence 
(1919- 1921), establishment of an independent of Republic  and other IRA’s 
campaign against the British rule (Neumann, 2005). 
As a consequence, an insurgency that has broad and popular support with 
legitimate political goals can attract international public attention to the issue and 
thus obtain support from abroad, especially from the Diaspora living overseas. 
For instance, The PKK has received reliable support from the Kurdish 
communities in Western Europe, especially from German and a lesser degree 
from Sweden (Cornell, 2001). In addition to the Kurdish Diaspora, the PKK was 
also supported or tolerated by several foreign countries due to various reasons. 
During the 1980s, the Soviet Union supported the PKK due to its Marxist-Leninist 
ideology; the Syria supported it and provided safe havens due to border dispute 
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over the Hatay province of Turkey; and Greece, Iran and Greek Cyprus are 
among other countries that supported or tolerated the PKK (Cornell, 2001). 
In his book, Beating the Goliath, Records (2007) viewed external support as 
one of the determinant factors in defeating powerful, strong governments. For 
example, the Kosovar Albanian insurgency led by the UCK guerrillas in 
Yugoslavia during the 1990s was able to attract great popular support from both 
Albanian natives as well as the international community because the insurgents 
were clever enough to convince their internal and international audience that 
their goals were legitimate. As a consequence, with help from the international 
community and broad popular support, within a few years the UCK won the 
insurgency warfare in the political field, even though not on the battlefield.  
Muller (1970, 1972) pointed out the perception of ‘legitimacy’ in government 
and examined how it relates to political violence.  Muller views it as one of the 
main and dominant factor in explaining political violence. In his study titled “A 
Test of Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence”, Muller (1972) measured 
legitimacy with trust political authorities and found an inverse correlation with 
political violence. Furthermore, he suggests that belief in the illegitimacy of the 
regime and belief in the utility of violence by the “dissidents” (insurgent) in the 
past have a substantial impact on individual’s readiness for mobilization to 
engage political violence against the government. In his earlier study, Muller 
(1970) examined the support linkage between citizens (represented) and political 
authorities. His findings suggested that although the performance of political 
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authorities certainly has influence on support, the much of this effect depends on 
legitimacy sentiment. In other words, if people think the ruling government is 
illegitimate, no matter how good the political authorities work, they will not 
support the government and its political authorities. By the same token, if the 
insurgent’s political party, which won the national and/or municipal elections, is 
perceived as legitimate, then its performance would not be important in terms of 
popular support. If this is the case, the population would vote for the political 
party associated with the insurgent unless it changes its opinion about the 
legitimacy. 
Types of Popular Support 
The importance of popular support is not only a scholarly discussion but 
also an operational and political goal for the insurgent. For example, Che 
Guevara (1962), an insurgent leader, viewed popular support as an 
indispensable condition of guerrilla warfare, and Mao Zedong (2000), another 
insurgent leader, famously noted that due to the fact that guerrilla warfare derives 
basically from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor 
flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation. Similarly, 
Galula (2006), a counterinsurgency practitioner and analyst, viewed support of 
the population as the “first law” of the counterinsurgency warfare, and Ney (1962) 
also concurred that the insurgent cannot survive or function without popular 
support. Although both scholars and practitioners of insurgencies have pointed 
out the importance of popular support, few have explicitly mentioned the type that 
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is vitally important for the insurgent or the key determining factor in insurgency 
warfare. 
Current literature divides popular support into “active” and “passive.” Active 
support includes people or groups who join the insurgency and provide critical 
assets to the insurgent including, for example, logistics, intelligence, 
transportation, and safe havens, and carry out actions on the behalf of the 
insurgent (U.S. Army, 2006).  
Passive support refers to tolerance or acquiescence and includes those 
individuals who quietly sympathize with the insurgent but are unwilling to provide 
material assistance; however, they do allow insurgents to operate, but do not 
provide information to counterinsurgents (O'Neill, 1990). Passive support often 
has a great effect on the insurgency’s long-term effectiveness (U.S. Army, 2006). 
As Taber (2002) pointed out, without the sympathy, cooperation, and support of 
the people, the insurgent would be merely a bandit and inevitably fail. Lawrence 
(1929) underlined passive support and argued that the insurgent must have a 
friendly population−not actively friendly−yet sympathetic to the point of not 
betraying rebel movements to the enemy. Galula (2006) divided the population 
into three groups: an active minority against the insurgent; a neutral majority, and 
the active minority supporting the insurgent. Resource mobilization theory (RMT) 
better describes the groups in a population. For example, in their resource 
mobilization theory, McCarthy and Zald (1977) added one more group and 
divided the population into four major groups and subgroups: (a) constituents 
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(active supporters), (b) adherents (passive supporters), (c) public bystander 
(neutral majority), and (d) opponents.  The RMT approach also distinguishes 
these active (constituents) and passive supporter (adherents) groups by whether 
or not they will directly benefit from the insurgent’s accomplishments. The term 
“beneficiary” refers to those who would benefit directly from the insurgent’s 
accomplishment of goals, whereas “conscience” refers to those who are direct 
supporters of the insurgent but do not stand to benefit directly from its success in 
accomplishing goals (McCarthy & Zald, 1977).  
Dividing popular support and the population into groups could have 
important practical implications in an insurgency. In order to defeat the opposing 
party, each side (government and insurgent) must carefully analyze these 
portions among the population and develop an effective strategy to win these 
groups over to their own sides. However, there is no consensus relating to this 
matter in the literature; rather, there are different suggestions pertaining to the 
groups that should be addressed. For example, according to Galula (2006) the 
insurgent focuses on the “neutral majority” and aims to mobilize it against the 
government with assistance from the supportive minor population. However, 
Sluka (1989) stressed the “opponent” group by arguing that the insurgent can 
survive even without active support from its population but cannot survive in a 
hostile population against support. Both Galula (2005) and Sluka (1989) 
suggested that the government should focus on the insurgent’s “opponents” and 
mobilize them against the insurgent. 
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From the insurgent’s side, RMT theorists McCarthy and Zald (1977) 
suggested that the insurgent focuses on passive supporters (adherents) as well 
as active supporters (constituents) rather than the public bystander (neutral 
majority). The reason derives from RMT’s concerns regarding the mobilization of 
potential resources into the insurgent organization. Since the main concern of the 
RMT is how to acquire support from the people and mobilize their resources into 
the organization, depending exclusively on mass beneficiary active supporters 
(constituents) would reduce the potential size of the resource pool that could be 
used for goal achievement (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Similarly, depending upon 
beneficiary passive supporters (beneficiary adherents) would severely restrict the 
amount of resources the organization could raise (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). 
Therefore, the RMT approach suggests focusing especially on non-beneficiary 
passive supporters and both active and passive supporters who are “isolated” 
from the insurgent. The term “isolated” refers to individuals who do not meet face 
to face with the insurgent and are not bound to the insurgent through solidary 
selective incentives (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). In order to do so, McCarthy and 
Zald (1977) suggested that effective media campaigns would be the best means 
to obtain resources from isolated constituents, and attractive “political goals” 
would work best for the isolated passive supporters (adherents).  
Similar to RMT theorists, Funes (1998) divides their audience into four 
major sectors and describe the theoretical framework. First is “operative base” of 
ETA (active supporters). They effectively support the violence. Second is “area of 
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influence” of ETA (passive supporters).They may not directly support violence, 
but they tolerate it and offer a kind of emotional support that may be transformed 
into active support at any moment. Third are “indifferents” (neutral population). 
They do not support ETA violence; they do not share their goals. Finally, “passive 
opponents” of the ETA. They reject ETA violence under any conditions and do 
not agree with the ETA. However, due to fear, they keep their opinions to 
themselves. According to Funes (1998), although these citizen groups target all 
of those sectors of the society, their first priority, is the ‘passive opponents” 
against the insurgent. Second, is “neutral population”. Third is ‘passive 
supporters” of the insurgent. Because it is very difficult to influence the active 
supporters; citizen groups strive to influence the people who are close to the 
violent group. In contrast to the traditional insurgency theorists, such as Galula 
(2006), Trinquer (2006)— who suggests mobilization of the mass against the 
insurgent—, Gesto por Paz and Elkarri of Spain is a good model of civilian-led 
mobilization against the insurgent. 
Although most scholars points out the importance of eroding popular 
support for the insurgent, they do not clearly describes how to practice it. In her 
study titled Social Responses to Political Violence in the Basque Country:Peace 
Movements and Their Audience, Funes (1998) describes how citizen groups, 
Gesto por Paz (“gesture toward peace”) and Elkarri (“among all of us”), that have 
been formed in mid1980s against the ETA violence in Spain was able to create a 
social pressure against ETA’s active and passive supporters, thus eroded 
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popular support for the insurgent. These two groups have more than a hundred 
subgroups that are consisted of thousands of supporters spread throughout the 
Basque country and autonomous community of Navarra. The main of these 
citizen groups is to end the violent conflict. Their members organize meetings; 
bring together people with different viewpoints to convince one part of society, 
which supports ETA violence, to give up violence and the government to help 
end the violence. If any person becomes a victim of terrorism due to ethnic 
conflict, regardless of whether a policeman, civilian, or terrorist, the following day, 
these citizen groups organize periods of silence for 15 minutes. Each local group 
chooses one specific venue, a very central place where these silent periods are 
observed. Supporters of these citizens groups know where and when, they need 
not be summoned to attend. Or if someone is kidnapped by the ETA, they come 
together at the same time, on the same day, every week until the terrorist 
organization release the victim.  
With regards to theoretical framework, according to Funes (1998, p.507) 
these citizen groups adopted the McAdam (1983) process of cognitive liberation 
process. The first step is loss of legitimacy. In this step, use of violence as a 
means to reach political goals is delegitimized and a people are aimed to be 
isolated from the violence. When this isolation succeeded, it increases the costs 
of remaining a member of ETA supporter. The second is “the abandonment of 
fatalism”. This step helps to culminate it and gives a new sense of efficacy. In the 
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final step, a new consensus is formed based on enhanced feeling of group 
political efficacy. 
Political Violence for Popular Support 
Although the literature points out the importance of popular support for both 
sides, it neither explicitly explains the possible actions that the insurgent would 
take when it senses losing a considerable amount of popular support nor the 
relationship between political violence and popular support. Furthermore, there is 
no consensus regarding whether violence against civilians increases or erodes 
popular support for the insurgent. In this dissertation, we argue that the need to 
secure survival forces the insurgent to use political violence even against its own 
native population.  
Rationale of Political Violence against Civilians 
Under what conditions do insurgent groups either gain or lose popular 
support is a complex issue that remains inadequate. The question of when 
political violence generates or erodes popular support for the insurgent is 
typically explained by two similar categorizations: (a) combatants and 
noncombatants (civilians) and (b) “selective or discriminate terrorism” and 
“indiscriminate or blind terrorism.” Indiscriminate force refers to the application of 
force against a target without limiting the force, whereas discriminate force refers 
to the limited use of force (Martin, 2009). Martin developed a political matrix 
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depicting the relationship between the “quality of force” used by terrorists and 
“characteristics of the victim” of the attack (see Figure 3).   
 
Figure 3: Political violence matrix 
 
 
Martin (2009) suggested that when force is used against combatants, it 
characterizes a warfare environment. However, when force is used against 
noncombatants or passive combatants, it occurs in a terrorist environment. 
Although Martin’s model indicates the type of conflict involving the terrorist and 
the victim, it can also be used to understand when a terrorist attack can either 
generate popular support or backfire. As shown in Figure 3, the insurgent has the 
best chance of obtaining support from its own population if it discriminately 
attacks only combatants.  
Although terrorist attacks can appear random, some scholars argue that 
they are usually highly selective in target selection and serve a distinct goal 
(Boyle, 2009). Because the insurgent is rational in its terrorist attacks, most 
terrorist violence is not indiscriminate or irrational; instead, it plays a quite 
strategic role in insurgent’s overall direction, and can be surprisingly effective in 
achieving its political aims (Kydd &Walter, 2002; 2006; Enders&Sandler, 1993; 
Barros, Passos&Gil-Alana, 2006; Lake, (2002). Thus, if the insurgent is rational, 
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then it should follow a specific pattern (Barros, Passos, & Gil-Alana, 2006; 
Hewitt, 2000).  
Despite these categorizations, whether indiscriminate violence against the 
population can generate popular support remains a controversial issue. Some 
researchers argue that indiscriminate violence erodes popular support for the 
insurgent (Douglass & Zulaika, 1990; Guevara, 1962; Abrahams, 2006), whereas 
others claim that the insurgent still obtains passive support due to discouraging 
the population to cooperate with the government through intimidation (Jordan, 
1962; Kalyvas, 1999; Trinquier, 2006). Taking the former approach, Guevara 
(1962), an insurgent theorist and practitioner, was opposed to attacking civilians 
and stated that “terrorism is a negative weapon and in no way produces the 
desired effects. It can turn people against a revolutionary movement, and brings 
with it a loss of lives among those taking part which is much greater than the 
return” (p. 35).  
Thornton (1980) distinguished selective terrorism from indiscriminate 
terrorism by arguing that if the insurgent carefully selects its targets and 
discriminately commits terrorism against only those selected targets, the 
population does not feel anxiety; however, totally indiscriminate attacks are not 
desirable for the insurgent. Stated differently, these attacks are not desirable 
because the insurgent has a political goal, and attacks must be directed toward 
fulfilling that goal. Abrahams (2006) approaches target selection from terrorist 
success perspective—which is defined as success as achiving the groups’s 
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declared political goals—rather than from a popular support perspective. He 
focuses on foreign terrorist organizations only and their terrorists attakcs on 
target government’s civilian population only. He concludes that the key variable 
for terrorist success in achieving political goals is the ‘target selection’; groups 
who attacks mostly civilians rather than combotants systemactically fails to 
achive their political objectives (p.52), because the government’s population 
interpret the consequences of a terrorist attacks targeting civilians as an attack to 
destroy the society, its core values or both rather than the group’s limited political 
objectives such as control over a piece fo territory or national self-determination. 
His analysis is based on the social pyschologist Edward Jones (1976 )’s study 
which found that observers tend to interpret an actor’s objective in terms of the 
consequence of the action. 
Similar to Thornton (1980), Douglass and Zulaika (1990) acknowledged the 
difference between selective and indiscriminate violence as exemplified by two 
ETA bombings in 1987 at a shopping center in Barcelona and military barracks in 
Zaragoza that indiscriminately killed many bystanders. These attacks prompted 
enormous public demonstrations that involved hundreds of thousands of 
participants against the violence. As a consequence, the ETA then stated that it 
had not intended to produce civilian casualties in the Barcelona case and 
claimed that the authorities had worsened the situation by giving advanced 
warning (Douglass & Zulaika, 1990). Likewise, Funes (1998), Bueno (2005), and 
Mesquita (2005) argue that despite the advent of political freedom and 
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constitutional guarantees, during transition from dictatorship to democracy and in 
its first years of democratic stability, the ETA increased its violence and carried 
out bloodier and indiscriminate terrorism against civilians. The ETA also 
attempted but failed to kill Prime Ministerial candidate Jose Aznar in April 1995, 
and King Juan Carlos in August 1996 (Barros, 2003).As a consequence of its 
sustained bloodier, indiscriminate terrorism campaign, its idealist image as 
freedom fighters fighting against the dictator began to erode and the ETA began 
to lose the popular support it had been enjoying (Funes, 1998; Barros, 2003), 
and as a negative consequence of these attacks, Aznar’s Popular Party, which 
adapts a hard-liner approach, was elected in the elections of May 1996 (Barros, 
Passos, & Gil-Alana, 2006).  
Similarly, when a landmine targeting the military exploded near a passenger 
bus and killed six children and 32 other civilians, and wounded 72 others on June 
6th of 2006 (the U.S Counterterrorism Center, 2006 report), the leader of the 
insurgent group issued an order to the military wing, the PLA, to stop all ‘physical 
actions’ against unarmed people (Gobyn, 2009).   
Thompson (1966) likewise argued that after a certain point, indiscriminate 
terrorism will shift the support in favor of the government. For instance, when the 
Chechen insurgents bombed three apartments that killed 229 Russian civilians in 
1999, it eroded a considerable amount of popular support from Russian 
population for the Chechen insurgency. Russian sympathizers who used to favor 
Chechen’s war for the independence shifted their view and became opponents. 
44 
 
 
 
According to Abrahams (2006), from the onset of military operations until the 
ceasefire in August 1996, some 70% of Russian opposed the war between the 
military and the Chechen insurgents; according the Public Opinion Foundation, 
71% of Russians were willing to trade the land for peace. However, the following 
terrorist acts, these numbers were reversed; 73% of Russians supported Russian 
Army to advance into Chechnya whereas only 19% of Russians wanted peaceful 
negations with the insurgents.  
Researchers of the latter approach adopt more rational and convincing 
arguments. For example, since popular support is vitally important for insurgents, 
by terrorizing the population, the insurgent will still be able to obtain passive 
support because of their ability to discourage supporters from cooperating with 
the government (Jordan, 1962; Kalyvas, 1999; Trinquier, 2006).  
Although these categorizations are certainly useful, they are still insufficient 
in capturing the dynamics of political violence against civilians. In order to clarify 
this vague explanation of violence against the population, this dissertation offers 
an additional dimension in categorizing the population. The researcher divides 
the population into two categories and then integrates a new concept into 
“selective” and “discriminate” terrorism. Thus, this study suggests that violence 
against civilians should be analyzed under two categories: (a) the insurgent’s 
native (own or local) population and (b) the government’s population. Without 
distinguishing between them, one cannot reach an accurate conclusion regarding 
the relationship between political violence against the population and popular 
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support, because violence against each group has different dynamics and 
pursues different goals. Few researchers (Boyle, 2009; Goodwin, 2006; Hewitt, 
1990; Ney, 1962) have analyzed the distinction between the government’s 
population and the insurgent’s native population.  
Violence against insurgent’s own population 
 As a main principle, Mao Zedong (2000) disapproved of violence against 
the insurgent’s own population by stating that “… in a war of counterrevolutionary 
nature, there is no place for guerrilla hostilities. Because guerrilla warfare 
basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist 
nor flourish if it separates itself from the population” (p. 44). However, the 
literature indicates that on many occasions, the insurgent breaks Mao’s rule and 
uses political violence against its own population.  
In contrast to Mao Zedong (2000), O’Neill (1990) suggested that in order to 
gain popular support, insurgent organizations will use coercion against their own 
people when other non-coercive methods do not work. Likewise, Ney (1962) 
suggested that terror is the insurgent’s most potent weapon used to extort the 
support of its “own” people. Alonso (2007) further argued that the insurgent often 
attempts to acquire such support through fear, because this method stresses that 
any opposition to its objectives will come at a price, and Sarma (2007) 
considered the use of terrorism as a tool to ensure that necessary conditions will 
prevail in which such support can thrive. Trinquier (2006) argued that 
unconditional support of the population is a necessary factor of victory in guerrilla 
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warfare; if it does not exist, it must be secured by every possible means, of which 
the most effective is terrorism. Similarly, Jordan (1962) suggested that when 
popular support is not always given voluntarily, it is acquired through terrorizing 
the population. Similarly, Ney (1962) argued that when voluntary support cannot 
be sustained at the desired level, the insurgent will almost inevitably resort to 
terrorism in an effort to compel this support, and when used against an 
insurgent’s own people, political violence establishes the needed popular 
support.  
Although the use of political violence against an insurgent’s own population 
for the purpose of obtaining popular support has been pointed out, little 
information is provided regarding the logic, dynamics, or how it works or 
generates popular support. This constitutes one of the weaknesses of the 
insurgency literature that should be strengthened. We argue that if the insurgent 
lacks the desired level of popular support, it will apply political violence against its 
own people to ensure that secure survival of the insurgency as well as the 
organization is secured.  As mentioned previously, it is believed that success in 
counterinsurgency goes to the party that achieves greater popular support (U.S. 
Army Stability Operations and Support Operations Manual of 2003), and as the 
insurgent group gains support, its capabilities grow (U.S. Counterinsurgency 
Manual of 2006). On the other hand, when the population strongly supports and 
believes in its government, then chances for the insurgent are remote (Jordan, 
1962). Therefore, popular support is the key factor in counterinsurgency warfare. 
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Due to this determining feature, popular support is viewed as a zero-sum 
commodity given that a gain for the insurgency is a loss for the government, and 
a loss for the government is a gain for the insurgency. This is the reason why the 
insurgent resorts to political violence when it does not have sufficient popular 
support.  
As RMT theorists McCarthy and Zald (1977) pointed out, once insurgent 
organizations are formed, organizational survival becomes their primary goal. 
Consequently, they pursue their goals only if they secure organizational survival. 
Since popular support is crucial for survival, if the insurgent senses that support 
is being threatened, any means to protect its survival will be used, even violence 
against its own native population. According to McCarthy and Zald (1977), this is 
because without securing survival, the insurgent cannot pursue its goals at any 
rate. Stated differently, if the insurgent cannot obtain the population’s support 
and resources (e.g., intelligence, recruits, and logistics) and does not use 
violence to obtain them, it will not survive and not reach its goals anyway. 
However, even if the population does not willingly choose to provide any support, 
the insurgent will still secure its organizational survival by using violence against 
the civil population to acquire the necessary resources. Although the insurgent 
will not obtain “active support,” by terrorizing the population it can still convert the 
people who do not cooperate with the government into “passive supporters” with 
“blind eyes.” As a consequence of this violence strategy, regardless of whether 
the people have sympathy or not, if they wish to live, they have no other choice 
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than to provide all kinds of requested materials and resources to the insurgency. 
If this is the case, the first important mission for the insurgent becomes survival, 
not one of being liked by the population. Without a doubt, however, this is the 
insurgent’s worst scenario and its least desired situation.  
On the other hand, after securing survival, the insurgent still has the chance 
to gain the population’s hearts and thereby reach its goals. Popular support is not 
continuously given to one political side (Galula, 2006) but rather is conditional 
and can change with time (Janos, 1980: Galula, 2006). This is because the 
population weighs the level of threat and its party’s chance to win before 
choosing a side and is thus more likely to be on the side of the party whose 
popularity and effectiveness are combined. In the initial stages, even if the 
people view the government as being more powerful, as the insurgent increases 
its threat against the population, and/or wins some battlefield victories against the 
government, the insurgent acquires more support from the people. For example, 
Kalyvas (1999) found that the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) of Algeria 
killed many Algerian civilians who supported the country’s secular government or 
simply refused to support the organization. According to Ney (1962), this 
intimidation technique usually works. Ney argued that when the Algerian 
insurgency commenced on November 1, 1954, the number of insurgents was 
estimated to be a few hundred to 3,000 but sharply increased to 20,000 full-time 
guerrilla troops by the beginning of the 1960s. This growth in strength was 
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attributed primarily to the widespread use by the FLN’s leadership of political 
violence against the Moslem population (Ney, 1962).   
The rationale to resort to violence requires secure survival of the insurgent 
and insurgency. Although without support the insurgent cannot not achieve its 
goals anyway, by frightening and forcing the people to support the organization 
through new recruits, information, logistics, and other means may appear to be 
the most rational and effective choice. As a result, for a population that is 
involved in insurgency warfare against a foreign power, the insurgent’s threat 
may possibly be envisioned greater and closer than the counterinsurgent 
government’s threat of imprisoning anyone who supports the insurgency.  
Violence against the government’s population 
 
 Hayes and McAllister (2005; 2001) stressed the importance of the 
insurgent’s political goals to generate popular support by suggesting that political 
ends justify the violence. Furthermore, if violence is perceived as having the 
greatest chance of achieving the required political goals, then it will be used. 
Thus, by employing violence against the government’s population in order to 
achieve political goals can be viewed as legitimate by the insurgent’s own 
population and even generate support. According to Boyle (2009) carefully 
planned selective terrorism against the government’s population indicates the 
capability of inflicting pain on the government and protecting the insurgent’s own 
population. Furthermore, such violence is a way to boost the insurgent’s 
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reputation for toughness and indicate its nationalist, ethnic or sectarian 
credentials as well as its willingness to fight in local power contests (p.218). 
Likewise, Hoffman (2004) argues that terrorism against enemy population is a 
message directed towards the insurgent’s own constituents and can be used 
stimulate popular activitism, bolster the insurgent’s base of support, help mobilize 
the population and achieve a self sustaining rate of organizational growth (as 
cited in Boyle, 2009). For instance, during so-called second Palestinian Intifada 
public support for terrorist suicide bombings stood at 70% of Palestinians (BBC 
News, 28, June,2002, as cited in Neumann,2005, p.947). According to Neumann 
(2005) support for terrorist attacks not only depend on nature of targets but also 
time and circumstances of the attacks. In his cross national study, Hewitt (1990) 
found that popular support for insurgent violence does not decrease due to 
terrorist violence against the government’s population (“ethnic enemy”)(p.166). 
Goodwin (2006) distinguished the insurgent’s own population from the 
government’s population and proposed three key contextual factors that strongly 
influence groups to adopt indiscriminate terrorism as a political strategy: (a) a 
perception that large numbers of civilians benefit from, support, or at the very 
least tolerate the use of repressive measures by the state against militant groups 
and their constituents; (b) a large and relatively unprotected population of 
‘‘complicitous’’ civilians; and (c) ‘‘social distance’’ between the terrorists, their 
constituents, and the target population. Likewise, Hewitt (1990) divides the 
population into two main categories: insurgent’s constituency (“fellow ethnics”) 
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and its enemies (p.147). Similar to the RMT approach, he argues that insurgent’s 
constituency consists of both potential and actual supporters. Hewitt concludes 
that “nationalist ideology” legitimates terrorist violence and generates a positive 
image of the insurgent as long as terrorism campaign uses proper tactics and 
does not kill “fellow ethnics”. Using a similar analogy, from an ethnic conflict 
perspective, Bruce (2001) suggest that when the society is divided into ‘us’ and 
‘them’, they become ready to deploy violence against the other. From this 
perspective, we argue that when the insurgent used violence against the 
government’s perspective, it would be tolerated or even generate support.  
Similarly, Mack (as cited in Record, 2007) focused on the government’s 
population and argued that success of the insurgent arises from the “progressive 
attrition” of the government’s political capability to wage war, not a military 
victory. In Mack’s view, attacking the government’s population would erode the 
government’s “political will” to continue to wage insurgency warfare and thus lead 
the insurgent to victory. Enders and Sandler (1993) argue that the main logic of 
massacring innocent civilians is to bring pressure on the government to accept 
their demands.  From a similar perspective, by considering Palestinian terrorism 
that gains since the early 1970s, Dershowitz (2002) argues that terrorism works 
and is an entirely rational choice to achieve to achieve political goals (as cited in 
Abrahams, 2006, p.44). Although targeting government’s civilians generate more 
concerns among the government’s population and erode the political will of the 
government, targeting governmental targets may also erode its political will under 
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certain conditions. For instance, the Lebanese-based Shiite terrorist group, 
Hezbollah’s terrorism campaign successfully compelled the United States and 
France to withdraw their military forces from Lebanon in 1984 (Atran, 2004, as 
cited in Abrahams, 2006, p.45), because they successfully eroded the 
government’s political will to continue the wage against the insurgent. Similarly 
when the violent attacks by the insurgent LTTE against the Indian Peace 
Keeping Force, or the IPKF — Indian army troops that were deployed in Sri 
Lanka to disarm the insurgent LTTE and enforce the Accord that was signed 
between the India and Sri Lanka government on July 30th of 1987— increased 
and caused over 1,500 casualties, it eroded popular support among the Indian 
population for Gandhi government’s Sri Lanka policy and political will of the new 
government. From the autumn of 1988 there was little public support for the 
government’s Sri Lanka policy. Due to lack of political will of the new National 
Front government, as soon as it got elected in the elections of December 1989, it 
agreed to the prompt withdrawal of the IPKF by March 1990 (Crenshaw, 
2000,p.151). 
Comparable to Record and Mack, Enders and Sandler (1993), and Galula 
(2006) believed that despite FLN’s military defeat on the battlefield, due to the 
lack of political will in Paris, the French withdrew all troops from Algeria and 
granted independence to Algeria in 1962. Therefore, we argue that unlike 
violence against the insurgent’s own population, insurgency violence against the 
government’s population might be more tolerated and even have a more positive 
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effect on the native population and generate popular support among the 
insurgent’s population, especially if the insurgent’s population believes it would 
erode the political will of the government or bring the government to its knees.  
Conclusion 
To sum up, the insurgent must depend on the population due to its logistics, 
intelligence, new recruits, financial support, food, and other requirements needed 
to wage guerrilla warfare and reach its political goals. Therefore, the level of 
popular support among the population should always be assessed by the 
insurgent. As Galula (2006) pointed out, popular support is not continually given 
to one political party but rather is conditional and can change with time. Because 
popular support is conditional and can shift from one side to the other, the 
insurgent cannot risk losing this important support and therefore must take 
necessary steps to retain or regain popularity. Insurgency leader Che Guevara 
(1962) acknowledged the possibility of changes in conditions and the importance 
of a popular support level in insurgency warfare and further suggested that the 
guerrilla must analyze the popular support. Likewise, Mao Zedong (2000) pointed 
out the changes in local conditions and suggested making modifications if 
necessary. In short, both insurgency leaders warned other insurgency leaders for 
possible changes in the environment. Taking this approach in this study, the 
researcher examines the insurgent’s responses to relative changes in its popular 
support level.  
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Debate on Relative Deprivation Theory (RD) and Resource Mobilization Theory 
(RMT) 
 
Two leading theories of sociology, relative deprivation theory (here after, 
RDT) and resource mobilization theory (here after, RMT), have been widely used 
in the literature to explain political violence and the occurrence of social 
movements. These theories constitute the principal theoretical framework of this 
dissertation for two main reasons. First, we view the PKK as an insurgent 
organization that uses terrorism as a tool to reach its goals; and insurgencies are 
categorized as “revolutionary social movements” in the social movement 
literature. Second, each theory is based on different assumptions and 
emphasizes various aspects of insurgencies that could shed light on the PKK’s 
use of political violence. 
Relative deprivation theory assumes that the difference between achieved 
and expected results generate relative deprivation that frequently leads to 
collective action (political violence) in order to achieve goals of the social 
movement (insurgency). This theory views discontent or grievances as the 
source of political violence. Although RDT’s main focus is on individuals, in this 
study its concept is applied to (insurgent) organizations.  
As a reaction to RDT, resource mobilization theory does not view 
grievances and inequalities as sufficient factors for the occurrence of social 
movements but rather considers them as a precondition for the occurrence of 
social movements. Furthermore, the RMT approach suggests that without 
55 
 
 
 
forming a social movement organization and resources available to the 
organization, social movement conditions cannot lead to collective action. The 
resource mobilization theory assumes that social organizations compete for 
resources to be flowed into the organization, and sometimes this competition or 
lack of resources available to the movement leads the social movement 
organization to use violence to obtain them. Resources may consist of financial 
assistance, equipment, land, information, and intelligence, among others. Since 
almost all of these resources are usually provided by the population to the 
insurgent, taking the RMT approach, in this study, popular support is viewed as 
the potential resources available that could be transferred to the insurgent. 
Although the theoretical grounds of each theory differ, both shed light on different 
issues that could influence post-election terrorism.  
Relative Deprivation Theory 
The relative deprivation theory became a dominant theory in the social 
movement literature of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The term “relative 
deprivation” was initially introduced in 1949 by Stouffer and Merton (1949) (as 
cited in Locher, 2002). In social science literature, the term refers to a situation in 
which individuals have less than they believe they deserve (Locher, 2002; Muller, 
1972). Gurr (1970) expanded its meaning to the discrepancy between 
achievement optimum and achievement. Using the notion of reference groups, 
Geschwender (1964) defined relative deprivation as the perception that a 
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person’s membership group is in an advantageous position relative to other 
group or groups (as cited in Muller, 1972) (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: RDT Model 1:  Comparison to reference group 
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Opposed to Geschwender’s (1964) notion of reference groups, Wilson 
(1973) and Runciman (1966) argued that there need not be an objective referent 
corresponding to the perception (as cited in Muller, 1972). Similarly, Gurr (1970) 
conceptualized relative deprivation and argued that the position of one’s own 
group (or one’s own standing) in the past, present, and/or future can be used as 
a reference point (see Figure 5).  
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Figure 5: Comparison to one’s own group 
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The main assumption of RDT is that relative deprivation is caused by a 
gap between expectations and achievements (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Goodwin, 
2006) that can and often do lead to anger (Zimmerman, 1983). According to 
Morrison (1978), there are two different kinds of relative deprivation that can lead 
to anger. The first is decremental deprivation, or when people believe that their 
opportunities have been suddenly reduced, it leads to decremental deprivation. 
The second is aspirational deprivation, or when people’s expectations and 
ambitions increase but their opportunities do not increase, it leads to aspirational 
deprivation. Both types of relative deprivation create similar feelings: something 
that is desired, expected, and demanded by a large number of people does not 
appear to be available to them. 
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Gurr (1970) developed a “theory of collective violence” based on the 
concept of relative deprivation theory. He argued that the potential for violence 
depends upon the discontent held by members of a society, and discontent is 
caused by a perceived gap between what they have and what they think they 
should have. Gurr referred to this gap as “relative deprivation” and argued that 
this gap frequently leads to violence. His causal mechanism that underlies the 
deprivation-violence relationship was derived from frustration-aggression theory 
(Muller, 1972). In this explanation, frustration produced by one’s perception of 
discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities is considered as 
the source of potential for political violence, and the magnitude of political 
violence will vary strongly and directly with the degree, or intensity, of relative 
deprivation (Muller, 1972). In this study, by taking the RDT approach, the 
researcher assumes that a proportional decline in popular votes that presumably 
reflects popular support for the insurgent should generate relative deprivation in 
the insurgent group. As Ross and Gurr (1989) suggested violence may increase 
when the insurgent perceives an existential threat to itself. Thus, it is reasonable 
to expect such relative deprivation because of at least two reasons: First, popular 
support is vitally important for the insurgent and a determining factor in defeating 
the adversary. Losing such support threats the insurgent’s survival due to 
logistics and other previously mentioned concerns. Second, the insurgent would 
lose its chance to achieve its goals. Due to the fact that the insurgent is weak 
against the government in terms of both materials and tactics, it employs guerrilla 
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warfare strategies and aims to mobilize the population against the government. 
However, failure in 2007 general elections indicates that the population supports 
the government rather than the insurgent; therefore, the insurgent’s opportunity 
to defeat the government by mobilizing the population would be remote anymore. 
Resource Mobilization Theory 
The resource mobilization perspective was introduced with the publication 
of Social Conflict and Social Movements by Oberschall (1973) and later improved 
by McCarthy and Zald (1977). Oberschall (1973) stressed the importance of 
organizations and leadership in social movements. Similarly, McCarthy and Zald 
(1977) acknowledged the importance of organizations in social movements but 
pointed out the necessity of organizational resources for the movement. 
Furthermore, according to the manner in which an organization uses and 
allocates resources as well as the amount of activity directed toward goal 
achievement is a function of the organization and influences the success of a 
social movement (MacCarthy & Zald, 1977). A movement’s organizations are 
important because they serve as sites to bring people together and as resources 
that sustain the movement (Reger & Dugan, 2001). Although theorists of the 
RMT approach exclusively consider resources as time and money, they also 
include knowledge, meeting space, communication networks, media, labor, 
solidarity, legitimacy, and internal/external support from the power elite (Reger & 
Dugan, 2001).  
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Unlike the RDT approach, the resource mobilization theory (RMT) 
challenges theories that are based on a person’s dissatisfaction and suggests 
that movements (insurgency) cannot be effective without proper resources 
(McCarthy & Zald, 1977). The RMT approach views strain or discontent, key 
aspects of insurgency and social movement theories, as an insufficient cause for 
a movement and emphasizes the importance of resources in a movement 
organization.   Organizations are viewed as key components in the emergence of 
movement (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Zald & Berger, 1978). Similarly, Galula 
(2006) suggested that in the insurgent’s cause, popularity alone is insufficient to 
transform sympathy to the population’s participation. This, however, can be 
achieved by an insurgent living among the population and being backed by 
guerrilla forces that will eliminate the open enemies, intimidate the potential ones, 
and rely on those among the population who actively support the insurgency. 
Correspondingly, the RMT approach argues that continuous availability of 
resources and the ability to mobilize these resources have an impact on the 
capability to maintain a conflict. Additionally, immediate outcomes depend upon 
this ability to mobilize resources in order to sustain a conflict (Zald & Berger, 
1978). Because the resources of movement are vitally important for success, 
social organizations compete with one another in an effort to acquire them 
(McCarthy & Zald, 1977). According to Boyle (2009) terrorist violence against the 
government’s population tend to be concentrated in high-value, resource rich, or 
contested territories, where multiple parties have conflicting stakes on territory 
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and stakes. Likewise, Höglund (2009) suggests that parties with ‘close races’ 
have strong incentive to use violence. From the RMT persective, this competition 
to obtain resources as well as a lack of resources may sometimes lead the 
movement to use coercive measures (Zald & Berger, 1978).  
Similar to the traditional insurgency approach, the RMT approach assumes 
that individuals are rational. In other words, they weigh the costs and benefits of 
participating in a movement and then decide to join only if the benefits outweigh 
the costs. Galula (2006) suggested that the population weighs the level of threat 
and the chances of a party’s victory before making a decision. The population is 
more likely to be on the side of the party whose popularity and effectiveness are 
combined. Therefore, by taking the resource mobilization theory, in this study we 
argue that as an insurgent group gains support from the people, its capabilities 
and resources to generate violence will expand, or, as McCarthy and Zald (1977) 
suggested, as the flow of resources increases, the movement organization will be 
able to hire more full-time professional personnel (e.g., full-time guerrillas, 
political officers, et cetera) and increase the potential size of the resource pool 
(e.g., new recruits, intelligence, logistics, financial support, et cetera).According 
to Mesquita (2005) increasing the level of resources invested in terror would 
increase the probability of defeating the government .As a consequence, the 
movement will be more likely to accomplish its goals. From the insurgent’s 
perspective, the more resources available not only mean more tangible 
materials, namely full-time guerrillas, weapons, and ammunition but also 
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intangible materials, for example, intelligence relating to the counterinsurgent and 
sheltering insurgents among the population.  
By the same token, as the insurgent group loses support, its capabilities 
and resources to generate violence will diminish. When the insurgent becomes 
unable to recruit new members and some segments of the population express its 
hostility against the insurgent, the insurgent may end its struggle and violent 
activities (Weinberg, 1991). The insurgent are subject to resource constraints 
that limit the insurgent’s expenditures on activities not to exceed its income or 
resources (Enders & Sandler, 1993). In his study using a game theoretic 
approach, Mesquita (2005) clearly explains the underlying logic why the 
insurgent violence decreases its political violence and supports his argument by 
the describing the violence in Northern Ireland following the Good Friday 
accords. To him, since the insurgent is endowed with resources, withdrawing 
support the insurgent some percentage of the resources available to the 
insurgent will be lost and remaining resources will accrue to terrorist activities As 
a consequence, there will be a decline in violence despite increased militancy, 
because the insurgent will lack the resources to engage in the amount of 
violence they would like. According to Mesquita (2005) decline in resources of 
the insurgent describes the situation in Northern Ireland following the Good 
Friday accords. After the Good Friday accords, the splinter groups such as “Real 
IRA” increased its militancy and engaged in terrorist attacks such as bombing of 
Omagh, a missile attack on the UK’s Secret Intelligence, M6, the assault on 
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Ebrington Barracks in Derry, and the bombing of the BBC . Despite these 
terrorist attacks were qualitatively more violent than anything which the 
Provisional IRA had engaged the splinter groups had small size and lacked 
resources to actually the overall death toll from the IRA violence. Similarly, by the 
late 1990s, the ETA lost most of its popular support and as a result it changed its 
violence strategy. Since then ETA activity and number of killings substantially 
decreased; however, the type of killings has become more specialized such as 
politicians, journalists and etc (Barros, Passos, & Gil-Alana, 2006).  
Ease of access to the resources and perception of risk also do matter for 
the insurgent. Berrebi and Lakdawalla (2007) found that the proximity of a 
terrorist base or an international border both substantially increase the frequency 
of attacks because of lowering the costs of a terrorist attack and risk of supplying 
resources and material for the attacks.  
In conclusion, by taking the RMT approach, the researcher hypothesizes 
that the insurgent will be more likely to increase its level of violence when there is 
more popular support and decrease its level of violence when there is less 
popular support from the population. 
Conclusion 
In sum, the literature and RMT approach were found to reach similar 
conclusions regarding the insurgent’s dependence on resources that are 
expected to be provided by the population. However, if the population does not 
willingly provide resources, as a last resort the insurgency may use political 
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violence against its own native population in an effort to acquire them (Zald & 
Berger, 1978). Thus, the primary stimulus for violence is the need and capability 
to gain resources. Because the insurgent considers popular support as a zero-
sum game, its primary rival is the government that strives to obtain support of the 
people as well. Although the insurgent might possibly attack its own native 
population due to a lack of popular support in obtaining resources, by attacking 
selective targets (e.g., military soldiers, police officers, and other governmental 
agents), insurgents will typically generate more popularity among the population. 
As a result, most terrorist attacks should be expected to occur within areas that 
are supportive of the insurgent due to the availability of resources supplied.  
Taking the RMT and insurgency approach, through popular support the 
insurgent will usually be assumed to have more freedom of movement, recruits, 
financial resources, logistics, places to hide, and intelligence to successfully carry 
out a selective terrorist attack. In contrast to the RMT approach, the relative 
deprivation (RD) approach assumes that a considerable amount relative decline 
in an insurgent’s support level will create a gap between its expected results 
versus achieved results. This gap is considered to be a relative deprivation that 
usually leads to political violence, the major issue in the proposed study. By 
taking the RDT approach, in this study, we expect that as a vote share of the 
insurgent’s political party declines between two elections, political violence also 
increases.  
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Elections and Insurgency 
 
Introduction 
 
This section reviews the political science literature to understand why 
insurgent organizations engage in electoral politics and examines the literature 
regarding elections and political violence as well. The underlying reason is that 
there is some literature on the ‘election violence’ which is considered as a special 
type of political violence in the political science literature, therefore literature on 
election is reviewed to understand the dynamics and the linkage between 
election and violence. Briefly, existing literature points out that in democracies 
elections are tools for transferring the political power; therefore sometimes they 
can be viewed as an opportunity to increase their popularity among the 
population by insurgent organizations or discredit the incumbent government. In 
order to do so, the insurgent may resort violence over the pre-election period. 
Most of the literature on election violence focused on the pre-election violence 
and examined its effect on election results, however still there is scant literature 
on post-election violence and why the insurgent use violence over the post-
election period. Furthermore existing studies attempt to explain post-election 
violence from a relative deprivation approach; they argue that the insurgent 
launch a violence campaign because of poor election results; although an RD 
approach provides a logical and reasonable explanation, still they ignore the 
alternative approach, resource mobilization approach.   
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Functions and Importance of Political Parties in Democracies 
Elections and political parties play an important role in democratic states. 
Political parties are considered as indispensable components of a democratic 
political order and institutions serve as means to solve economic and social 
differences peacefully (Weinberg, 1991). Geddes (1996) referred to political 
institutions as “weapons” in the struggle for political power (as cited in Finn, 
2000)  because political institutions are vehicles to make trade-off among 
competing values and to establish the rules for obtaining power (Quandt, 1998). 
Elections allow for the “peaceful” transfer of this power (Höglund, 2009). 
Furthermore they provide legitimacy through direct popular participation, and, in 
turn, legitimacy creates legitimate governments enjoying popular support for their 
policies (Elkit & Svensson 1997, as cited in Sisk, 2008) and capacity for effective 
governance (Brown 2003, as cited in Sisk, 2008).From this perspective, electoral 
process is an alternative way to violence because of being a means for 
governance (Fischer, 2004). For instance, the Nicaraguan election in 1990 was 
the ‘first peaceful transfer of power from a revolutionary government to its 
opposition (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a).Finn (2000) lists four important 
functions in democracies: First, “legitimating” function by coupling political 
obligation with consensual participation. Second, “integrating” function by binding 
citizens and political parties to the state. Third, “socializing” function by teaching 
and transmitting democratic values to the citizens. Finally, “transferring political 
power” by providing a certain and conventionalized means (p.52-53). However, 
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at the same time, they are also vulnerable to political violence, because elections 
are means of achieving or retaining political power and governance (Sisk, 2008); 
and violence can be used as a tactic in political competition (Fischer, 2004). 
Understanding the Importance of Elections for the Insurgent 
Briefly, since the elections can provide insurgent political power and access 
resource, the insurgent has good reasons to engage in electoral politics. Namely, 
when political parties won the power, they will be able to organize campaigns, 
mobilize masses, and oversee policies (Rapoport and Weinberg 2000a, p.28). In 
other words, the insurgent can intentionally use its political party to gain 
sympathy from not only its native or government’s population but also from the 
international community. By this way, it can also make their armed struggle with 
the government legitimate. In addition, when the insurgent’s political party took 
office, it would expand the pools of its supporters through providing benefits to 
them thus strength their loyalty. Furthermore, it could also destabilize the political 
system and even achieve self rule or independence from the government 
(Weinberg 1991).  
Neumann (2005) describes seven reasons or advantages of the insurgent’s 
participation in elections: First, it can exploit the democratic process to 
strengthen the insurgent’s military wing. Second, insurgent’s political wing may 
facilitate insurgent recruitment and radicalization by providing “vetting 
mechanism”, or providing a possibility of “legalized fundraising” (p.946).Third is to 
obtain official recognition and legitimacy. Forth is to mobilize the mass and 
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broaden the movement— that is, to tap into resources and mobilize sections of 
community that had not been available previously, which RMT theorists name 
isolated adherents and constituents. Fifth, is to secure continuity both in terms 
ideology and personnel. Sixth is to neutralize the government’s military 
superiority. Finally, the insurgent can realistically assess consequences of the 
terrorism campaign and demonstrate its popular support with the election results. 
The reasons to engage in electoral politics can be group under three 
categories: 1) increasing popular support for the insurgent; 2) gaining legitimacy 
and respectability; 3) increasing the pool of its resources and role of the military 
wing. 
Increasing popular support 
The most scholars focusing on this issue points out the importance of 
participating elections in obtaining popular support for the insurgent thus 
broadening the movement and increasing the organizational resources to 
achieve insurgent’s goals. The insurgent may emphasize the ethnic and cultures 
differences, and use political competition in calling for mobilization of large 
sections of the population, because conflicts are commonly used to gain popular 
support for its political party (Höglund, 2009, p.420). 
Ginsberg and Weissberg (1978) purported that elections are mechanisms 
for generating popular support for the government and its policies as well. Taber 
(2002) argued that “political mobilization” is the first task of the insurgent, and 
Richardson (2001) pointed out the importance of electoral politics as a means for 
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political mobilization. According to Richardson, the issue is two-fold: (a) First, 
electoral politics is used by the insurgent as a means of building popular support 
for the purpose of political mobilization, and (b) second, electoral results are 
considered as an indication of the success or failure of that effort, because 
obtaining a seat in the national or local government is viewed as a success and 
reinforces the terrorist organization’s influence over the population.  For instance, 
till the Westminster election in April 1981, the IRA’s political wing the Sinn Fein 
used to follow an “absenteeism policy”, which prevented their elected candidates 
from taking their seats in the parliament. However, the president of Sinn Fein 
Gerry Adams and others realized that by remaining isolated from the political 
negotiations, they cannot mobilize the population towards their political goals, 
therefore, they rescinded their absenteeism policy at 1986 Sin Fein conference 
(McAllister, 2004,p.128). 
Drake and Silva (1986) viewed votes as a “trade” to gain tangible benefits 
from the government. In order to get elected the insurgent could pledge the 
delivery of resources to its supporters and once elected, through providing 
“domestic rewards” such as distributing resources and key positions of the 
government to its supporters (Boyle, 2009, p.217), the insurgent would be able to 
win population on its own side, and consolidate its control over the population. 
Similarly, Höglund (2009) explains such mechanism through ‘patron-client 
relationship” for political power, in which the ‘protection, services or rewards to 
the clients are provided by the ‘patron’. Due to this mutual benefit oriented 
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relationship, ‘clients’, who are usually individuals of low status, become the 
patron’s political followers. As a consequence of such relationship, since the 
political power is very important for the patron, and his/her followers, they can 
strive to keep the patron in power, even with violence (p.420).   
Legitimacy and respectability 
The insurgent may gain democratic legitimacy through elections (Weinberg, 
1991; Höglund, 2009). The election outcomes may encourage the insurgent to 
demand secession and concessions (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a), thus would 
gain domestic and international legitimacy. On the other hand, when it happens, 
the supporters of the government may oppose the insurgent group’s demands 
and resort to violence against the insurgent and its supporters. A desire to gain 
respectability in domestic or international politics may lead the insurgent to end 
its violent activities and engage in electoral politics (Weinberg, 1991).  
Increasing the resource pool of the insurgent and role of the military wing 
Weinberg (1991) found that terrorist groups with linkages to political parties 
are more successful in persisting and waging their armed struggle than those 
groups lacking these linkages. He suggests that terrorist groups with political 
party links have an easier time in recruiting new members and obtaining logistical 
aids from the population (p.434). Furthermore presence of military wing makes it 
easier for the insurgent to return violence if it does not satisfy the election 
outcomes (Höglund, 2009, p.420), therefore it would be wiser strategy for the 
insurgent not to demobilize all of its armed forces.  
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Competition in elections may complement rather than replace the 
insurgent’s military activities, and reduces the risk of major splits within the 
organization over tactics (Höglund, 2009). For instance, with 1981 election, the 
popular support encouraged the Sinn Fein, for the first time, to contest in 1982 
Northern Ireland Assembly elections under the Sinn Fein. The Sinn Fein won 
10.1% in 1982 election; this percentage increased to 13.4% in the Westminster 
election, (McAllister, 2004, p.127). The insurgent interpreted this results that they 
could fight an armed struggle and win the elections at the same time (O’Brien, 
1999, p.126, as cited in McAllister, 2004). In 1986, the IRA adopted an electoral 
strategy combined with a military campaign and sought to transform its military 
success that generated popular support into electoral success, which could be 
used to legitimize the continued use of threat of force (McAllister, 2004, p.128). 
Similarly, as Neumann (2005) argues that when the IRA’s political party Sinn 
Fein received a substantial vote share in 1981, Gerry Adams, the leader of the 
party, expanded its political wing, however giving importance to the political 
activities did not diminish the importance of military wing of the IRA and armed 
struggle, instead, it legitimized the armed struggle, demonstrated popular support 
for the IRA, advanced the movement. As Gerry Adams, the president of the Sinn 
Fein, stated “Elections have helped to develop the party, and experienced bunch 
of political workers” (Neumann, 2005, p.967).Furthermore, it argued that electoral 
success also gave the political wing a kind of veto power which would make any 
constitutional accommodation between the main moderate parties in Northern 
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Ireland , because by taking seat in the Irish parliament, they reached a political 
power to force a minority government to adopt a more intransigent manner vis-à-
vis Britain and to refrain from introducing harsh counterterrorism measures in the 
IRA’s most important areas (Moloney, 2002, as cited in Neumann, 2005).  
Election Violence 
‘Election violence’ is considered as a special type of political violence in the 
political science literature, therefore literature on election has been reviewed 
understand the dynamics and the linkage between election and violence,  
 Dhanagare (1968) defines “election violence” as “use of force in the 
struggle for scarce power positions and statuses between two or more individuals 
or political parties and their supporters (p.151). Lewis (1964) focuses on the 
political rivals and defines the aim of election violence as to "neutralize, injure or 
eliminate rival or rivals" (as cited in Dhanagare, 1968, p.151).  Unlike Levis, 
Fischer (2004) focuses on the election process and the electorates rather than 
perpetrators. Fischer defines election violence as a means to determine, delay or 
otherwise influence the results of an election (p.6). Sisk (2002) stresses the 
“election process” and “election outcomes” and argues that election violence 
aims to vitiate the elections all together by undermining the integrity of the 
results, or to influence voting behavior through threat or intimidation (p.1). 
Although these definitions underline different components, they describe election 
terrorism during the pre-election violence. So, in this study, we hypothesize that 
“terrorist attacks increase during the pre-election period”. 
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Similarly, much of the past literature on election violence has focused on the 
effects of terrorism on electoral process and election results (Guelke & Smyth, 
1992; Neumann, 2005; Kydd & Walter, 2002; Bali, 2007; Gassebner et al., 2008; 
Rose & Murphy, 2007). Although the past literature provides some insights about 
under what conditions recourse terrorism and how it affects election results, it 
offers little information how the election results affect terrorism in the post-
election period. Furthermore, the scant existent literature on post-election 
violence usually explains from a relative deprivation approach and lacks a 
resource mobilization perspective. Thus, it is important to ask not only how the 
terrorism influence elections, but also how the election results influence terrorism 
over the time as well. This is one of the strength of this study. After surveying the 
literature on election violence, this study focuses on post-election violence. 
Dimensions of Election Violence 
Scholars (Dhanagare, 1968; Fischer, 2002; Sisk, 2008) addressed and 
described various dimensions of election violence. These dimension can be 
categorized under five groups (see figure): 1) Perpetrators; 2) Victims or targets 
of electoral violence; 3) Types of election Violence; 4) Time Periods, and 5) 
Aims, or Motives of Election Violence (Figure 6).  
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Figure 6: Dimensions of Elections Violence 
 
Perpetrators 
 Election violence can be committed by various actors. Dhanagare (1968) 
includes only individuals, political parties and their supporters into his definition of 
election. Fischer (2004) expands them and divides the perpetrators into five 
categories: First, Voter motivated conflict: This type election violence occurs 
when voters challenge the state and claim ‘unfairness’ in the election process. 
Massive cheating or fraud – such as conspiracies to bribe voters, tampering with 
ballots, fallacious counting, or other measures (such as releasing large numbers 
of prisoners to vote) – can be the stimulus for a voters (Sisk, 2008). For instance, 
in Thailand elections on January the 6th of 2001, the voters believed that local 
officials were biased in their counting procedures therefore organized protests 
and burned police vehicles to disrupt vote counting. Second, State-motivated 
conflict: It occurs when the State initiates conflicts with electorates who challenge 
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the results of elections. Third, Rival-motivated Conflict: Political rivals may 
conflict with each other for political gains. The Fischer (2002)’s study findings 
suggest that rival-motivated conflict is the most common election type but also 
most responsive to mediation among the others. Rival motivated election 
violence may stem from history of intense rivalry among political clans, stark 
competition for government posts that carry the potential for power and access to 
resources and state largesse (Sisk, 2008). Sri Lanka elections of 2001 set up an 
example of a pre-election violence performed by the governing political party. As 
deSilva (2002) pointed out, in 2001 Sri Lanka elections, in Hambantota district of 
the Southern Province, a senior cabinet minister and his close associates sought 
to terrorize the electorate by attacks through armed groups on opposition 
candidates and their supporters (deSilva, 2002). Fourth, Insurgent-motivated 
conflict: The insurgent capitalizes on the visibility of an election to promote the 
insurgency. Fischer (2002) found that insurgent-motivated conflicts are growing 
and the most difficult to prevent because of being unresponsive to governance or 
other electoral objectives, and seeking only to disrupt, delay and diminish the 
democratic process. Fifth is a combination of those categories above.  
Scholars include different actors into their definitions, but most of them 
conclude that election violence is a collective, purposeful and instrumental action; 
so, if it is collective, and instrumental, then it requires an extensive organization, 
leadership, and resources (Sisk, 2008, p.13); because only with an effective 
leadership and organization, the rank-and-file can be bridged, logistical needs to 
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carry out violent act can be created, and associational or population 
representation dimension can be generated. Thus, organizational resources 
allow the leaders and organizational structure to foment violence (Sisk, 2008, 
p.13).  
Although election violence can be performed by various actors, from the 
perpetrators’ perspective, the insurgent-motivated conflict is the primary interest 
of this study. This type of violence requires an organization, leadership and 
resources. Thus, both resource mobilization approach and relative deprivation 
approach can be useful to explain election violence. 
Victims or Targets of Election Violence 
 Election violence includes various type of victims or targets. They can be 
people such as electorates, candidates, political party workers, places such as 
polling stations, offices, party buildings, campaign materials, vehicles, vehicles or 
data such as ballot boxes; and victims can be resident in target ethnic, gender, 
geographical, or political “hot spot” communities (Fischer, 2002).  
Forms of Election Violence 
 Election violence can be committed through various ways. It can be random 
or organized act, or threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse a 
political stakeholder or stakeholders (Fischer, 2002). Types of violence may also 
include riots, demonstrations, terrorist campaigns, military coups, civil wars 
(Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a, and p.33), abductions, direct or targeted killings, 
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terrorist attacks on rallies, destruction of property and vehicles, and the like (Sisk, 
2008). Although there are various forms of election violence, this study includes 
only terrorist incidents.   
Aims and Motives of Election Violence 
 Like other dimensions, aims and motives vary and highly depend on the time 
period of the election. In general, pre-election violence aims to influence electoral 
process and election results whereas the post-election violence generally is 
argued to stem from a relative deprivation caused by dissatisfaction with the 
election results.     
Some scholars stress (Finn, 2000; Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a; Sisk, 2008) 
pointed out the influence of fair democratic process on election violence.  
Rapoport and Weinberg (2000a) argue that when the “electoral process” is fair, 
legitimate and works well, the ballots can silence the guns, as the Namibia 
election of 1989 did end a 30-year war. Furthermore if the parties accepted that 
winning possibility is too low and costs are too high, the elections can reduce the 
violence (p.18). Likewise Finn (2000) argues that the “election structures” and 
“rules” are among the possible sources of election violence. Similar to Finn’s 
argument, Hewitt (2000) argues that if certain groups or individuals feel that the 
political system is “unresponsive” to them, they become frustrated, thereby resort 
to violence (p.326). 
To explain reasons for or motives of election violence, usually scholars focus 
on the benefits—political power, access to resources etc— that would be gained 
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through the elections. In his analysis of election violence, Sisk (2008) 
emphasizes the stakes of political competition, expectations about winning and 
losing in election contests, and the incentives that the electoral process creates. 
He argues that election violence is most likely to occur: when the stakes of 
stakes of winning and losing valued political posts are very high and those 
political posts are scarce; when winning the elections is the key to livelihood for 
an entire clan, or ethnic group; depending upon the expectations, when the 
winning the elections are highly uncertain about the ultimate outcome of the 
electoral process, especially when margins of victory very close, they may resort 
violence to affect uncertain outcomes; or when losing the elections are almost 
certain, they may use violence to affect voter turnout through discouraging the 
opponent’s supporter electorates; or when the losing elections are almost certain, 
they may use violence to prevent the election’s success. 
Time Periods 
 Höglund (2009) divides election periods into three periods; 1) Pre-election; 2) 
during the election; and 3) Post-Election periods. Sisk (2008) includes even more 
time periods into the pre-and post-election periods. He divides election violence 
period into five time phases and defines most likely types and targets election 
violence: Phase I: The Long Run-Up to Electoral Events; Phase II: The 
Campaign’s Final Lap; Phase III: Polling Day(s); Phase IV: Between Voting and 
Proclamation; and Phase V: Post-Election Outcomes and their Aftermath. 
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Scholars have used different time scales in analyzing the election violence 
ranging from two-week periods (Dhanagare, 1968) to four years (Klor & Berrebi, 
2008). Dhanagare (1968) used biweekly periods and focused on only 60 days-
period prior to release of the Fourth General Elections of 1967 in India. He 
divided the election period into four phases of 15 days. The fourth phase covers 
the election that started on February 15th and ends when most of the poll results 
were announced. His study mainly covers pre-election period and election days 
but excludes the post-election period. He found that election violence increases 
as closing to the election day(s) and the violence varies across the 
constituencies. Sisk (2008) considered election violence time period as cycle, 
which often conceived of in terms of at least one year prior to an actual election 
event (Wall, et.al. 2006, as cited in Sisk, 2008, and p.13). Like Sisk (2008), in this 
study, we considered the election period as a one year period prior to an 
election, and like Höglund (2009) we have thought election period also covers 
the post-election period because of posing a risk generated by the perpetrators 
due to their dissatisfactions with the election results. So, in this study, an election 
period covers 24-months period (12 months before and 12 months after the 
study).  
Analyzing dimensions of Election Violence in the Pre-election Period 
Sisk (2008) divides pre-election periods into two periods: Phase I (long run-up 
to electoral events) and Phase II (the election campaign’s final lap). According to 
Sisk, often objective of election violence in the Phase I of the pre-election 
80 
 
 
 
period— is to affect the electoral process, and to establish a dominant position 
within a particular district by eliminating or threatening potential adversaries 
(p.14). Thus, it is highly selected rather than indiscriminate violence; the main 
targets are not innocent, or neutral civilians, instead electoral process and the 
political rivals are the most common targets. Therefore, common targets of 
violence in this period are incumbent state officials or emerging candidates from 
political parties (Sisk, 2008, p.14).  
During the Phase II—the election campaign’s final lap—the pattern of 
violence shifts from incumbent state official and emerging candidates from 
political parties to potentially adversary electorates and candidates. The main 
common aim of the election violence during this period is to intimidate or 
influence voters through creating insecurity against opponent’s potential 
supporters (Sisk, 2008; Höglund, 2009). As the Election Day approaches, the 
violence intensifies. Common types of violence in final weeks of the election 
include clashes between rival groups of supporters; attacks on election rallies, 
candidates, bomb scares; attacks or intimidation of election officials; and attacks 
on domestic/international observers (Sisk, 2008). 
Analyzing dimensions of Election Violence during the Election Days 
During the polling day(s), usually perpetrators cease their acts of violence 
when the voting begins (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a; Höglund, 2009; Sisk, 
2001). However when election violence occurs on the Election Day, it commonly 
aims to disrupt the polling and to limit turnout and targets security forces, election 
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administrators, observers; and materials such as destruction of ballot boxes 
(Sisk, 2008). For instance on the Election Day, January 30th of 2005 in Iraq, the 
insurgents carried out 260 attacks that resulted in at least 44 people, including 26 
Iraqi civilians, eight Iraqi troops, ten British servicemen, and one American 
soldier. 100 of the attacks were carried out at or near the polling stations.  
Furthermore, although there was a traffic ban on the Election Day, the insurgents 
sent at least eight suicide bombers on foot, wearing suicide vests, into voting 
stations (Can the voters build on success? 2005). Similarly in Sri Lanka 
presidential election of 1988, at least 46 people were killed on the poll day 
(Sunday Times, January 1, 1989, as cited in Amerasinghe, 1989). In this study, 
the Election Day has not been included into neither the pre-election nor post-
election day.  
Possible Consequences of Violence in the Pre-Election period and during the 
Election Days 
There are four possible common consequences of the violence prior to the 
Election Day or during the election days: 1) Postponing or disrupting elections 
from taking place; 2) Effecting voter turnouts; 3) Forcing the candidates to leave 
from the electoral process; and 4) Influencing electorates’ political preferences. 
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Postponing or disrupting elections from taking place 
The insurgent may attempt to postpone or disrupt elections from taking place by 
resorting violence prior to or during the election days. This aim may stem from 
three main reasons: a fear of losing political power, opposing elections at all, and 
electoral system.  
In some cases, a fear of losing power could lead the insurgent to 
undermine the integrity of elections (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a) and result in 
forcing the governments to abandon elections (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a; 
Höglund, 2009). Or in other cases, elections or political system could be source 
of election violence. Or, the insurgent may oppose to any sort of elections and 
view them as an “illegitimate” method to transfer political power, or oppose to the 
ruling system under which the elections are held, therefore it may try to prevent 
elections from taking place or postpone the elections (Höglund, 2009). For 
instance, the Peruvian insurgent group Sendero Luminoso opposes the elections 
and even targeted other left wing groups that compete in the elections (Höglund, 
2009). Similarly, in order to disrupt the elections, insurgent groups in Iraq 
increased their violence prior to the Election Day. Within the first week of the 
New Year, which was just three weeks before the Iraqi elections of 2005, at least 
90 people were killed across the country including Bagdad’s governor, Ali Al-
Haidari and his six of his bodyguards (Ever bloodier.2005). Upon increase of the 
violence prior to the election, Ghazi al-Yawer, the president, Iyad Allawi, the 
interim prime minister, and some other high level political officials gave voice to 
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possibility of postponement of the election by the United Nations (UN). 
Chechen’s pre-election violence in Russia is another example. The Chechen 
insurgents carried out bomb attacks just two days before the Election Day to 
disrupt the 2003 Duma elections in Russia. They exploded a bomb attack on a 
train resulted in more than 40 killings and over 150 wounded in Yessentuki 
station in Russia’a southern fringe (Oates, 2006). Although the insurgents often 
attempt to disrupt the electoral process, they rarely succeed in postponing or 
preventing the elections from taking place, however, their violent acts can be 
effective in influencing election outcomes through affecting voter turnouts, forcing 
the candidates to leave from the electoral process, and changing electorates’ 
political preferences. 
Affecting voter turnouts 
 In some cases the insurgent may intentionally employ violence against 
rivals’ potential supporters to get them refrained from casting their votes due to 
fear of violence (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a; Höglund, 2009; Sisk, 2008). The 
aim of voter intimidation is to produce a self-imposed loss of freedom on the 
victim. If intimidated, the victim will vote or behave in a certain fashion (Fisher, 
2002). For instance, the insurgent LTTE and other extremist groups in Sri Lanka 
group usually resorts violence prior to the elections. Although Sri Lanka used to 
have high voter turnout rates in the last nationwide election in 1970 (85.2%), 
1977 (86.7%) and 1982 (81.1%), due to high volume political violence that JVP 
(Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna or People's Liberation Front—the Sinhalese 
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nationalist extremist organization) and the DJV (Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya 
or Patriotic People's Front launched three months before the elections; as a 
consequence, only 55.32% of the electorates casted their votes in the Sri Lanka 
presidential elections of 1988 (Amerasinghe, 1989). According to Amerasinghe 
(1989) the main aims of this pre-election violence was to create fear that would 
lead to a compulsory boycott of the election by the electorate (p.349). For 
instance, in Matara in Sri Lanka, on the morning of the poll people were 
intimidated by a set posters warning voters that "the penalty for voting was 
death". Only and even after the security forces created suitable condition very 
small portion of electorates casted their votes (Matara 23.84%, Moneragala 
17.1% and others (Amerasinghe,1989).Similarly, Maoist insurgents, the 
Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) imposed violent nationwide protests 
that resulted in only 20 percent voter turnout across Nepal (Gobyn, 2009). A 
similar strategy was implemented prior to Iraqi Elections of 2005. In order to 
intimidate the voters into not voting, the insurgent groups in Iraq launched a 
terrorism campaign before the election of 2005 that resulted in low turnout rate 
due to the fact that hundreds of thousands Sunni Arabs scared and did not cast 
their votes (Can the voters build on success? 2005). Chechen insurgent’s 
terrorist attacks in a Russian constituency two days before the 2003 Duma 
elections in Russia succeeded too in discouraging the Russian voters and 
resulted in only 55.75% turnout rate. As seen in the literature, violence prior to 
the election affects turnout rates, in most cases it lowers the turnout whereas in 
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few cases, it increases the turnouts as Madrid terrorist attacks did in Spaniard 
Elections of 2004.  
Forcing the candidates to leave from the electoral process 
In some cases, by use of violence, the insurgent can successfully force the 
rival political contenders to leave the electoral process Rapoport & Weinberg, 
2000a; Höglund, 2009), thus eliminate political rivals and win the elections. For 
instance the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
launched a violence campaign against the Oromo Liberation Front (OLS) that 
resulted in the OLF to leave the elections of 1992 (Pausewang, Trondvall & 
Aalen,2004, as cited in Höglund, 2009). Likewise, the LTTE, which is linked to 
the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), attacked the political activists of other political 
parties and local election monitors to force its political rivals to leave the 
elections. As a consequence of these attacks, several candidates from other 
political parties left elections (Höglund, 2009). Similarly, in the 2005 Iraq 
elections, due to fear of terrorist attack, many political parties have not 
announced their candidates, and some parties, including the country’s most 
prominent Sunni group, the Iraqi Islamic Party, did not contest the election (Ever 
bloodier.2005). 
Influencing electorates’ political preferences 
 Winning votes through use of violence is neither a new technique nor only 
peculiar to insurgents. As Charles and Frary (1918) points out violence and 
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intimidation were regarded as the most effective way of winning votes by 1715 
and political parties carried on them for more than 150 years (as cited in 
Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a). Sisk (2008) acknowledges the existence of efforts 
of coercive methods on gaining votes and considers them as “a form of election 
fraud” (p.6).  
As explained in previous sections, violence can be an effective means of 
increasing popular support for the insurgent. We propose that it applies to the 
election violence in terms of obtaining popular votes as well; therefore the 
insurgent might resort to violence to win electoral support for its political party. 
However effectiveness of election violence and its impact on election outcomes 
is open to discussion. In some cases terrorist attacks against civilians may 
suppress the mass mobilization whereas in other they may increases votes by 
that population (Sisk, 2008, p.6). 
Discussion on Consequences of Violence in the Pre-election and during the 
Election Days 
Pre-election violence may serve for various purposes and produce different 
outcomes in pro-insurgent areas than pro-government areas. If the insurgent is 
not strong in some constituencies, as Sisk (2008) argued, it may use 
indiscriminate violence against government’s civilians in areas where the 
insurgent is most likely to lose the election in order to discourage electorates for 
voting; or target rival party candidates to force them to contest elections in pro-
insurgent areas, or use selective terrorism against carefully selected government 
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targets/combatants to increase its support among the insurgent’s own population. 
Although existent studies on election violence provide valuable insights in to 
election violence, there is still scant literature on this field and still many 
questions remain unanswered. Under which conditions pre-election violence 
produce desired results is still not known clearly; in some cases it may backfire 
and be counterproductive at the ballot box. For instance, unlike presidential 
elections of 2005 in Sri Lanka, or 2005 Elections in Iraq, in East Timor militia 
groups backed by the Indonesian army employed violence prior to the 1999 
referendum in order to intimidate the electorates into not voting for the 
independence, however, contrary to their expectation, it generated a massive 
turnout (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a, and p.19). Similarly, the 2004 Madrid 
Bombing just few days before the elections in Spain indicated that a successful 
terrorist attack can provoke a sharp change of mood in the electorate (A winning 
streak for zapatero.2007)  and can increase the turnout rates against governing 
party (Bali, 2007). Furthermore, in some cases, as a response to pre-election 
violence, the electorates may punish the governing party and replace it whereas 
in others the governing party even increases its vote share even more than 
previous elections. For instance, Madrid bombings of 2004 in Spain just three 
days prior to the Election Day replaced the governing PP party with a soft party, 
the socialist PSOE party, whereas the terrorist attacks just two days before the 
2003 Duma Elections brought a hard-line party, the United Russia. Furthermore, 
similarly, Hamas terrorist campaign from April to February of 1996 before the 
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Israeli elections of May 1996 damaged the incumbent government and replaced 
the incumbent Labor Party government of Shimon Peres with the more hard-line 
government of Benjamin Netanyahu of Likud. As seen in the literature, the 
question of when or why the electorates would punish the governing party and 
replace the government with the election is still not clear.  Given the existent 
literature, we point out five important factors that could be useful to anticipate 
whether the governing party would be replaced or increase its vote share as a 
response to pre-election period. 
Position of the governing party on terrorism 
 Terrorism prior to the elections affects the electorates’ preferences and 
usually brings a hard-line government. Terrorism can change public opinion and 
in general this change is likely to favor the most right-wing and militaristic forces 
in the electoral arena rather than the advocates of international law, peace and 
negotiations (Fishman & Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 2005, 
p.13). Similarly, Hewitt (1990) suggests that usually majorities or pluralities in all 
countries favor hard line policies. If the people believe that governing political 
party does not have a harsh position on terrorism, they are more likely to vote for 
a more hard-line party and replace the current governing party. However, if the 
governing party is a hard-line party and has already harsh policies against 
terrorism, then other people who had not vote for it also would vote the governing 
party thus increase its vote share in the upcoming elections. Israeli elections of 
May 1996, February 2001, Spain elections of May 1996, and 2003 Duma 
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elections in Russia, and provincial elections of 1988, and 2008 in Sri Lanka set 
good examples of it. 
In Israel, Hamas launched a massive bloody pre-election terrorist campaign 
from February to April 1996 against the Israel. On February the 25th of 1996, a 
suicide bomber carried out a suicide bomb attack on a travel bus that killed 26 
and injured 48 people. Another suicide attack on a travel buss was carried out on 
March the 3rd of 1996 and killed 19 and wounded 7 people. Other pre-election 
terrorist attacks occurred in Ashkelon and Dizengoff Center which killed 59 
people (Suicide bombings scar Peres' political ambitions CNN, May 28 1996). As 
the polls taken in mid-May indicated Peres was ahead by 4-6%, however due to 
these terrorist attacks, two days before the election Peres declined to 2% (CNN, 
May 28, 1996). As a consequence, Labor Party government of Shimon Peres lost 
the elections (49.5%) and was replaced with a hard line government of Benjamin 
Netanyahu of Likud (50.5%). Kydd and Walter (2002) examined the impact of 
Hamas’s terrorist campaign and reached the same conclusion that these terrorist 
attacks damaged the incumbent government and replaced it with the more hard-
line government of Benjamin Netanyahu of Likud in Israeli elections of May 1996 
(p.280). Likewise, Bloom (2004) concludes that these attacks were intended to 
influence the election outcomes and as a consequence they brought a hard-line, 
the right wing Netanyahu government into power. The Hamas’s next terrorism 
campaign against Israel began in December 2000, two months before the Israeli 
elections of February 2001. Again, the Hamas intestinally increased its terrorist 
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attacks prior to the election. As a consequence, the terrorism campaign has 
again reached its goals and Barak lost the elections (Kydd & Walter, 2002).  
The Berrebi and Klor’s study (2008) findings are consistent with the Kydd & 
Walter study (2002). They analyzed five national electoral data from 1988 to 
2003 and examined two-way relationship between terrorism and electoral 
preferences by employing differences-in differences (DID) methodology. They 
found that terrorism has a strong impact on the electorate’s political preferences. 
A terrorist attack regardless of where it was perpetrated increases the support of 
the right bloc of political parties, which have strict policies against terrorism; 
additionally, its electoral impact increases as it occurs closer to the elections. 
Likewise, the governing party, the PSOE, lost the elections and was 
replaced with a more hard-line political party, the Partido Popular (Popular Party, 
here after the PP) in the Spanish general election of 1996. Barros, Passos, and 
Gil-Alana (2006) attributed this electoral turnaround to ETA’s pre-election 
terrorism campaign. They suggested that the ETA’s failed terrorist attacks 
against the Prime Ministerial candidate Jose Maria Aznar, and King Juan Carlos 
in August 1995 brought a more hard line government, Popular Party. The PP 
presents itself as a party to control and eradicate the terrorism; according to Rigo 
(2005) 9/11 attacks in the U.S had provided the PP an opportunity to present 
itself a hard-line party through taking a strong position against the terrorism.    
Chechen pre-election terrorism that killed more than 40 and injured more 
than 150 people in Russia brought a hard-line party too, the United Russia, pro-
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Vladimir Putin party with largest number of votes and seats. Oates (2006) found 
that indirectly, Putin’s position on terrorism was relevant in voting behavior 
because many of the participants perceived Putin as a strong, decisive leader, a 
man  would ‘flush’ the Chechen terrorists down the toilet (p.288). 
In Sri Lanka, the bomb attack by the LTTE just one day before the provincial 
election of May 2008 election, which killed 11 and wounded 29 people, has 
brought a landline victory to the hard line governing party, United People's 
Freedom Alliance or the UPFA. According to the UPFA General Secretary Susil 
Premjayanth the electorates viewed the elections as the referendum on war 
against terrorism, and voted for their hard line governing party , which they 
favored their counter terrorism policies (Ferdinando, 2008).  
As seen in these examples, usually pre-election terrorism brings a hard-line 
government. Thus it is important to ask why people vote for a more hard-line 
government.  
Most scholars (Höglund, 2009; Michavila, 2005; Indridason, 2008) explain 
calling a hard-line government through an increase in personal security 
concerns. Pratkanis and Aronson (1996) propose that recourse to fear as a 
propaganda tool is most effective when: “1) there is a serious shock; 2) a specific 
recommendation is offered to overcome the problem; 3) the proposed measures 
are perceived as effective to deal with the threat; and 4) the person who receives 
the message believes he or she can carry out the recommendation” (as cited in 
Michavila, 2005,p.16). To put differently, a terrorist attack increases personal 
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safety concerns, and people seek a political party that would effectively provide 
them the most secure environment.  
Likewise, Gassebner et al. (2008) pointed out the impact of terrorism on 
increasing people’s personal safety concerns thus affecting their political 
preferences. Their study examines the impact of terrorism on the replacement of 
incumbent governments by analyzing 800 elections in 115 countries, and found 
that terrorist attacks increase the probability of government replacement after an 
election by revealing the government’s incompetence of protecting its people 
from terrorism; furthermore, they suggested that this probability increases with 
the severity of the attack. 
Höglund (2009)’s study stresses a relationship among pre-election violence, 
personal safety concerns and electorate’s political preferences. Höglund 
suggests that electoral violence may polarize the electorate along conflict lines, 
thus lead to new outburst of violence, and replace the incumbent with a hardliner 
government, because when people feel they are insecure, they give more 
importance to law and order than the peace and reconciliation, thereby call 
alternative than call for reconciliation (p.412-413).  
Michavila (2005) examines how and why people support government’s 
harsh countermeasures. Michavila argues that people more concern their 
personal security than collective security, whether national or international, 
therefore to the extent that a citizen feels that the state guarantees his or her own 
security, he or she supports the measures it adopts (p.17). Similarly, through 
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analyzing the polls, Huddy, Khatib, and Capelos (2002) found that 9/11 terrorist 
attacks increased concern about their personal security among the Americans 
that they or a family member would become a general victim of terrorism. 
Furthermore, the attacks also increased their support for the government and its 
counter terrorism measures. Similarly, Indridason (2008) argues that terrorism 
may influence electorate’s concerns about their safety, and such concerns 
influence the electorate’s preferences. In other words, the electorates tend to 
cast their votes for the party that would provide more security, especially the 
ones who have been affected by the violence. Amerasinghe (1989) found pre-
election violence carried out by extremist groups in Sri Lanka lowered turnout 
rates and those affected from violence voted against the opposition candidate, 
Bandaranaike, rather than governing party’s candidate. 
When the leftist insurgents increased their violence, General Gustavo Rojas 
Pinilla took power in 1953 trough a military coup in Colombia and number of 
killings under his tenure declined in the short run. And not surprisingly, the next 
year, in 1954, due to his initial success, the national assembly elected him as the 
president (Brauer, Gómez-Sorzano, & Sethuraman, 2004). By the same token, 
since providing security of its population is one of the primary responsibilities of 
government, the electorate may hold the government accountable for its failure in 
securing and protecting its population against the terrorism. Thus, to Indridason 
(2008), depending upon their performance, it is reasonable expect that the 
electorate reward or punish the political parties at the ballot box. By the same 
94 
 
 
 
token, on the other hand, it is also possible that fear of terrorism may work both 
in favor of the insurgent. If the local population feels that the government is not 
capable of protecting the population and preventing terrorism, it may vote for the 
insurgent’s political party, just to avoid from being a target of the insurgent 
terrorism, especially in the post election period.  
Although pre-election violence is more likely to bring a hard-line 
government, sometimes it may not always work that way. In few cases, it may 
defeat a hard-line governing party, or lead the government to implement warm 
policies that the insurgent may favor. For instance, Madrid bombings, which 
occurred just three days before the Spanish General Election of 2004, replaced a 
hard-line government (PP) with a soft one, (PSOE).Or in others, pre-election 
violence may the lead the new government to accommodate the insurgent’s 
demands in return for a relative decline in political violence. For instance, in 
Colombia, when Liberal party candidate Cesar Augusto Gaviria Trujillo (1990-
1994) won the elections and became president, he pushed the legislatures to 
replace the constitution of 1886, appointed a former guerrilla leader to his 
cabinet, pushed large scale budget increases in social expenditures and moves 
that could be viewed as accommodating insurgent demands (Brauer, Gómez-
Sorzano, & Sethuraman, 2004). 
As seen in the literature, only one dimension—position of the governing 
party on terrorism— does not explain the election outcome, therefore, there 
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should be some additional dimensions in anticipating the consequences of pre-
election violence and election outcomes. 
Fault factor 
  If people reach a conclusion that government’s policies or programs 
attracted the terrorists to launch their terrorist campaign or carry out a terrorist 
attack, then they are more likely to hold responsible the government for the 
terrorist attack(s), and as a consequence, will punish the government at the ballot 
box by replacing it with another one, even with a soft one. Spanish general 
election of 2004 is a good example of this.  
On March, 11st of 2004, just three days before the general elections ten 
bombs were exploded in three different trains in Madrid and killed 191 deaths 
and injured over 1500. Although polls indicated that the incumbent party, 
People’s Party was supported by a majority of population in February 2004, the 
incumbent lost the 14 March election with 37.6% of the vote while the Socialist 
Party (PSOE) received 42.6% of the vote and won the election (Indridason, 
2008). The winning party PSOE gained three million new votes compared to the 
previous elections and as a consequence, won a total of 164 of the 350 seats, 
while the incumbent a hard line PP party lost almost 7% of its votes from the 
previous election and 35 of the 183 seats gained in 2000 (Chari, 2004). Whether 
the Madrid bombings affected the unexpected election outcomes received a 
great attention from scholars (Chari, 2004; Van Biezen, 2005; Montalvo, 2007; 
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Bali, 2007; Rose & Murphy, 2007; Tures, 2009). Almost all scholars agreed that 
the Madrid bombings affected electoral outcomes in various ways 
Many international analysts and news media argued that if the ETA had 
been responsible for the Madrid bombings the election outcomes would have 
been very different than the current results; because an ETA attack would benefit 
the incumbent party because of its clear accomplishment in combating terrorism. 
However, an attack by Al-Qaida would put the responsibility for the deaths on the 
governing party because of its support of the U.S in the war in Iraq, which most 
of the Spaniards clearly opposed (Michavila, 2005, p.4). 
Bali (2007) examined the influence of Madrid bombings through individual 
level survey data and found that the Madrid train bombings of 2004 influenced 
the electorate’s voting behavior not because of the population’s weakness 
against terrorism, but because the terrorist attack increased the turnout rate in 
favor of other parties and issues regarding the incumbent government’s policy on 
the Iraq war and mismanagement of the bombing investigation.  
Chari (2004) views the Madrid bombings as a catalyst for change and as a 
reaction to governing party’s foreign policy. He concluded that the terrorist attack 
coupled with the misinformation by the government and served as a catalyst to 
encourage the abstainers to vote against the governing party.  
In addition to the government’s support the war in Iraq, Rigo (2005) 
concluded that poor management of the terrorist investigation was perceived by 
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the population as an attempt to manipulate the tragedy influenced the election 
(p.613).  
Michavila (2005) analyzed published pre-and post-election polls and micro-
data from the post-election poll by the CIS, based on 5,377 door to door 
interviews. He categorized the most proposed reasons for the election outcomes 
under the following four hypotheses and tested their influence: 1) a latent desire 
for a change of government; 2) the shock caused by the attacks; 3) a desire to 
punish the government for its position on the war in Iraq; and 4) a dual 
manipulation of information – by the government and against the government. 
His study findings suggest that the Madrid bombings had a decisive impact on 
the election results that is relatively small but a determining factor that changed 
the final result. Finally, he concludes that those four hypotheses are not 
exclusive, but rather complementary. The first three were necessary 
preconditions for the electoral turnaround and the last one reinforced the 
process. In other words, he argues that, without a latent desire for change, 
without the Spanish government’s support for war in Iraq, and without the shock 
by the terrorist attack, the change would not have occurred (p.32). 
Proximity 
Scholars have argued that as terrorist attacks occur near to election time, its 
impact on the election results increases, whereas the farther away from the 
election, terrorist attacks lose impact (Dhanagare, 1968; Bali, 2007; Berrebi & 
Klor, 2008; Gassebner et al., 2008). For example, in their study on terrorism and 
98 
 
 
 
electoral accountability, Gassebner et al. (2008) examined terror events that 
occurred two years before the elections and found that they do not influence the 
election outcome; therefore, the authors concluded that the electorate is short 
sighted with respect to its voting behavior. Similarly, Berrebi and Klor (2008) 
found that the electoral impact of terrorist acts decreases the farther away the 
terrorist act occurs from the elections. Bali (2007) acknowledged the importance 
of the electoral proximity and suggested that if the Madrid bombings had 
occurred three months before the elections, the electoral outcomes may have 
been different today. In other words, due to the political competition and media 
coverage, if a terrorist act occurs near to election times, the government’s 
performance becomes questionable and vulnerable thereby changing 
government at the elections by the electorate.  
The other two factors that can affect the election outcomes are the 4) 
severity and 5) targets of the terrorist campaign. The more severe and bloodier 
terrorist attacks may generate the greater electoral impact on the elections; and 
indiscriminate terrorism usually generates greater concerns about the personal 
safety among the population.  
To sum up, from the electorate’s perspective, pre-election violence raises the 
concerns about the personal safety and these concerns dominates the voting 
behavior. In case of pre-election violence that is close to the election, if the 
governing party is a soft one, it is most likely that it will be punished at the ballot 
box because of being incapable of protecting its citizens against the terrorists, 
99 
 
 
 
thus will be replaced with a hard-line political party in the upcoming elections. 
However, if the incumbent government is already a hard-line political party, then 
people would decide whether the government’s policies or programs might have 
attracted the terrorists to carry out the attack. If the terrorist attack was carried 
out by a domestic terrorist group, then it is most likely that the incumbent 
government would benefit from the attack because of its already known position 
against the terrorist group and harsh policies. However, if the attack(s) were 
conducted by an international terrorist organization, then the population would 
look at its policies or programs that might lead the terrorist organization to 
choose that country to attack. If the governing population is held responsible for 
the terrorist attacks due to its poor or faulty policies, then it would be replaced 
with another one, probably with a hard line party. This mostly depends on the 
perception of the population. The media, political rivals and other actors may be 
able to undermine incumbent government’s credibility and increase its concerns 
about the incumbent government thus replace the government with the upcoming 
elections; or depending upon the conditions; capabilities and skills of the 
government, its allied media and other factors, if the blame can be attributed to 
other factors and public can be convinced, the government may even benefit the 
terrorist attacks and increase its vote shares.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, pre-election has at least five dimensions. Therefore we argue 
that if the insurgent is really rational, as many scholars acknowledge, then it 
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should consider these dimensions, and carefully plan its terrorism campaign prior 
to the election. Otherwise, since the election is a zero-sum game, the insurgent 
would not only lose its popular support and fail at the ballot box thus deprive it 
from political and population’s resources but also bring a hard-line government 
that would make everything harder. Thus it is important to ask if pre-election 
violence is likely to bring a hard-line government, why would the insurgent use 
violence prior to elections; who actually benefits from pre-election violence, the 
government or insurgent? What are the rationales behind of it? In order to get 
desired outcomes, under what conditions would the insurgent resort to pre-
election violence?  
Under the light of existent literature, if the primary goal of the insurgent is to 
increase support and votes for its political party, it would not attack against its 
native population, especially in its constituencies. Rather, the terrorism campaign 
would focus on combatants and governmental targets in its constituencies.  
However, if insurgent’s primary aim is to damage the government and electoral 
process rather than winning elections, then terrorism campaign would focus on 
government’s civilian population in non-insurgent constituencies. By this way, the 
insurgent might increase the government’s population’s concerns about their 
personal safety and to lead the government’s population to hold responsible the 
government for the attacks. Thus, as a consequence, in order to decrease 
personal security concerns among its citizens and secure a victory in the 
upcoming elections, incumbent government would sit at the negotiating table and 
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give concessions in favor of the insurgent. Because, in some cases, as Rose and 
Murphy (2007) points out, terrorist attacks on civilians may potentially lead to 
policy concessions if the government and citizens believe that the insurgent’ is 
motivated by limited policy objectives; so the government may prefer to make 
some policy changes in favor of  the insurgent. Or, even if the elections usually 
brings a hard-line government, due to its possible harsh indiscriminate counter 
terrorism policies against the insurgent’s native population, the insurgent’s 
population may alienate itself from the government; thus, the insurgent still would 
be able to increase its popular support in the long run and secure the next 
elections. As an example of such strategy, in November 2001 the Maoist 
insurgents, the CPN-M, intentionally escalated the conflict to force the 
government to drop their “democratic mask” and reveal their “true fascist role” in 
front of the Nepalese people and international people (Gobyn, 2009). 
Violence in the Post-Election Period 
Various factors can influence violence in the post-election violence. They 
include fraud in elections (Sisk, 2008; Fischer, 2004), which often occurs when 
disputes over election results or the inability of judicial mechanisms to resolve 
disputes in a fair, timely and transparent manner; electoral system–occurs 
especially when elections are seen as “zero-sum” events and “losers” are left out 
of participation in governance (Fischer, 2004) or in winner-take-all systems may 
cause violence in fragile states because of not letting ethnic minorities to 
represent in the government due to a threshold that must be met across the 
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country (Sisk,2008); and election outcomes (Amerasinghe, 1989; Rapoport & 
Weinberg, 2000a; Boyle, 2009; Finn, 2009; Höglund, 2009; Sisk, 2008).  
Most of the studies focusing on the post-election violence (Amerasinghe, 
1989; Rapoport and Weinberg 2001, Boyle, 2009; Finn, 2009; Höglund, 2009; 
Sisk, 2008) focus on election outcomes and explain it through a relative 
deprivation approach that is generated by dissatisfied election outcomes.  
Electoral Outcomes 
Most scholars have considered election outcomes as the main source of 
the post-election violence therefore conceived post election violent events as 
quick and short-lived events that starts right or soon after the results are 
announced and ends in a short period of time, such as a couple of weeks. 
According to Rapoport and Weinberg (2000a) usually, post election violence 
occurs after the results are announced, as it did in Sri Lanka Elections of 1988 
(Amerasinghe , 1989). The election violence started as soon as results of 1988 
Sri Lanka presidential elections of 1988 announced (Amerasinghe (1989). As the 
Sunday Times (January 1, 1989) reported, 94 bodies were found just on the day. 
Furthermore, at least 260 people were killed within the five days and 417 were 
killed within 13 days in the post-election violence (as cited in Amerasinghe, 1989, 
p.346). 
 Poor election outcomes have various negative meanings for the insurgent 
such as failure at mobilizing the mass (Weinberg & Eubank, 1992), deprive of 
political power and its benefits (Sisk, 2008; Finn, 2009), loss of legitimacy. 
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Without a correct interpretation of election outcomes, post-election violence 
cannot be anticipated or analyzed accurately. 
Weinberg and Eubank (1992) suggest that terrorist violence is the 
outcome of a small elite group of individuals who are frustrated by their inability 
to mobilize the masses; therefore terrorism should be related to a frustrating 
decline in power, not an increasing parliamentary presence, because they may 
think their electoral appeals go “unheeded” (p.136). In other words, when the 
insurgent confronts the indifference of the population that it hopes to get its 
support and mobilize against the government, and its appeals for support are 
rejected by the electorate, it resorts to violence (Weinberg, 1991). Likewise, the 
Hewitt (2000) study on violence perpetrated by the White racists during the South 
during the civil rights period and by the Black militants in the late 1960s and early 
1970s, found that timing of each outbreak of terrorism coincided with the decline 
of popular mobilization, rather than its high points. To Hewitt, unexpectedly poor 
electoral support at the ballot box may lead the insurgent to conclude that the 
entire electoral politics is a fraud and the population has been blinded to the 
insurgent’s real interests (p.433). Furthermore he concludes that groups lose in 
the elections, particularly if they lose “consistently”, are likely view violence as 
tempting option (p.343).  
Similarly Sisk (2008) and Finn (2009) views undesired election results as 
the main source of the election violence because of the insurgent’s aims to retain 
political power or unwillingness to cede power. When the insurgent’s political 
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party lost the elections, it may frustrate its supporters thus lead to political 
violence (Finn, 2009, p.53). As Boyle (2009) pointed out dissatisfied groups have 
powerful incentives to use violence against target population (Boyle, 2009); thus, 
when the insurgent does not satisfy with the defeat at the ballot box, the 
insurgent may use violence against target population (Boyle, 2009), or try to 
overthrow or alter the election outcomes (Höglund, 2009, p.416). Depending 
upon the insurgent’s interpretation of election results, the perpetrator can punish 
the electorates for not voting for its political party, or target government and its 
citizens. For instance when the results of 1999 referendum indicated that an 
overwhelming 78.5% of people voted for the independence of East Timor from 
the Indonesia, military- backed militias launched a violence campaign against the 
East Timorese population, foreign journalists, the UN staff and Catholic clergy 
(Schulze, 2001,p.77-78); as a consequence of this campaign 70-80% of the 
business district in Dili was destroyed, almost 50% of houses in the capital city 
were burnt, and over 271,545 East Timorese were forced to leave to the West 
Timor (Crouch,p.155 as cited in Boyle, 2009, p.225). 
Scholars (Guelke & Smyth, 1992; Neumann, 2005; Berrebi & Klor, 2008) 
have reached different conclusions in their research on the influence on election 
outcomes on post-election violence. For instance Berrebi and Klor (2008) 
examined the influence of Israeli popular support for Israel’s right block parties on 
Palestinian terrorism during the post election period and found no evidence 
indicating a relationship. Perhaps it would have generated greater insight for the 
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proposed study if Berrebi and Klor had examined the Palestinian population’s 
votes. 
 Guelke and Smyth (1992) examined this relationship between violence and 
relative decline in popular support for the IRA by using electoral data and 
concluded that relative decline in popular votes led the IRA to commit terrorist 
acts to increase its popular votes. They suggested that when its political party, 
the Sinn Fein, suffered a set back in the second direct election to the European 
Parliament and polled 10,000 fewer votes than the party had received in the 
Westminster election a year earlier, this failure led to dissatisfaction within the 
IRA regarding the priority given to the electoral contest. Consequently, violence 
increased and most important was the attempt to assassinate the British prime 
minister at the Conservative Party Conference held in 1984 (Guelke & Smyth, 
1992). They suggested that the IRA carried out this attack in order to increase its 
popularity among the Irish population. However, effectiveness of resorting 
violence to increase popular votes is open to discussion. Neumann (2005) found 
that the IRA violence did not manage to increase its popular support in the long 
run. He found that in the long run, as its popular support declined the IRA 
violence declined too in the following ten years and never has reached its death 
tolls.  
Weinberg (1991), McAllister (2004) and Neumann (2005) suggested that 
depending upon the conditions the insurgent may shift its strategy from violence 
to electoral politics, or use both simultaneously. Neumann’s (2005) study 
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indicates that relative declines in vote share of the Sinn Fein started at 1984 
European elections and lasted till 1989 local elections of Northern Ireland. In the 
following years after the 1989 elections, the number of IRA killings gradually 
declined. When the IRA declared a ceasefire in 1993, its political party Sin Fein 
received its highest vote share at 1993 local elections in Northern Ireland and 
European elections. Neumann attributes this electoral success to the IRA’s ability 
to correctly read the changing dynamics of the movement and understand its 
electorates’ opposition to violence. Likewise McAllister (2004) suggested that 
Sinn Fein benefited from the ceasefire of 1994 and built itself a stronger personal 
base of support. In other words, Sin Fein’s political constituents delegitimized the 
violence and this opposition put a pressure on the IRA and limited its violence. 
Therefore, in order to keep popular support with its own side, the insurgent did 
not increase its violence to meet its electorate’s demands thus succeeded in 
regaining popular support. Similarly, Weinberg (1991) points out the mutability of 
political conditions and suggests that given the appropriate circumstances the 
insurgent can replace the electoral campaign with terrorism campaign, the 
opposite, or both simultaneously. If the insurgent desires to acquire respectability 
in domestic and international politics and its violent activities have been to be 
ineffective, then it may pursue its political goals through participating in 
democratic electoral politics (Weinberg, 1991).    
The degree of attached importance to efficiency of violence to reach 
insurgent’s political objectives varies with the time and may affect the insurgent’s 
107 
 
 
 
violence as well. Similarly, Funes’s study findings indicate that in 1989, 80% of 
the Basque country people agreed that violence is unnecessary to obtain political 
goal. This percentage reached to 88% in 1991 and in 1997. The terrorist attacks 
of September 11 2001 in the U.S and March 11 2004 in Madrid have further 
reinforced strong opposition to any terrorist activity in Spain (Pallarés, Muñoz, & 
Retortillo, 2006), as consequence in order to not to alienate the population from 
itself and keep its popular support, the ETA decreased the number of its killings. 
Discussion on Post-Election Violence 
Much of the past literature on election violence primarily has focused on the 
pre-election violence and its effects on electoral process and/or election 
outcomes. However, post-election violence has different dynamics and stems 
from different reasons than the pre-election or election day(s) violence. As 
Amerasinghe (1989) points out pre-election violence aims to “obstruct” 
electorates whereas post-election violence aims to “punish” them (p.347).  
Much of the past studied has explained violence in the post-election period 
with dissatisfaction with the election outcomes, in other words, through a relative 
deprivation approach. Basically, these studies suggest that when a political party 
lost elections, they deprive from political power and resources, thereby these 
political parties or their supporters resort to violence because they do not want to 
loss political power and resources. Although this approach provides some 
insights about post-election period in cases where the insurgent’s political party 
has lost elections or gained a poor success at the ballot box, it provides little 
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information on post-election violence when the insurgent’s political party has won 
the elections or increased its vote shares compared to previous election.  
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This study uses a quantitative research methodology and secondary data 
analysis approach, and constructs a longitudinal design. This chapter first 
provides information about the research design, research approach; then it 
discusses validity and limitations of the study. It introduces the variables and how 
they are coded in the study. Finally, it presents proposed hypotheses.  
Research Design 
Longitudinal designs are quasi-experimental designs, in which the same 
subjects are examined two or more time intervals to allow researchers to 
examine the changes in the dependent variable, and to determine the direction of 
the causation (Nachmias-Frankfurt & Nachmias, 2000). Furthermore, due to the 
fact being extended over time, longitudinal designs are considered as superior to 
cross-sectional designs (Nachmias-Frankfurt & Nachmias, 2000). 
In this study we examine terrorism trends over the elections and relationship 
between insurgent’s electoral support and its terrorist attacks. Timing of data 
collection should be consistent with the nature of change processes under 
investigation (Mitchell & James, 2001, as cited in Ployhart, Holtz, & Bliese, 2002). 
Scholars have argued that as terrorist attacks occur near to election time, its 
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impact on the election results increases, whereas the farther away from the 
election, terrorist attacks lose impact (Bali, 2007; Berrebi & Klor, 2008; 
Gassebner et al., 2008). For example, in their study on terrorism and electoral 
accountability, Gassebner et al. (2008) examined terror events that occurred two 
years before the elections and found that they do not influence the election 
outcome; therefore, the authors concluded that the electorate is short sighted 
with respect to its voting behavior. Similarly, Berrebi and Klor (2008) found that 
the electoral impact of terrorist acts decreases the farther away the terrorist act 
occurs from the elections. Bali (2007) acknowledged the importance of the 
electoral proximity and suggested that if the Madrid bombings had occurred three 
months before the elections, the electoral outcomes may have been different 
today. In other words, due to the political competition and media coverage, if a 
terrorist act occurs near to election times, the government’s performance 
becomes questionable and vulnerable thereby changing government at the 
elections by the electorate. Consistent with previous research, we assumed that 
a monthly time period is appropriate for data collection over a year period both 
before and one year after the elections. 
Research Approach 
The study uses a secondary data analysis approach to examine the 
relationship between electoral support for the political party affiliated with the 
PKK and terrorist incidents over the election periods. Nachmias-Frankfurt and 
Nachmias (2000) list four main advantages of using a secondary data analysis 
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approach: 1) provides opportunity for replication; 2) enables researcher to 
employ longitudinal research design; 3) may improve the validity of measurement 
by expanding time the scope of the independent variables used when 
operationalizing major concepts; and 4) enables the researcher to increase 
sample size, its representatives, and number of observations; 5) it can be used 
for triangulation; and finally reduces the costs.  
Secondary data analysis has three main limitations: 1) differences in data 
collection methods, variables, sample sizes and others; 2) difficulties in 
accessing the data; and 3) problems may arise if insufficient information is 
provided on how the data were collected and other procedures (Nachmias-
Frankfurt & Nachmias, 2000).   
Data of the Study 
In this study, unit of analysis is the provinces of Turkey. Currently, there are 
81 provinces in Turkey. Although the PKK does not carry out any terrorist attacks 
in some provinces, due to presence of a 10% threshold and not to harm 
generalization of the study across Turkey, we included all provinces in to the 
study. The secondary data of the study were collected on two main areas: 1) 
Elections and 2) terrorist attacks 
Terrorism data for the dependent variable was acquired from a database 
generated by the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG) of Sam 
Houston State University in Huntsville, TX. This database includes terrorist 
incidents that occurred in Turkey between 1980 and 2008. The researcher 
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assigned terrorist attacks only carried out by the PKK listed in the database to 
the province wherein the attack was carried out. 
Electoral data for both the parliamentary and municipalities were obtained 
from Turkey’s High Election Board (YSK). For the parliamentary elections, data 
includes the total number of eligible voters, voter turnout, and popular votes for 
each political party. These observations correspond to the results of the 
parliamentary elections of 1995, 1999, 2002, and 2007, and municipal elections 
of 1999, and 2004, in provinces of Turkey.  
Measurement of Variables 
In this study terrorism is measured through the “number of terrorist 
incidents” carried out by the PKK in provinces of Turkey. Vote share of the 
political party affiliated with the PKK is assumed to represent the degree of 
popular support from the province; therefore popular support was measured 
through “vote share of the political party affiliated with the PKK”. Its vote share is 
assumed to represent the degree of popular support from the province.  
Dependent variable 
 Number of terrorist incidents: This variable represents the number of 
terrorist attacks that have occurred within individual provinces of Turkey. The 
study measures terrorism through number of terrorist incidents rather than 
casualties, because from a RMT approach, it is assumed that each terrorist 
attacks requires some level intelligence, logistics, materials and human 
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resources to have; therefore, from this perspective, number of terrorist attacks 
also indicates the terrorism capacity and intention of the insurgent. While a 
terrorist attack could kill tens of people several terrorist attacks might not result in 
any casualties. Therefore, by counting only casualties, not only might we miss 
some terrorist incidents but also might overestimate the capacity or think that the 
insurgent avoided carrying out terrorist attacks. For instance in reality, the 
insurgent might attempt carry out a number of terrorist attacks, but due to 
effective counter-terrorism efforts, they could have been prevented or failed to kill 
or wound anyone. Or resorting indiscriminate terrorism in a crowded place could 
kill tens of people. For these reasons, the researcher counted terrorist attacks 
within corresponding time period for each province.  
Independent variables 
Singer and Willet (2003) describes how to construct a model to analyze 
changes upon an expected event. They name it as “discontinuous individual 
change model” and illustrate how to code the variables into the dataset to 
examine changes pre- and post-event period. Their analogy and discontinuous 
individual change model were use in few studies such as Lang and Bliese 
(2009). Similar to others, this study uses the Singer and Willet (2003) study’s 
design for the sake of this study. 
Due to both statistical and theoretical reasons, an election was divided into 
three election periods: 1) pre-election period; 2) transition stage, (or short term 
post-period; and 3) post-election period, (or long term post-period). If the 
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elections have any impact on terrorist attacks, then they will affect terrorism 
trajectories of provinces by the following ways:  
An immediate shift in elevation, but no shift in slope: In this case provinces’ 
terrorist attacks will increase abruptly upon the election, but their subsequent rate 
of change will be unaffected.  This means that the elevations of their trajectory 
jump, but their slope in the pre-election and post-election epochs remain the 
same. The following figure illustrates such an immediate shift at the election but 
no shift in the post-election slope.  
An immediate shift in slope, but no shift in elevation: In this case provinces’ 
terrorist attacks will remain stable upon election, but their subsequent rate of 
change will be affected—increase or decline in the post-election period. This 
means that elevation of terrorism trend is no higher at the election, but its slope 
in the pre-and post-election epochs differ. 
An immediate shifts in both the election and slope: In this case provinces’ 
terrorist attacks change in two ways as a result of election: They abruptly change 
(increase or decline) and their subsequent rate of change increases/decreases. 
This means that both the elevation and slope of the terrorism trajectories differ 
pre-election and post-election  
The model of the study was structured to represent these possible changes 
upon election by including the following independent variables. 
Time: The time period for the time variable begins 12 months (coded as 0) 
before the election and ends twelve months after the election (coded as 
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23.month) for each individual province; because of following two time variables, 
the time variable in this study represents the pre-election slope for terrorism 
attacks over the pre-election period. 
Election: A dummy coded election variable has been added in the dataset, 
and 0 has been coded for terrorist incidents that occurred before the election and 
1 for after the election. This dummy variable examines the possible elevation 
upon election. Furthermore, the inclusion of the dummy-coded time variable 
allows for discontinuity in the change model (Lang & Bliese, 2009).In the Bliese’s 
study this represents the transition stage to the post-election period. Thus, in 
words of Singer and Willet (2003)’s study this dummy variable indicates whether 
there is an immediate shift in elevation  
Post-election: The post-election variable is used to determine if the post-
election slope differ from the pre-election slope. Stated differently, this variable 
examines whether the slopes of terrorism trajectories differ pre-election and post-
election.  
Vote share of the political party associated with the PKK: This variable 
represents the electoral support (or popular support) of the PKK. For each 
province, it is calculated by dividing valid votes for its party into total valid votes. 
Before the new election (election=0, or time=0…11), previous vote share of the 
PKK’s party has been used and its latter vote share has been used for after the 
new election. Thus, parameter of this variable indicates whether vote share of the 
PKK’s party is significantly associated with the PKK’s terrorist attacks. A positive 
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parameter indicates a positive relationship with the attacks, thus representing the 
RMT approach, whereas a negative parameter indicates a negative relationship, 
thus representing the RD approach. The Table 1 lists all of the variables in the 
study. 
 
Table 1: List of the Variables in this study 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables 
Number of terrorist incidents 
(continuous) 
time (continuous) 
 
 
election (dummy) 
 
 
post-election (continuous) 
 
 
Vote share of the party affiliated with the PKK 
(continuous)  
 
 
This design was employed for each election separately. Although data 
were collected from 1995 and 2002 election results to calculate electoral support, 
the study does not include a separate analysis for 1999 local elections and 2002 
general elections. With regards to local elections of 1999, the PKK’s political 
party did not participate in 1995 local elections, so no electoral data available for 
its political party that is needed for the analysis of 1999 local elections. As 
explained previously, consecutive election results are needed to analyze one 
election. Therefore the researcher did not include local elections of 1999. 
Regarding the general election of 2002, after the capture of PKK leader Abdullah 
Ocalan in 1999, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire that covers 2002 general 
elections –the ceasefire ended in 2004. During the period of 2002 general 
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elections, only few terrorist attacks occurred, so, inclusion 2002 general elections 
into the study would not yield reliable results. Therefore for the sake of this study, 
the researcher has not included 1999 local and 2002 general elections in to this 
study. As a result, three separate dataset (1999 general, 2004 local and 2007 
general elections), were constructed by using above mentioned independent and 
dependent variables. The Table 2 below indicates the data structure for Istanbul 
province in 1999 general elections. 
 
Table 2: Data Structure of the study 
provincename voteshare time election postelection ntotalincidents 
ISTANBUL 3.64 0 0 0 0 
ISTANBUL 3.64 1 0 0 2 
ISTANBUL 3.64 2 0 0 1 
ISTANBUL 3.64 3 0 0 2 
ISTANBUL 3.64 4 0 0 0 
ISTANBUL 3.64 5 0 0 1 
ISTANBUL 3.64 6 0 0 0 
ISTANBUL 3.64 7 0 0 0 
ISTANBUL 3.64 8 0 0 0 
ISTANBUL 3.64 9 0 0 0 
ISTANBUL 3.64 10 0 0 6 
ISTANBUL 3.64 11 0 0 1 
ISTANBUL 4.03 12 1 0 0 
ISTANBUL 4.03 13 1 1 0 
ISTANBUL 4.03 14 1 2 3 
ISTANBUL 4.03 15 1 3 0 
ISTANBUL 4.03 16 1 4 0 
ISTANBUL 4.03 17 1 5 0 
ISTANBUL 4.03 18 1 6 0 
ISTANBUL 4.03 19 1 7 0 
ISTANBUL 4.03 20 1 8 0 
ISTANBUL 4.03 21 1 9 0 
ISTANBUL 4.03 22 1 10 0 
ISTANBUL 4.03 23 1 11 0 
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Hypotheses of the Study 
The main research question of the study is “are the elections and popular 
support affect insurgent’s terrorist attacks?” Two main hypotheses are proposed 
to answer it: The first one; 
H01: “Terrorist attacks are not associated with its popular support”.  
H1:   “Terrorist attacks are associated with its popular support”.  
With regards to impact of electoral support, the RMT and RD theoretical 
approaches have different expectation, so we have two sub hypotheses: First, 
deriving the RMT approach, we hypothesize that: 
H1a: “Popular support is positively associated with terrorist attacks”.  
From a RMT approach we expect that an increase in its vote share 
increases its terrorist attacks. If vote share of the insurgent is positively 
associated with terrorist attacks, then provinces with higher electoral support are 
expected to experience higher terrorist attacks, because more electoral support 
is assumed to indicate more popular support from the local population. Thus, the 
PKK would be able move freely with little concern about being informed to the 
security forces and get more logistic, intelligence and other resources to conduct 
terrorist activities. 
In contrast to the RMT approach, taking a RD approach, we hypothesize 
that: 
H1b: “Popular support is ‘negatively’ associated with terrorist attacks”. 
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If vote share of insurgent is negatively associated with terrorist attacks, the 
researcher expects that a relative decline in the PKK’s electoral support lead to 
an increase its terrorist attacks because of the relative deprivation caused by 
undesired election results. 
The second main hypothesis of the study is that: 
H02: “Terrorist attacks are not associated with elections”.  
H2: “Terrorist attacks are associated with elections”.  
The main reason of proposing two related but separate hypotheses is that vote 
share of the insurgent might be related to terrorist attacks but terrorist attacks 
may not change as a function of time over the election periods. Or it is also 
possible that terrorist attacks may change as a function of time over the election 
periods, but vote share may not associate with them.  
As explained previously, the study divides an election into three election 
periods: 1) pre-election period; 2) transition stage, (or short term post-period; and 
3) post-election period, (or long term post-period). We propose hypotheses for 
each of these periods. 
H02a (Null): “Terrorist attacks will not change during the pre-election period”. 
H2a: “Terrorist attacks will increase during the pre-election period”. 
The PKK could intentionally increase its terrorist attacks over the pre-election 
period to discredit the government, to discourage electorates to cast their votes, 
and increase its popular support among the Kurdish population. Thus, as a 
possible consequence of its pre-election terrorism the incumbent might be 
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replaced with a rival, probably a conservative party—who is known for, or 
promised to take though counterterrorism measures against the PKK.  
As some scholars pointed out post election violent events as quick and 
short-lived events that starts right or soon after the results are announced and 
ends in a short period of time (Amerasinghe , 1989). Consistent with previous 
research finding we expect an increase soon after the election and a decline in a 
short period of time; so we propose the following hypotheses: 
H02b (Null): “Terrorist attacks will not change abruptly upon the election”. 
H2b: “Terrorist attacks will increase abruptly upon the election”. 
H02c (Null): Subsequent terrorism attacks will not differ in the post-election 
period. 
H2c: Subsequent terrorist attacks will decline over the post-election period. 
Analytical Techniques used in the Study 
Longitudinal Data as Hierarchical: Time Nested Within Individuals 
In this study, we examine the changes in terrorist incidents over election 
periods and how relative changes in vote share of the PKK’s political party are 
related to terrorist attacks. Rogosa, Brandt, and Zimowski (1982) provided the 
following useful guidelines for analyzing changes: First, assessments of change 
must be based on a model for change. Second, a model for individual change is 
useful for the measurement of change. Third, the regression function represents 
the key initial summary of the data. Fourth, measures of individual change can be 
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“improved” by incorporating information from all n persons into the measure of 
change. Finally, answers to questions regarding change are most often obtained 
from longitudinal panel data. This study meets Rogosa et al.’s suggestions 
because of its longitudinal design and application of multilevel modeling to model 
terrorism trajectory of provinces over time. 
 Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) can be applied to multiple 
observations nested within a single individual. Due to this feature, HLM can be 
applied to longitudinal data where the primary interest is to model the structure 
and predictors of change over time (Luke, 2004). These models, in which the 
HLM applied to longitudinal data, are also known as “growth models” or “growth 
curve models”.  
Within a longitudinal design, HLM is an intuitive and efficient way to 
estimate individual growth or change curves (Tate & Hokanson, 2006). Multilevel 
models are also known as Random coefficient models (RCM), Multi Level 
Modeling (MLM) or Linear Mixed Models (LMM). Furthermore, multilevel 
modeling is capable of separating changes over time within individuals and 
differences in between individuals at the initial status. It allows random effects 
into the model, and each individual is treated as a random effect. In multilevel 
model, data should be in long format in order that individual slopes and intercepts 
can be calculated. Having estimated individual slopes and intercepts, the model 
predicts individual variability with more precision by using other variables to 
predict the individual variability. Thus, the researcher can examine how an 
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individual changes over time, what the rate of change is, and how the rate of 
change varies by predictors across the individuals.  
One of the essential features of multilevel modeling is that it substantially 
reduces the number of parameters to be estimated while still allowing the 
coefficient to differ from unit to unit or from time to time (Hsiao & Pesaran, 2004). 
This is done by estimating two models: The Level 1 model specifies the intra-
individual model (also referred to as micro model, within-subject, or intra-
individual model), and then the Level 2 model produces parameters for the inter-
individual model (also known as macro, between-subject, inter-individuals model) 
using the parameters of the level 1 model. In other words, level 2 models the 
macro model based on the parameters of level 1 and attempts to explain the 
change and variability by adding predictors of interest in the level 2 model.  
In addition, unlike other repeated measures analysis methods, HLM allows 
the fit of data with unequal numbers of repeated observations for each subject, 
variable timing of observations, and missing data features (Tate & Hokanson, 
2006). Many traditional longitudinal approaches, such as repeated-measures 
MANOVA, are unable to easily handle unbalanced longitudinal data (Luke, 
2004). The HLM can also provide significance tests for individual parameters 
(Ployhart, Holtz, & Bliese, 2002). 
Growth and Discontinuous Growth Models with Hierarchical Linear Modeling 
 “Growth modeling” is widely applied to the analyses of longitudinal data and 
tests for individual differences in the outcome and variability in the rate of change 
123 
 
 
 
over time. The growth model can explain differences in overall outcomes and 
differences in slopes as a function of level 2 characteristics. Growth curve 
modeling requires that the outcome data collected at each time point be 
measured on a common metric in order that changes across time reflect growth 
and not changes in the measurement scale (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1987). Typical 
growth models work in cases when there is an underlying trend to the data, or 
there is no explicit transition point between measurement intervals where change 
takes on a distinct non-linear pattern. However, in many situations, events 
representing distinct transition points occur during longitudinal data collection. 
When this occurs, the growth model masks sub-trends in the overall change 
pattern. Even longitudinal data without any apparent change may reveal 
important information when transition points are examined. If the topic of interest 
is a certain point(s), a “discontinuous growth model” is a good way to reveal such 
information (Bliese, 2006; Lang & Bliese, 2009). In this study, election is the 
‘transition point’ that we will examine. 
 Discontinuous growth models are a specific form of multilevel mixed-effects 
models with multiple time variables to model transition processes over time and 
individual differences in transition processes (Lang & Bliese, 2009). Furthermore 
a discontinuous growth model can capture possible changes and variability 
among provinces. Therefore, in order to thoroughly analyze the differences in the 
terrorism outcome and variability in the rate of change over time, a discontinuous 
growth change was established to analyze whether the terrorism pattern has 
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really changed after an election within-individual, inter-individual levels. 
Furthermore, individual provinces may differ in each term of the discontinuous 
growth model, because it is possible that individual differences can exist for the 
pre-election, election, and post-transition slopes among provinces. For instance, 
some provinces may experience different terrorism patterns in the post-election 
period while others might stay the same. Such individual differences can be 
predicted using level-2 variables. 
The standard HLM does not appropriately analyze the data if the data is 
count.  In these cases, the possible values of Y are non-negative integers, 
typically indicating a positively skewness. If data has few zeros, a transformation 
may solve the problem and allow us to use a linear model; however, if there are 
many zeros, the normality assumption cannot be approximated by a 
transformation (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002, p.292). In such cases, predicted 
values based on a linear model might be negative, indicating coefficients are not 
interpretable. Generalized Hierarchical linear models (Luke, 2004) also known as 
generalized linear models with random effects (Schall, 1991), or Hierarchical 
Generalized Linear Models (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002), offer a coherent 
modeling framework for multilevel data with nonlinear structural models and non-
normally distributed errors (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002, p.292). GHLMs can 
handle a wide variety of different types of non-continuous or non-normal 
dependent variables including binary, proportion, count, and ordinal variables 
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through a necessary transformation and appropriate error distribution for the 
dependent variable (Luke, 2004). 
Initial analysis of the data of this study revealed the need for a Poisson 
distribution in the study because of the presence of nonlinearity of the 
association between predictors and outcome, production of negative predicted 
values, and highly skewness of terrorist attacks is highly skewed. These 
problems can be addressed more productively in employing a nonlinear model. 
Therefore, a generalized hierarchical linear model (GHLM) is more appropriate 
for the sake of this study. 
Generalized Hierarchical Linear Models (GHLM) 
Hierarchical linear models are considered as a special case of GHLM with 
a normal sampling model and identity link function at level 1 (Raudenbush and 
Bryk, 2002).  The level-1 model in HGLM has three parts: a sampling model, a 
link function, and a structural model. A standard generalized linear model for the 
count data uses “Poisson” sampling model and a log link function. These extend 
directly to hierarchical models. In other words, the transformational link connects 
the untransformed dependent variable to a new transformed variable (Luke, 
2004).  
The standard link function when the level-1 sampling is Poisson is log link, 
that is, 
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In words, , is the log of event rate. Thus, if the event rate,λti, is 1, the 
log is 0. When the event rate is less than 1, the log is negative; when the event 
rate is greater than 1, the log is positive. Thus, while  is constrained to be 
nonnegative,  can take on any real value. 
The transformed predicted value of  is now related to the predictors of 
the model through the linear structural model. 
 
 =β0j+  β1j  * 1ij + β2j  * 2j+…………………+ βpj * pij 
 
Then such, transformed predicted log event rate can be converted to an 
event rate, λti by computing λti=exp( ).  Whatever the value of predicted nti, λti, 
will be nonnegative. As seen , combining the level-1 sampling model, the level-1 
link function and the level-1 structural model reproduces the usual level-1 model 
of HLM.  
 
Yti | λti ~ P (mti, λti) 
 
According to the Poisson distribution, the expected value and variance of 
Yti, given the event rate,λti, are then 
 
E(Tti| λti)=mti λti, Var(Tti| λti)= mti λti 
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In words, the expected number of terrorist attacks in time t for province i is 
its event rate, λti, times its exposure mti.  
Specification of the Model of the Study 
Level-1 
 
Y t i  = β 0 i +β 1 i (voteshare t i)+ β2 i (time t i)+ β3 i (election t i)+ β4 i (postelection i )+еti 
 
 Where Y is the ‘log’-number of terrorism incidents in province i at the time 
t; t denotes the measurement occasion (t=1 to T i  where T i  is the number of 
observations for province i ), and time t i  is the month that begins for all provinces 
from 12 months (time starts from 0) before election and ends 12 months after the 
election.  
For the current scaling of time, the intercept β 0 i represents the log-number of 
terrorist incidents in the province i 12 months before the election (time=0); The β 1 
i coefficient reflects the log-rate of terrorism change when vote share of insurgent 
increase one 1%.for the province I; the β 2 i coefficient reflects the log-linear rate of 
change of terrorism indicator for the province i  over pre-election period; the β 3 i 
coefficient reflects log-linear rate of change of terrorism indicator for the province i  
in the transition stage; the β 4 i coefficient reflects the log-linear rate of change of 
terrorism indicator for the province i  over post-election period. The е t i term is the 
log-within-subject residual at the tth   month (i.e., the deviation of Y regarding the 
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true systematic change curve for province i for the t
th   measure).In count terrorist 
attacks are converted by calculating its exponential value.  
 If this level 1 analysis suggests that people differ on within-individual change, 
then the level 2 (between-provinces) can examine the association between 
explanatory variables of interest and patterns of change. Stated differently, like 
HLMs, in GHLM models, variables are added to level 2 models to analyze level-1 
coefficients, either intercepts or slopes (Nezlek, 2001). Due to the fact that 
primary interest of this study is level-1 model (within-province change), no level-2 
predictor other than the mean score of the corresponding coefficient has been 
included in to the level-2 model.  
 
Level-2 Model 
 
Intercept:  β 0 i = π 00+r0 i 
 
VoteShare Slope (change rate by 1% increase in vote share): β 1 i = π 10 +r1 i 
 
time (change rate in pre-election period) : β 2i = π 20+ r2i 
 
election Slope (change rate in transition stage) : β 3 i = π 30+ r3 i 
 
postelection Slope (change rate in post-election period): β 4 i = π 40 +r4 i 
 
 
Analysis Steps for each election 
The HLM.6.08 software package, which was developed by Raudenbush, 
Bryk and Congdon (2004) was used in analyses and only the population-average 
estimates were reported. The population-average estimates give the expected 
difference in the in outcome associated with a unit increase in the predictors, 
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holding constant the other predictors, but averaging over the distribution of level-
2 random effects (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). Furthermore Raudenbush, Bryk 
and Congdon suggest using population-average estimates if the researcher is 
interested in how a change in a predictor can be expected to affect the overall 
population mean. 
Researchers of the HLM usually points out the importance of three main 
steps in conducting level-1 model analysis (Bliese et al, 2007), Singer and Willet, 
2003, Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002): 1) Estimating null model (also referred as 
unconditional means model) and calculate intra class correlation coefficient 
(ICC). 2) Estimate unconditional growth model without random slopes and 3) 
estimate growth model with random slopes. 
Step 1: Estimating Null model and calculating the ICC score 
Step 1 of the procedure involves estimating the intra class correlation 
coefficient (ICC) for the criterion measure.  In our context, the ICC indicates how 
much variability in terrorism scores among observations can be attributed to 
between-province differences across time periods. 
Null model 
Level-1 Model 
 E(Ntotalincidents | β t i ) = λ t i 
 Log [λ t i ]=η t i 
 η t i= β 0i +℮ t i 
 
Level-2 Model 
 β 0i = π 00+ r0 
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The null model does not describe change in the outcome overtime; it stipulates 
that the true individual change trajectory for individual i is completely flat, sitting 
at elevation π00 at level-1. Instead, the null model simply describes and partitions 
the outcome at every level. The level-2 stipulates that while these flat trajectories 
may differ in elevation, their average elevation is π00, and any interindividual 
variation in elevation is not linked to predictors. Thus testing the null model 
allows researcher to establish whether there is systematic variation in our 
outcome that is worth exploring (Singer & Willet, 2003, p.92). The null model 
needs to be fitted first, because its partitions the total variation in the outcome 
meaningfully. The primary reason for fitting the null model is to estimate variance 
components, which assess the amount of outcome variation that exists at each 
level (Singer & Willet, 2003; p93). Where β0i   is true log-mean of Y for province i; 
π00 is true log-mean of Y across provinces in population; and the level-1 residual 
is a “within-individual” deviation that asses the “distance” between Yij and β0i. 
Variation in the log-outcome is just the sum of the within and between-individual 
variance components, so the population intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) is 
calculated as the following: 
ICC= Intercept variance (between-province variance, also referred as level-2 variance)  
         Intercept variance +Residual (also referred as level-1 variance) 
 
Step-2: Unconditional Growth Curve Model 
Step 2 involves estimating the nature and shape of the time-terrorism 
score relationship. The null model and unconditional growth model assess 
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whether there is potentially predictable outcome variation, and if so where it 
resides (Singer & Willet, 2003; p.102). In order to examine the fixed relationship 
between level-1 variables and number of terrorist incidents, number of terrorist 
incidents were regressed on four time-variant predictors which represent the pre-
election, transition stage, post-election slope and vote share slopes. Vote share 
of party affiliated with the PKK has been included as a covariate into to model as 
a level-1 variable rather than level-2 predictor, because of being a time-varying 
covariate, which means it is not constant for a given province, rather it covariates 
with the time, because it changes after the Election Day (time=11). Time-varying 
covariates are included into the level-1 model as level-1 predictors, not into the 
level-2 model (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002, p.179) so that the variation in the vote 
share can be captured by the model.  
Adding additional time-varying predictors to the level-1 can reduce the 
level-1 variance and can affect variance components in both levels, because they 
vary both within-and between provinces; but time-invariant (level-2) predictors 
cannot explain much within-person variation (level-1). The reason is that since 
time-invariant predictors are constant across all individuals they have no within-
province variation to allow for a level-2 residual. However, adding time-invariant 
predictors will reduce the level-2 components if they “explain” some of   the 
between-province variation in initial status or rates of change, respectively. 
(Singer & Willet, 2003; p.103, p.170). Adding a time- varying predictor changes 
the meaning of the individual growth parameters because of the two reasons: (1) 
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the intercept parameter β0i, now refers to the value of the outcome when all 
predictors, not only time variables, but also the time-varying predictor, are zero. 
(2) The slope parameters are now a conditional rate of change, controlling for the 
effects of the time-varying predictor.  
The level-1 and level-2 models for the unconditional growth curve model 
are presented in Equation 2. 
The level-1 and level-2 models for unconditional growth curve model. 
Level-1 Model 
E(Ntotalincidents | π t i ) = λ t i 
Log [λ t i ]=η t i 
η t i=β 0 i +β1i(voteshareti)+β2i(timeti)+β3i(electionti)+β4i(postelectionti)+ ℮ t i 
 
Level-2 Model 
β 0 = π 00+ r0 
β 1 = π 10 
β 2 = π 20 
β 3 = π 30 
β 4 = π 40 
 
Step-3: Unconditional Growth Curve Model with Random Coefficients 
Step 3 involves testing for significant variability across provinces in the 
slopes of time-terrorism relationships. One of the drawbacks of unconditional 
growth models in step 2, which allow only intercepts (r0) to vary among 
provinces, is that it assumes these parameters are constant for each province. 
However, some provinces may have different terrorism patterns over the time 
than other provinces. In order to determine whether provinces have different 
terrorism patterns, alternative models with random slopes that allow slopes vary 
are tested in the Step 3.  P values of the parameters have been used to examine 
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parameter variability. A p-value that is smaller than 0.05 indicates a statistically 
significant variability in the corresponding parameter among provinces.    
Limitations of the Study 
External validity of the study is a limitation of the study. Whether the study 
findings can be generalized to larger populations and applied to different settings 
is referred as “external validity” (Nachmias-Frankfurt & Nachmias, 2000).  Since 
the study focuses only one specific insurgent terrorist organization in Turkey over 
time, it could have a low external validity. Although findings could provide some 
insights into election related terrorism in other countries—especially for those 
who struggle with ethnic insurgent terrorist organizations with political party, 
since terrorist organizations have different background, characteristics and 
operates countries with different characteristics, its findings cannot generalized to 
other countries. Namely, terrorist attacks might follow a totally different trend over 
the election periods or there might be no trend at all.  
The other limitation of the study is related to the data of the study. The 
data were collected by the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG) of 
Sam Houston State University in Huntsville through open sources, so the data 
might cover important terrorist attacks that attracted media attention. There might 
be some small scale terrorist attacks that did not attract media attention thus not 
present in our data.  
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CHAPTER IV: FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
 
 
The results of the study are presented in three sections. The first section 
provides descriptive statistics on the overall number of and type of attacks, then 
charts the attacks longitudinally. The second section test hypotheses and 
presents results of the study. 
Briefly, our study found that electoral support for the PKK was positively 
related to its terrorist attacks. Furthermore, terrorist attacks changed in two ways 
as a result of election: They first abruptly increased upon election and their 
subsequent rate of change declined over the post-election period, meaning that 
both the elevation and slope of the terrorism trajectories differ pre-election and 
post-election.  
Descriptive Statistics of the study 
Number of provinces affected by PKK terrorism and number of terrorist 
attacks differ from election to election. Terrorist attacks increased and expanded 
to more provinces in the 2007 elections. In 1999 general election a total of 27 
provinces (34%) out of 80 experienced terrorist attacks, however this number 
declined to 20 provinces (25%) out of 81 in the 2004 local elections, indicating 
the PKK focused on certain provinces, especially those are located in the 
dominantly Kurdish populated region (DKPR)—which the PKK claims to fight for 
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its independence— rather than conducting a large-scale terrorism campaign. On 
the other hand, for the 2007 elections, terrorist attacks occurred in 30 (37%) out 
of 81 provinces. 18 (60%) of those 30 provinces are located in the DKPR; 
furthermore while provinces located in the non-DKPR region experienced 44 
terrorist incidents other provinces experienced 380 terrorist attacks over 24-
month period in 2007 general elections. The tables 5-6-7 provide detailed 
information about number of and types of terrorist attacks as well as casualties 
for elections. 
Terrorist Attacks in 1999 Elections 
In 24-month period of 1999 elections, a total of 147 terrorist attacks were 
carried out by the PKK in provinces of Turkey (See Table 3, Figure 7 and Figure 
8). In terms of attack type, 58% of attacks were armed attacks and 29% of the 
attacks were bombing attack. 47% of the attacks targeted individuals/ vehicles or 
facilities with combatant status, which include soldiers, gendarmerie forces, 
police and village guards. However, 63% of the targets were affiliated with the 
government. Stated differently, although the PKK targeted mostly non-combatant 
targets (53%), most of the targets (63%) were either government’s officials or 
facilities used by the government. We argue that by targeting officials, vehicles or 
facilities of the government, the PKK tried to avoid losing support of the local 
population, because it is normally easier to justify carrying out terrorist attacks 
against governmental targets than merely civilians without any tie to the 
government. 
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Among combatant targets, the PKK much more preferred to target military 
targets (36%) rather than the police (11%). Since the PKK mostly targeted 
combatants, almost half of the deaths (55%) and wounded (51%) were 
combatants. Attacking mostly military targets is not surprising, because of three 
main reasons: First, the PKK considers itself as a kind of army of the Kurdish 
people and to have a responsibility to expel occupying (Turkish) forces from the 
DKPR region. Second, the police work only in urban areas, whereas the PKK 
militants mainly operate in the rural areas. In order to target the police, the PKK 
has to gather intelligence against police, acquire some logistics and other 
materials; however, operating in the urban areas decreases their chances to 
succeed in their attacks because of relatively less resources and supporters in 
the urban areas.     
 
Table 3: Terrorist Attacks in 1999 Elections 
 Total Arm.Att.    Bomb.    Kidn.   Arson  
Comb vs. 
non-Comb.  
Gov vs. 
non-Gov 
Terrorist attacks  147 85 43 8 11 69 - 78 93- 54 
 
 
Target 
Total 
Attack  Target Deaths Injured Total 
Military 53  Terrorists 61 8 69 
Police 16  Security Forces 193 232 425 
Government 24  Civilians   99 211 310 
Civilian 54  Total 353 451 804 
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Figure 7:Targets of Terrorist Attacks 
in 1999 GE 
Figure 8: Casualties in 1999 GE 
   
 
The Figure 9 illustrates the terrorist attacks over 24 months in 1999 
general elections. These terrorist attacks are divided into pre-and post-election 
periods below and their characteristics are explored.   
 
Figure 9: Terrorist Attacks over the Time in 1999 Elections 
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Pre-election period of 1999 GE 
The Table 4 below presents number of terrorist attacks against the 
governmental vs. non- governmental targets and combatants vs. non-combatants 
over the pre-election period of 1999. During the overall pre-election period of 
1999 elections, the PKK mostly hit the non-combatant targets (50, or 63%), 
especially in the final lap of the election. Despite a higher number of attacks 
against non-combatants, they were not merely civilians. Rather, 55% of the 
targets were affiliated with the government. However, when looked the time 
period of the attacks, it is seen that especially in the final lap of the election the 
PKK dramatically increased its violence against both the governmental and non-
governmental targets, however, most of them were non-combatant targets (see 
Figure 10 and Figure 11 ). 
Table 4: Target Types over Pre-election period of 1999 Elections 
Month 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 total 
Governmental  3 1 7 6 1 1 2 4 2 0 8 9 44 
non-governmental   0 6 2 10 2 0 3 1 0 0 8 4 36 
Total 3 7 9 16 3 1 5 5 2 0 16 13 80 
              
Month 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 total 
Combatant 3 1 5 4 1 1 2 4 1 0 4 4 30 
non-combatant 0 6 4 12 2 0 3 1 1 0 12 9 50 
Total 3 7 9 16 3 1 5 5 2 0 16 13 80 
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Figure 10: Attacks against 
combatants and Non-combatants 
over the pre-election period of 1999 
elections 
 
Figure 11: Attacks against governmental 
and non- governmental over the pre-
election period of 1999 elections 
 
   
 
 
 
The Table 5 below provides number of terrorist attacks over the pre-
election period of 1999 elections by dividing them into their regions and 
combatant status. As seen in the table 5, almost 90% percent (or 26 out of 30) of 
the combatants were attacked in the DKPR region, indicating that during the pre-
election period, the army, police and village guards experienced much more 
terrorist attacks compared to their counterparts deployed out of the DKPR region. 
Interestingly, the PKK carried out more terrorist attacks against the non-
combatant (50) than the combatant targets (30) over the pre-election period. 
However, as closing the Election Day, while terrorist attacks against the 
combatant targets were declined in the DKPR region, they increased in the non-
DKPR regions (see Figure 12 and 13). Furthermore, in the final lap of the 
elections, attacks against the non-combatant targets sharply increased in both 
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the DKPR and non-DKPR regions.42% of the attacks against non-combatants 
within two months prior to the Election Day. 
 
Table 5: Terrorist Attacks over the Pre-Election Period of 1999 Elections 
1999 GE month 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total 
DKPR Combatants  3 1 5 4 1 0 2 4 1 0 3 2 26 
non-DKPR Combatants  0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 
Total Combatants  3 1 5 4 1 1 2 4 1 0 4 4 30 
               
 
1999 GE month 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 total 
DKPR Non-Combatants  0 4 1 8 0 0 2 1 1 0 3 6 26 
non-DKPR Non-Combatants  0 2 3 4 2 0 1 0 0 0 9 3 24 
Total Non-Combatants  0 6 4 12 2 0 3 1 1 0 12 9 50 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Attacks against 
combatants over the pre-election 
period of 1999 elections according 
to their region. 
Figure 13: Attacks against non-
combatants over the pre-election period of 
1999 elections according to their region. 
 
 
    
Post-election period of 1999 GE 
Table 6 provides number of terrorist attacks against non-combatants over 
the post-election period of 1999 elections according to their regions. Like the pre-
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election period, most of the combatants (31, or 79%) were hit in the DKPR 
region. However, unlike pre-election period, the PKK avoided from targeting non-
combatants (5) out of the DKPR region but continued in DKPR region. 82% of 
non-combatants (23 out of 28) were hit in the non-DKPR region over the post-
election period. Terrorist attacks against combatant and non-combatant targets 
abruptly increased upon the election in both the DKPR and non-DKPR regions 
(see Figure 14 and Figure 15). 82% of the attacks (or 23 attacks) against those 
non-combatant targets and 74% of attacks (or 29 attacks) against combatant 
targets were carried out within three months after the Election Day. 
 
Table 6: Terrorist Attacks over the Post-Election Period of 1999 Elections 
1999 GE month 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Total 
DKPR Combatants  5 8 9 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 31 
non-DKPR Combatants  3 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 
Total Combatants  8 9 12 7 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 39 
               
1999 GE month 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Total 
DKPR Non-Combatants  4 2 12 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 
non-DKPR Non-Combatants  1 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Total Non-Combatants  5 3 15 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 
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Figure 14: Terrorist Attacks against 
Combatants in the DKPR And Non-
DKPR Regions Over The Post-
Election Period Of 1999 Elections.   
Figure 15: Terrorist Attacks against Non-
Combatants in the DKPR and Non- DKPR 
Regions Over the Post-Election Period of 
1999 Elections. 
 
   
 
 
To sum up, in 1999 general elections, most of the PKK terrorist attacks were 
armed assaults and attacks focused on governmental targets without combatant 
status. In the final lap of the election, PKK increased its violence in the DKPR 
region. However, starting from the election, the PKK concentrated it attacks on 
the DKPR region and targeted both combatants and noncombatant targets (see 
Figure 16). 
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Figure 16: Attacks against combatants and non-combatants over 24-month 
period of 1999 elections. 
 
 
Terrorist Attacks in 2004 Local Elections 
In 24-month period of 2004 local elections, a total of 84 terrorist attacks 
were carried out by the PKK in provinces of Turkey .While armed assault (58%) 
was the primary attack type and non-combatant targets (53%) were the primary 
targets in the 1999 elections, the attack type shifted from armed assault (46%) to 
bomb involving attacks (48%) and target type shifted from non-combatants (39%) 
to combatants (61%) in 2004 local elections (See Table 7). 75% of the targets 
were affiliated with the government. As a consequence of its attacks, half (51%) 
of the overall deaths and wounded were combatants (see Figure 17 and Figure 
18). This indicates that PKK strategically chose certain targets which are 
affiliated with the government but was not good enough to control the 
consequences of its attacks, especially number of wounded. Finally, like the 
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1999 elections, in terms of combatant targets, the PKK directed its violence 
against military targets (40%) rather than the police (19%).  
 
Table 7: Terrorist Attacks in 2004 Local Elections 
 Total Arm.Att.    Bomb.    Kidn.   Arson  
Comb vs. 
non-Comb.  
Gov vs. 
non-Gov 
Terrorist attacks  84 39 41 2 2 51-33 63-21 
 
Target 
Total 
Attack  Target Deaths Injured Total 
Military 34  Terrorists 25 0 25 
Police 17  Security Forces 45 74 119 
Government 12  Civilians   19 70 89 
Civilian 21  Total 89 144 233 
 
 
Figure 17: Terrorist Attacks in 2004 
Local Elections 
 
Figure 18: Casualties in 2004 Local 
Elections 
      
 
 
The Figure 19 illustrates the terrorist attacks over 24 months in 2004 Local 
elections. These terrorist attacks are divided into pre-and post-election periods 
below and their characteristics are explored.   
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Figure 19: Terrorism trend in the 2004 Local Elections 
 
 
Pre-election period of 2004 LE 
The Table 8 below presents number of terrorist attacks against the 
governmental vs. non-governmental targets and combatants vs. non-combatants 
over the pre-election period of 2004 elections. In contrast to the pre-period of 
1999 elections, the PKK concentrated its attacks against the combatant targets 
(10, or 59%).  70% (or 12) of targets were affiliated with the government. Unlike 
the previous elections, the PKK minimized its violence especially within the last 
months of the local elections (see Figure 20 and Figure 21). Specifically, only 
one attack was carried out against a civilian target. 
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Table 8: Target Types over Pre-election period of 2004 Local Elections 
Month 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Total 
Governmental targets  0 0 0 1 1 0 6 3 1 0 0 0 12 
Non-governmental targets 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 5 
Total 0 0 1 2 1 1 6 4 1 0 0 1 17 
              
Month 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 total 
combatant 0 0 0 0 1 0 6 2 1 0 0 0 10 
non-combatant 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 7 
total 0 0 1 2 1 1 6 4 1 0 0 1 17 
 
 
Figure 20: Attacks against 
combatants and Non-combatants 
over the pre-election period of 2004 
Local Elections 
 
Figure 21: Attacks against governmental 
and non-governmental over the pre-
election period of 2004 Local Elections 
 
   
 
The Table 9 below provides number of terrorist attacks over the pre-
election period of 2004 elections according to their regions and combatant status. 
70% (or 12 out of 17) of overall terrorist activities during the pre-election occurred 
in the DKPR region. 75% of the targets were combatant targets, which occurred 
in the DKPR region (See Figure 22). Of those combatants, 90% percent (or 9 out 
of 10) were attacked in the DKPR. Terrorist attacks against combatant targets 
stopped within the last months of the election regardless of the region, although 
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few individual attacks were carried out non-combatant targets in the non-DKPR 
region, only one non-combatant target was attacked in the DKPR region within 
the last six months of the election (See Figure 23). Unlike the previous elections, 
it seems that this time PKK wanted a peaceful electoral process before the local 
elections, therefore minimized its terrorist attacks. 
 
Table 9: Terrorist Attacks over the pre-election period of 2004 Local elections 
according to their regions and combatant status. 
2004 LE Month 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 total 
DKPR Combatant 0 0 0 0 1 0 6 1 1 0 0 0 9 
non-DKPR Combatant 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
 Total 0 0 0 0 1 0 6 2 1 0 0 0 10 
               
2004 LE Month 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 total 
DKPR Non-Combatants  0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
non-DKPR Non-Combatants  0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 4 
Total Non-Combatants  0 0 1 2 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 7 
 
 
Figure 22: Terrorist attacks against 
combatants in the DKPR and non-
DKPR regions over the pre-election 
period of 2004 Local Elections. 
 
Figure 23: Terrorist attacks against non-
combatants in the DKPR and non-DKPR 
Regions over the pre-election period of 
2004 Local Elections. 
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Post-election period of 2004 LE 
Table 10 provides number of terrorist attacks according to combatant 
status over the post-election period of 2004 local elections. 80% (67 out of 84) of 
overall terrorist attacks were carried out during the post-election period. 25% of 
the post-election attacks occurred within three months and 74% of them occurred 
within the six months after the election. Almost 90% of the attacks within the first 
three months after the local election were carried out against combatant targets. 
 
Table 10: Terrorist attacks according to combatant status over the post-election 
period of 2004 local elections. 
 
Month 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 total 
Combatant 0 7 8 3 10 5 5 0 0 0 2 1 41 
non-combatant 0 0 2 3 7 5 5 2 0 0 0 2 26 
Total 0 7 10 6 17 10 10 2 0 0 2 3 67 
 
Post-election terrorist attacks focused on the DKPR region (see Table 11, 
Figure 24 and Figure 25 below). 75% of overall post-election attacks occurred in 
the DKPR region. First choice of target was combatant targets in the DKP region. 
Over 70% of the targets in the DKPR region were combatant targets; and 90% 
(37 out of 41) of the combatant targets of the post-election period were attacked 
in the DKPR region. This indicates that during the post-election period, the PKK 
carefully chose its targets especially in the DKPR region and used a discriminate 
terrorism strategy to increase its popular support and avoid from losing it. 
However, in contrast to the DKPR region, the PKK directs its violence against 
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non-combatant targets in the non-DKPR region provinces. In post-election 
period, 75% of overall targets were non-combatant targets. 
Within the first three months following the election, the PKK exclusively 
targeted combatants in the DKPR region. Only 1 attack out of 15 was carried out 
against a noncombatant target.  
 
Table 11: Terrorist Attacks over the post-election period of 2004 Elections 
 
2004 LE Time 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 total 
DKPR Combatant 0 7 7 3 10 3 4 0 0 0 2 1 37 
non-DKPR Combatant 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Total Combatant 0 7 8 3 10 5 5 0 0 0 2 1 41 
               
2004 LE Time 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 total 
DKPR Non-Combatants  0 0 1 3 2 2 3 1 0 0 0 2 14 
non-DKPR Non-Combatants  0 0 1 0 5 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 12 
Total Non-Combatants  0 0 2 3 7 5 5 2 0 0 0 2 26 
 
Figure 24: Terrorist attacks against 
combatants in the DKPR and non-
DKPR regions over the post-election 
period of 2004 Local Elections.  
 
Figure 25: Terrorist attacks against 
non-combatants in the DKPR and non-
DKPR Regions over the post-election 
period of 2004 Local Elections. 
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When considered the  overall terrorism trajectory, it is seen that in the long 
run up to the 2004 local elections, the PKK increased its attacks against the 
combatant targets in the DKPR region, where it’s most constituencies live in, but 
during the election’s final lap it stopped its terrorist activities in this DKPR region 
(See Figure 26). In the post-election period, it concentrated on the DKPR region 
and launched a massive terrorism campaign against combatant targets in this 
region. Furthermore, starting from four months after the election, the PKK also 
directed its violence against non-combatant targets in out of the DKPR region.   
 
Figure 26: Attacks against combatants and non-combatants in 2004 Local 
Elections 
 
 
 
In conclusion, the 2004 local elections have the lowest rate of terrorist 
attacks among others. The PKK made some changes in its terrorism strategy. In 
general, the attack type shifted from armed assault to bomb involving attacks and 
target type shifted from non-combatants to combatants in 2004 local elections. 
151 
 
 
 
While the attacks focused on combatant targets in the DKPR region, they 
focused on non-combatant targets in out of the DKPR region. In contrast to the 
other elections, provinces experienced more terrorist attacks during the post-
election than the pre-election period; finally, there is no increasing trend in the 
final lap of the election, instead, terrorist attacks declined to minimum points as 
closing to the Election Day.  
Terrorist Attacks in 2007 General Elections 
Compared to other elections, the 2007 general elections have the greatest 
number of terrorist attacks. In 24-month period of 2007 general elections, a total 
of 424 terrorist attacks were carried out provinces of Turkey (See Table 12, 
Figure 27 and 28). Armed attacks (63%) became a prevalent attack type again in 
the 2007 general elections. Like the previous elections in 2004, terrorist attacks 
were concentrated on officials and property of the government (88%), especially 
on combatant targets (84%). Not surprisingly, the military was the first choice of 
the PKK; 77% (or 328 out of 424) of attacks were directed against the military. 
Civilian targets were the second choice, which came even before the police 
targets. Although a greater proportion (67%) of the deaths was combatant 
targets, proportion of the wounded civilians (51%) exceeded the combatant 
targets (48%). As a consequence of the terrorist attacks, 485 civilians and 460 
combatants were injured. This indicates that either the PKK was not good 
enough to control civilian victims or intentionally did not avoid from using 
indiscriminative terrorism, which increases number of civilian casualties. 
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Table 12: Terrorist Attacks in 2007 General Elections 
 
 
Target 
Total 
Attacks  Target Deaths Injured Total 
Military 328  Terrorists 179 5 184 
Police 27  Security Forces 503 460 963 
Government 20  Civilians   70 485 555 
Civilian 49  Total 752 950 1702 
 
 
 
Figure 27: Terrorist Attacks in 2007 
General Elections 
 
Figure 28: Casualties in 2007 General 
Elections 
  
 
The figure 29 illustrates the terrorist attacks over 24 months in 2007 
general elections. Then these terrorist attacks are divided into pre-and post-
election periods below and their characteristics are explored.   
 
 
 
 
 
 Total Arm.Att.    Bomb.    Kidn.   Arson  
Comb vs. 
non-Comb.  
Gov vs. 
non-Gov 
Terrorist attacks  424 268 135 12 9 355-69 375-49 
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Figure 29: Terrorist Attacks over the Time in 2007 General Elections 
 
Pre-election period of 2007GE 
The Table 13 below presents number of terrorist attacks against the 
governmental vs. non- governmental targets and combatants vs. non-combatants 
over the pre-election period of 1999. During the overall pre-election period of 
2007 elections, 88% of the targets were governmental targets; specifically 84% 
of the targets were combatant targets. As closing the Election Day, the PKK 
increased its violence against governmental targets, especially against 
combatant targets (see Figures 30 and Figure 31 below). Choosing combatant 
targets indicates the PKK’s intention to use discriminate or selective terrorism 
strategy, thus avoiding from being criticized by its own population. As mentioned 
previously, use of violence against combatant targets is a means of acquiring 
popular support for the insurgent. Increasing terrorism especially within the final 
lap of the election indicates the intention of the PKK to effect elections. The 
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reason could be discouraging adversary parties’ voters and increasing its own 
electoral support especially.  
 
Table 13: Terrorist Attacks over the pre-election period of 2007 General 
Elections 
pre-election 2007 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 total 
Governmental targets  24 25 12 3 4 2 1 1 2 13 57 38 182 
Non-governmental targets 4 7 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 3 2 24 
Total 28 32 14 3 4 2 2 2 2 17 60 40 206 
              
pre-election period 2007 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 total 
Combatants 19 23 12 3 4 2 1 1 2 13 57 36 173 
Non-combatants 9 9 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 3 4 33 
Total 28 32 14 3 4 2 2 2 2 17 60 40 206 
 
Figure 30: Attacks against Combatants 
and non-combatants over the Pre-
election Period of 2007 General 
Elections. 
 
Figure 31: Attacks against 
Governmental and Non- governmental 
over the Pre-election period of 2007 
General Elections. 
 
    
 
The DKPR region and combatant status of the targets are important 
factors for the PKK. Almost 90% (183 out of 206) of the terrorist attacks during 
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the pre-election period were carried out within the DKPR region; and 90% (161 
out of 183) of those attacks within the DKPR region targeted combatants (Table 
14 and Figure 32 and Figure 33 below). Furthermore, especially in the final lap of 
the election the PKK dramatically increased its violence against combatants in 
the final lap of the election. 60% (106 out of 173) of the attacks targeting 
combatants were carried out within the last three months of the election, and only 
one of them was carried out of the DKPR region. 
 
Table 14: Terrorist Attacks over the pre-election period against 
combatants/noncombatants according to the region in 2007 General Elections. 
 
2007 GE-pre Time 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 total 
DKPR combatant 13 21 12 3 4 2 0 0 1 13 56 36 161 
non-DKPR combatant 6 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 12 
 total 19 23 12 3 4 2 1 1 2 13 57 36 173 
               
2007 GE-pre Time 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 total 
DKPR non-combatant 8 4 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 4 22 
non-DKPR non-combatant 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 11 
 total 9 9 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 3 4 33 
 
Figure 32: Attacks against combatants 
in the DKPR and non-DKPR regions 
over the Pre-election period of 2007 
General Elections 
 
 
Figure 33: Attacks against non-
combatants in the DKPR and non-
DKPR regions over the Pre-election 
period of 2007 General Elections. 
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Post-election of 2007 GE 
Post-election violence started after the election and quickly declined three 
months after the election. 84% (183 out of 218) of the post-election period 
attacks were carried out within the first months after the election (See Table 15, 
Figure 34 and Figure 35 below). Like the pre-election period, main targets of the 
PKK during the post-election period were governmental (89%) and combatant 
targets (83%). 88% of the combatants that were targeted during the overall post-
election period were attacked within the first three months after the election. 
Attacks followed a similar trend for both the combatant and noncombatant, or 
governmental and nongovernmental targets. 
 
Table 15: Terrorist Attacks According to Governmental and Combatant Status 
over the Post-election Period of 2007 General Elections 
 
Post-election 2007 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Total 
Governmental targets  45 81 41 7 3 2 0 2 5 3 4 0 193 
Non-governmental targets 3 5 8 1 1 2 0 2 0 2 1 0 25 
Total 48 86 49 8 4 4 0 4 5 5 5 0 218 
              
Post-election 2007 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Total 
Combatants 43 78 38 7 3 2 0 2 4 3 2 0 182 
Non-combatants 5 8 11 1 1 2 0 2 1 2 3 0 36 
Total 48 86 49 8 4 4 0 4 5 5 5 0 218 
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Figure 34: Attacks against Combatants 
and non-combatants over the Post-
election Period of 2007 General 
Elections 
Figure 35: Attacks against 
Governmental and Non- governmental 
over the Post-election Period of 2007 
General Elections. 
   
When considered the DKPR region, it is clearly seen that the attacks 
focused on the DKPR region. Specifically, 90% of (197 out of 218) the post-
election attacks occurred within the DKPR region (See Table 16, Figure 36 and 
Figure 37). 86% of those attacks were carried out against the combatant targets; 
which 75% (149 out of 197) of them occurred within the first three months after 
the election. 
 
Table 16: Terrorist Attacks According to Combatant Status and Region over the 
Post-election Period of 2007 General Elections 
 
2007 GE Time 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 total 
DKPR combatant 38 74 37 7 3 1 0 2 4 3 1 0 170 
non-DKPR combatant 5 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 12 
 total 43 78 38 7 3 2 0 2 4 3 2 0 182 
               
2007 GE Time 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23  
DKPR non-combatant 3 7 8 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 3 0 27 
non-DKPR non-combatant 2 1 3 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 9 
 total 5 8 11 1 1 2 0 2 1 2 3 0 36 
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Figure 36: Terrorist Attacks against 
combatants in the DKPR and non-
DKPR regions over the Post-election 
period of 2007 General Elections.  
 
Figure 37: Terrorist Attacks against 
non-combatants in the DKPR and non-
DKPR regions over the Post-election 
period of 2007 General Elections 
   
 
The PKK focused on the DKPR region and launched a massive terrorism 
campaign against specifically combatant targets over the final lap of the 2007 
general elections. In the post-election period, campaign against the combatants 
abruptly increased in the short run after the election but then declined 
approximately over the post-election. Furthermore it seems that the PKK 
considers the DKPR region factor and combatant status when directing its 
violence (See Figure 38). 
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Figure 38: Terrorist Attacks against combatants and non-combatants in 2007 
General Elections 
 
Comparison of the Elections 
In terms of geographical location, Kurdish region factor seems to be an 
important for the PKK. The PKK’s main area of terrorism is the DKPR, which it 
has a considerable amount of popular support and each passing election the 
PKK has more concentrated its terrorist attacks on Kurdish region. While 72% of 
terrorist attacks occurred within the Kurdish region in 1999 general elections, this 
percentage increased to 75% in 2004 local elections, and peaked at about 90% 
in 2007 general elections (see Table 17). In addition to DKPR region, the PKK 
specifically targets combatants, which include soldiers, police and village guards 
that were deployed in the DKPR region. For instance, the percentage of terrorist 
attacks against the combatant targets in the DKPR region increased from 54% to 
73% in 2004 local elections and peaked at 87% in 2007 general elections (See 
Table 18). On the other hand, in contrast to such a selective terrorism strategy in 
the Kurdish region, the PKK tends to target mostly noncombatant targets (70-
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75%) in non-Kurdish region provinces. Although such an indiscriminate terrorism 
strategy was a prevalent strategy in non-Kurdish provinces till 2004 local 
elections, this strategy seems to shift from non-combatants (45%) to combatants 
(55%) in 2007 elections. In 2007 elections, only 13% of targets were 
noncombatant targets in the Kurdish region and 45% were noncombatants in the 
non-Kurdish region. Stated differently, the PKK systematically decreased its 
attacks against noncombatant targets region but increased them against 
combatants in the DKPR region. 
Despite this shift, a considerable amount of threat against non-combatant 
targets still exist in the non-Kurdish region provinces.   
 
Table 17: Terrorist Attacks according to Combatant Status of Terror Targets 
across Elections 
         
  DKPR    Non-DKPR  
  Comb. 
Non-
comb. total 
% of 
total Comb. 
Non-
comb. total 
% of 
total 
1999 GE 57 49 106 72.11% 12 29 41 27.89% 
2004 LE 46 17 63 75.00% 5 16 21 25.00% 
2007 GE 331 49 380 89.62% 24 20 44 10.38% 
         
 
Table 18: Percentages of Terrorist Attacks According to Combatant Status of 
Terror Targets across Elections 
 
 DKPR Non-DKPR 
  Comb. Non-comb.   Comb. Non-comb. 
1999 GE 53.77% 46.23%  29.27% 70.73% 
2004 LE 73.02% 26.98%  23.81% 76.19% 
2007 GE 87.11% 12.89%   54.55% 45.45% 
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Figure 39: Terrorist Attacks According to Combatant Status of Terror Targets 
and Regional Status across Elections 
 
 
 
Visual inspection of terrorist attacks over time indicates that terrorist attacks 
show an increasing trend and reaches their peaks two months before the general 
elections. However; in contrast to general elections, terrorist attacks started to 
decline as closing to the local elections and reached its minimum levels in the 
final lap of local elections (See Table 19 and Figure 40 below). In general 
elections, terrorist attacks first reach their peak points within three month after 
the election day, then dramatically declines in the post-election periods.However, 
local elections has a different terrorism trajectory during the pre-election period 
only. Terrorist attacks were kept at the minimum level during the pre-election 
period of the local election of 2004, then, like the general elections terrorist 
attacks increased in the post-election period, declined in the long run.  
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Table 19: Total Terrorist incidents in Turkey during pre-and post-election periods 
for each election 
 
 Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
pre-election period 1999 80 3 7 9 16 3 1 5 5 2 0 16 13 
post-election period 1999 67 13 12 27 11 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
              
pre-election period 2004 17 0 0 1 2 1 1 6 4 1 0 0 1 
post-election period  2004 67 0 7 10 6 17 10 10 2 0 0 2 3 
              
pre-election period 2007 206 28 32 14 3 4 2 2 2 2 17 60 40 
post-election period  2007 218 48 86 49 8 4 4 0 4 5 5 5 0 
 
 
Figure 40: Overall terrorism trajectories per election 
 
 
Conclusions from descriptive statistics 
To sum up, the data indicates that terrorism starts to increase three 
months before the general elections and drops three months after the election. 
Local election has a different terrorism trajectory in pre-election period. Although 
terrorism shows a declining in the long-run over the post-election period of the 
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local election, it did not drop below the level in the pre-election terrorism. 
Furthermore, in terms of geographic locations, most of terrorist attacks occur 
within the Kurdish populated region. In terms of target type, the PKK specifically 
chooses combatants within the Kurdish region. Although the PKK concentrated 
its violence on non-combatants in the non-Kurdish region provinces in the past 
two elections, it has shifted this strategy to combatant targets in the last 
elections.  
Analysis Results of the Study 
 This section presents the results of our analysis. Each election is analyzed 
and interpreted separately first, then compared to each other. In each election, 
variables (vote share, pre-election, election and post-election) in the model 
represent our hypotheses; therefore their corresponding parameters have been 
used to test to our hypotheses. Having analyzed each election separately and 
compared to each other, we present our hypothesis tests.   
Overview of the Results 
 
Briefly, our analysis indicates a significant immediate shift in both the 
elevation and slope for each election. Namely, terrorist attacks changed in two 
ways as a result of election: They first abruptly increased and their subsequent 
rate of change declined. Statistically, this means that both the elevation and 
slope of the terrorism trajectories differ pre-election and post-election. With 
regards to the relationship between popular support and terrorism, our study 
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found a positive relationship between them, indicating that electoral support for 
the PKK is positively related to its terrorist attacks.   
To start with the terrorism trajectories, with the exception pre-election 
terrorism in 2004 local elections, our analysis indicated that all independent 
variables are statistically significant. In terms of terrorism trajectory our findings 
indicate that that terrorism increases upon the election in the short-term after the 
election but subsequent terrorism declined in the long-term over the post-election 
periods. Specifically, our analysis indicates a statistically significant increasing 
terrorism trend over the pre-election periods in the1999 and 2007 general 
elections (t=2.01, p=0.045; t=3.69, p=0.000, respectively), but not in the 2004 
local elections (t=0.330, p=0.74). Furthermore, terrorism dramatically and 
significantly increases upon the election (t=6.2, p=0.000; t=5.5, p=0.000; t=6.2, 
p=0.000, respectively), then subsequent terrorism declines over the post-election 
period (t=-12.6, p=0.000; t= -2.9, p=0.005; t=-11.133, p=0.000, respectively). The 
Figure 41 illustrates the expected terrorism trajectories over the 24-month period 
for each election based on our findings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
165 
 
 
 
Figure 41: Expected terrorism trajectories over 24-month period for each 
election based on our findings estimates 
 
 
 
Our analysis indicates that PKK’s electoral support is significantly and 
positively associated with terrorism in all three elections (t=3.213, p=0.002; 
t=6.279, p=0.000, respectively). These findings provide evidence for resource 
mobilization theory, suggesting that popular support increases terrorist attacks 
and lack of electoral support decreases them. 
Finally, our analysis indicates that there are variances among provinces in 
terms of their terrorist attacks, indicating that terrorism declined in some 
provinces whereas increased in others. 
Variances among provinces in Elections 
The Table 20 below presents the estimates of the null models for 1999 
general, 2004 local and 2007 general elections. Results for the step 1(estimating 
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the null model) presents that provincial characteristics had a statistically 
significant effect on terrorist attacks across all the three elections (t=-10.7 for the 
1999 GE, t=-12.4 for the 2004 LE, and t=-6.3 for the 2007 GE). This finding 
indicates that there are statistically significant differences among provinces in 
terms of their terrorism scores. Provinces could experience terrorist attacks 
differently either because of their provincial characteristics (time in variant factors 
such as being located in the dominantly Kurdish populated region) or because of 
some time-variant factors that they experienced over the time (such as elections, 
changes in electoral support for the political party associated with the PKK). 
Since the primary interest was not on the differences of the provinces (Level-2 
model) we did not attempt to explain these differences by including provincial 
characters.  
 
Table 20: Unconditional Model estimates 
 
Fixed Effect          coeffient s.e t-ratio d.f 
p-
value exp{coeff} 
For intercept, β0 (when time=0) 
1999 GE:INTRCPT2, B00      -2.480 0.232 -10.71 79 0.000 0.084 
2004 LE: INTRCPT2, B00      -3.021 0.243 -12.45 80 0.000 0.049 
2007 GE:INTRCPT2, B00     -1.493 0.237 -6.298 80 0.000 0.225 
 
At step 2, we looked at the variance components and calculated the ICC 
scores in order to see where these differences reside. Our analyses indicate that 
provinces varied in terms of their terrorist attacks, and provincial characteristics 
of provinces are the main source of such variance among provinces. 
Furthermore in all elections there was much more between-province differences 
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than within-individual differences in terms of their log-terrorist attacks (results are 
not shown here). For instance, 90% of the variance in log-terrorist attacks over 
24-month time period can be attributed to provincial characteristics in 1999 
elections; 92.5% in the 2004 local elections and 84% in the 2007 general 
elections.  
At Step-3 whether there were any differences in terrorism during any of 
the periods among provinces were examined. A series of analyses suggested 
that there are differences among provinces in their transitions stage (short term 
after the election) in each election. For instance while provinces followed a 
similar terrorism trajectory in their pre-election periods in 1999 and 2004 
elections, there were sufficiently large differences in 2007 elections to conclude 
that certain provinces experienced different terrorism trajectories in their pre-
election, transition stage and post-election periods (results are not shown here).  
Since the primary focus of this study was on the intra-province, or within-province 
changes over the time, we have not included any level-2—provincial 
characters—predictors to explain such differences in terrorism trends over the 
periods among provinces. 
Terrorism in 1999 General Elections 
 
Briefly, our analysis suggest that vote share of the PKK’s party is positively 
associated with its terrorist attacks in 1999 elections accounting for other 
variables. Furthermore, terrorist attacks gradually increased over the pre-election 
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period, then first abruptly increased upon the election in the short term then 
declined over the post-election period. The table 21 presents the results of our 
analysis for 1999 general elections, and Figure 42 and 43 illustrates the logs and 
counts of expected terrorism trajectory of provinces in 1999 elections, 
respectively. 
Table 21: Analysis Results in 1999 Elections 
Fixed effects Coeff. S.E t-ratio D.F 
p-
value 
Exp{Coeff} 
Rate Ratio 
Intercept    -3.256077 0.254955 -12.771 79 0.000* 0.039 
Vote share           0.041697 0.012979 3.213 1903 0.002* 1.043 
Pre-election          0.035774 0.017832 2.006 1903 0.045* 1.036 
Election 0.955136 0.153641 6.217 1903 0.000* 2.599 
Post-election        -0.443562 0.035141 -12.622 1903 0.000* 0.642 
 
 
Figure 42: Log-Terrorist incidents over 
time in 1999 Elections 
 
Figure 43: Count Terrorist Incidents 
over time in 1999 Elections 
 
   
 
Our analysis suggests that vote share of the political party affiliated with the 
PKK is significantly and positively related to terrorist attacks (t=3.2, p=0.002). A 
1% increase in the vote share increases the log-terrorist attacks by 0.042; or 
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stated differently, a 1% electoral support is the expected to make a 0.042 
difference in the log-terrorist attacks of provinces. Holding others constant, a 
positive relationship between electoral support and terrorist attacks implies the 
followings: First, provinces with higher popular support experiences higher level 
of terrorism; or provinces with less popular support experience lower level 
terrorism. Second, an increase in electoral support for the PKK leads it to 
increase its terrorist attacks in the post-election period. From the same token, a 
decline in its electoral support decreases its terrorist attacks in the post-election 
The Figure 44 and Figure 45 below illustrate this relationship on three provinces 
with different electoral support for the PKK. As seen in the Figure 28, a province 
with a higher level electoral support for the PKK’s party is expected to experience 
higher level of terrorism over the time. In other words, more ballots breed more 
bullets. 
 
Figure 44: Impact of Electoral Support on Log-Terrorist Incidents in 1999 
Elections 
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Figure 45: Impact of Electoral Support on Count Terrorist Incidents in 1999 
Elections 
 
 
 
Parameters for pre-election slope suggest that terrorist attacks systematically 
increased over the pre-election period, thus indicates presence of a significant 
increasing terrorism trend (t=2.0; p=0.045). Specifically, the log-terrorist attacks 
significantly increase by 0.036 per month. This increase is a very small change 
relative to the dummy election and post-election variables.  It is 26 times smaller 
than the dummy election and 12 times smaller than the post-election variable. In 
other words, there is slower rate of terrorism change during the pre-election 
period compared to the dummy election and post-election period.  
The Figures 46 and Figure 47 below plot the log terrorist attacks and count 
terrorist attacks over the pre-election period, respectively.  
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Figure 46: Log-Terrorist incidents over 
the pre-election period in 1999 
Elections 
Figure 47: Count Terrorist incidents 
over pre-election period in 1999 
Elections. 
 
       
 
As explained previously, we have included a dummy election variable in the 
election month, because we anticipated that elections would affect the PKK’s 
terrorist attacks, thus the PKK will employ a different terrorism strategy after the 
election. The parameter for dummy Election indicates that log-terrorist attacks 
significantly and abruptly increased by 0.96 upon the election (t=6.2, p=0.000). 
Election caused an immediate shift in terrorist attacks after the election and had 
the greatest impact on the terrorist attacks among others. If the parameters for 
the dummy election variable had not been significant, it would have indicated that 
terrorism trend remained stable upon the election. The Figures 48 and Figure 49 
plot the expected terrorism change upon the 1999 elections in the log and count 
terrorist attacks, respectively.  
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Figure 48: Change in Log-Terrorist 
Incidents upon the 1999 Elections 
 
Figure 49: Change in Count Terrorist 
Incidents upon the 1999 Elections 
 
     
 
Finally, election had a significant influence on the subsequent rate of 
terrorism change over the post-election period. Specifically, log-terrorist attacks 
declined by -0.44 per month over the post-election period. A significant p value 
for the post-election slope indicates that election also shifted in the slope. When 
compared to pre-election period, log-terrorist attacks over the post-election 
period changed 12 times faster than the pre-election. The Figures 50 and Figure 
51 plot post-election terrorism trend based on our expected subsequent rate of 
terrorism change in the log and count terrorist attacks respectively over the post-
election period of 1999 elections  
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Figure 50: Log-Terrorist incidents over 
the post-election period in 1999 
Elections   
 
Figure 51: Count Terrorist incidents 
post-election period in 1999 Elections 
 
   
 
Since the parameters for dummy election has a significant p value, our 
analysis indicates that rate of change in terrorist attacks abruptly increased upon 
the election and their subsequent rate of change decreased over the post-
election period.  This means that both the elevation and slope of the terrorism 
trajectories differ pre-election and post-election.   
Terrorism in 2004 Local Elections 
Like the general elections of 1999, vote share of the PKK’s party is positively 
associated with its terrorist attacks in 2004 local elections accounting for other 
variables. However, in contrast to the previous election, there is no reliable 
terrorism increasing trend over the pre-election trend. Like the previous elections, 
terrorist attacks first abruptly increased upon the election in the short term then 
declined over the post-election period.  
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Table 22 presents the results of our analysis for 2004 local elections and 
Figure 52 and Figure 53 plots the expected logs and count terrorist attacks over 
the pre-election period in 2004 elections, respectively. As seen in the Table 22, 
vote share of the PKK’s political party is significantly and positively related to 
terrorist attacks (t=5.9, p=0.000). A 1% increase in the vote share increases the 
log-terrorist attacks by 0.077, indicating that a 1% electoral support is the 
expected to make a 0.077 difference in the log-terrorist attacks of provinces.  
 
Table 22: Analysis Results in 2004 Local Elections 
Fixed effects Coeff. S.E t-ratio D.F 
p-
value 
Exp{Coeff} 
Rate Ratio 
Intercept    -4.920254 0.339737 -14.483 61 0.000* 0.007 
Vote share           0.077152 0.013004 5.933 1219 0.000* 1.080 
Pre-election          0.011992 0.036289 0.33 1219   0.741 1.012 
Election 1.571605 0.284813 5.518 1219 0.000* 4.814 
Post-election        -0.113615 0.039612 -2.868 1219 0.005* 0.893 
 
 
   
Figure 52: Log-Terrorist incidents over 
time in 2004 Local Elections 
 
Figure 53: Count Terrorist incidents 
over time in 2004 Local Elections 
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The Figure 54 and Figure 55 below illustrate this relationship on three 
provinces with different electoral support for the PKK. Although two provinces 
with the same degree electoral support for the PKK are expected to experience 
same terrorism trajectory over the pre-election period, the province where the 
PKK gained an additional 10% vote share is expected to experience a higher 
level terrorism trend than the other one whose electoral support remained same 
in the latter election (See Figure 54 and Figure 55).This finding implies that 
provinces with higher level electoral support are expected to experience a higher 
level of terrorist attacks over the time. Similarly, provinces where the PKK’s 
political party gained more electoral support in the new election are expected to 
have higher rate of terrorism over the post-election period (see Figure 53 and 54 
below).   
 
Figure 54: Impact of Electoral Support on Log-Terrorist Incidents in 2004 Local 
Elections 
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Figure 55: Impact of Electoral Support on Count Terrorist Incidents in 2004 Local 
Elections 
 
Parameters for pre-election slope indicate that there is no statistically 
significant terrorism trend over the pre-election period (t=0.33; p=0.741). As seen 
in the figures 53 and 54, count terrorist attacks remained stable over the pre-
election period. 
  Similar to the previous elections in 1999, the parameter for dummy Election 
indicates that log-terrorist attacks significantly and abruptly increased by 1.57 
upon the election (t=5.5, p=0.000), indicating election caused an immediate shift 
in terrorist attacks after the election and had the greatest impact on the terrorist 
attacks among others. It coefficient is 131 times greater than the coefficient of 
pre-election and 14 times greater than the post-election’s. The Figures 56 and 
Figure 57 plot the expected terrorism change upon the 2004 local elections in the 
log and count terrorist attacks, respectively.  
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Figure 56: Change in Log-Terrorist 
Incidents upon the 2004 Local Elections 
 
Figure 57: Change in Count Terrorist 
Incidents upon the 2004 Local 
Elections. 
 
  
Finally, subsequent rate of terrorism change over the post-election period 
was also significantly affected by the local election (t=-2.87; p=0.005), indicating 
that local elections also shifted in the slope. Specifically, log-terrorist attacks 
declined by -0.11 per month over the post-election period (See Table 22). 
Despite this decreasing trend over the post-election period, due to high rate of 
terrorism change in the short run and relatively small rate of change over the 
post-election slope, terrorist attacks did not decline below the pre-election 
period’s level (see Figure 58 and Figure 59).  
The Figures 58 and Figure 59 plot post-election terrorism trend based on 
our expected subsequent rate of terrorism change in the log and count terrorist 
attacks respectively over the post-election period of 2004 local elections  
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Figure 58: Log-Terrorist incidents over 
the post-election period in 2004 Local 
Elections. 
 
Figure 59: Count Terrorist incidents 
over the post-election period in 2004 
Local Elections. 
 
   
 
In conclusion, because of the fact that dummy election and post-election 
parameters have significant p values, we conclude that rate of change in terrorist 
attacks abruptly increased upon the election and their subsequent rate of change 
decreased over the post-election period.  Like the previous election, this means 
that both the elevation and slope of the terrorism trajectories differ pre-election 
and post-election.   
Terrorism in 2007 General Elections 
 
Like the other two elections, vote share of the PKK’s party is positively 
associated with its terrorist attacks in 2007 general elections accounting for other 
variables. The terrorism trajectory over the 2007 general elections resembles the 
1999 elections. Namely, terrorist attacks increased over the pre-election period, 
then first abruptly increased upon the election in the short term then declined 
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over the post-election period. Table 23 presents the results of our analysis for 
2007 general elections; and Figure 60 and Figure 61 plot the logs and counts of 
expected terrorism trajectory of provinces in 2007 general elections, respectively. 
 
Table 23: Analysis Results in 2007 General Elections 
  Fixed effects Coeff. S.E t-ratio D.F 
p-
value 
Exp{Coeff} 
Rate Ratio 
Intercept    -3.443496 0.251876 -13.671 80 0.000* 0.032 
Vote share           0.060502 0.009636 6.279 1399 0.000* 1.062 
Pre-election          0.08153 0.022098 3.689 1399 0.000* 1.085 
Election 1.173584 0.188138 6.238 1399 0.000* 3.234 
Post-election        -0.486888 0.043735 -11.133 1399 0.000* 0.615 
 
 
Figure 60: Log-Terrorist incidents over 
time in 2007 General Elections. 
 
Figure 61: Count Terrorist incidents 
over time in 2007 General Elections 
 
   
 
Like the previous elections, our analysis of 2007 general elections found a 
significant positive relationship between the vote share of the PKK’s political 
party and its terrorist attacks (t=6.3; p=0.0000. Specifically, a 1% increase in the 
vote share increases the log-terrorist attacks by 0.06. In other words, a 1% 
electoral support is the expected to make a 0.06 difference in the log-terrorist 
180 
 
 
 
attacks of provinces. This finding implies that provinces with higher level electoral 
support for the PKK’s party are expected to experience higher level of terrorism 
over the time. The Figure 62 and Figure 63 below illustrate this relationship on 
three provinces with different level of and changes in electoral support for the 
PKK (see Figure 62 and Figure 63). 
 
Figure 62: Impact of Electoral Support on Log-Terrorist Incidents in 2007 
General Elections 
 
 
Figure 63: Impact of Electoral Support on Count Terrorist Incidents in 2007 
General Elections 
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Our findings indicates presence of a significant increasing terrorism trend 
over the pre-election period of 2007 general elections (t=3.7; p=0.000). 
Specifically, the log-terrorist attacks significantly increase by 0.08 per month (See 
Table 23 above). This increase is a relatively small change compared to the 
dummy election and post-election variables.  It is 14 times smaller than the rate 
of change upon the election and 6 times smaller than the rate of change over the 
post-election period. In other words, terrorist attacks shows a slowly increasing 
trend over the pre-election period, but a faster increasing trend  in the short run 
upon the election and a faster declining trend in the long run over the post-
election period. The Figure 64 and Figure 65 below plot the log terrorist attacks 
and count terrorist attacks over the pre-election period, respectively.  
 
Figure 64: Log-Terrorist incidents over 
the pre-election period in 2007 General 
Elections. 
 
Figure 65: Count Terrorist incidents 
over the pre-election period in 2007 
General Elections 
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 Similar to the previous elections in 1999 and 2004, the parameter for dummy 
Election indicates that log-terrorist attacks significantly and abruptly increased by 
1.17 upon the election (t=6.2, p=0.000), indicating election caused an immediate 
shift in terrorist attacks after the election and had the greatest impact on the log-
terrorist attacks among others (See Table 23, Figure 66 and Figure 67). The 
Figures 66 and Figure 67 plot the expected terrorism change upon the 2007 
general elections in the log and count terrorist attacks, respectively.  
 
Figure 66: Change in Log-Terrorist 
Incidents upon the 2007 General 
Elections 
 
Figure 67: Change in Count Terrorist 
Incidents upon the 2007 General 
Elections 
        
 
With regards to post-election terrorism, our analysis suggests that similar 
to 1999 and 2004 elections subsequent rate of terrorism change over the post-
election period was significantly affected by the 2007 general elections (t=-11.13; 
p=0.000), indicating that elections also shifted in the slope. Specifically, log-
terrorist attacks declined by -0.49 per month over the post-election period (See 
Table 23). The rate of change per month in the post-election period is 6 times 
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than the rate of change per month over the pre-election and only 2.4 slower than 
the rate of change in the short run after the election, therefore in few months after 
the election terrorist attacks dropped below the terrorism level during pre-election 
period (see Figures 68 and 69 below). The Figures 68 and Figure 99 plot post-
election terrorism trend based on our expected subsequent rate of terrorism 
change in the log and count terrorist attacks respectively over the post-election 
period of 2007 general elections.  
 
Figure 68: Log-Terrorist incidents over 
the post-election period in 2007 
General Elections 
 
Figure 69: Count Terrorist incidents 
over the post-election period in 2007 
General Elections 
 
      
 
In conclusion, rate of change in terrorist attacks abruptly increased upon the 
election and their subsequent rate of change decreased over the post-election 
period.  Therefore we conclude that both the elevation and slope of the terrorism 
trajectories differ pre-election and post-election.   
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Tests of Hypotheses 
 In this section we focus on the same independent variables across 
elections, compare their rate of change in terrorist attacks and test our 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis Test for Electoral support for the Insurgent’s Political Party 
The primary focus of the study is on the popular support and its relationship 
with the terrorist attacks. 
 H1: “Terrorist attacks are associated with its popular support”. 
Due to the RMT and RD approaches’ different assumption, we had developed 
two different sub-hypotheses: 
H1a: “Popular support is positively associated with terrorist attacks”.  
H1b: “Popular support is ‘negatively’ associated with terrorist attacks”. 
To remind, we have measured popular support for the PKK through vote 
share of the PKK’s political party in this study and have tested its relationship 
with the PKK’s terrorist attacks. The Table 24 provides our results across 
elections.  
 
Table 24: Electoral Support for the PKK’s Party across Elections 
 
Fixed effects Coeff. S.E 
t-
ratio D.F 
p-
value 
Exp{Coeff} 
Rate Ratio 
Vote share (1999 GE)          0.041697 0.012979 3.213 1903 0.002 1.043 
Vote share (2004 LE)          0.077152 0.013004 5.933 1219 0.000 1.080 
Vote share (2007 GE)          0.060502 0.009636 6.279 1399 0.000 1.062 
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To summarize, our analysis found a statistically significant relationship 
between popular support and number of terrorist attacks in provinces 
(β1=0.041697, p=0.002 in 1999 GE, β1=0.077152, p=0.000 in 2004 LE, β1 
=0.060502, p=0.000). Since this relationship was statistically significant in 1999, 
2004 and 2007 elections, we accepted our first main hypothesis (H1) which 
states “Terrorist attacks are associated with its popular support”. 
A statistically significant ‘positive’ relationship between PKK’s electoral 
support and terrorism supports the RMT and provides no evidence for the 
relative deprivation approach. If the findings had found a ‘negative’ relationship 
between electoral support and terrorist attacks, this would have supported a 
relative deprivation approach, meaning poor electoral support would lead to more 
terrorist attacks; or relative decline would lead to terrorist attacks. Therefore we 
accepted our sub-hypothesis H1a which states “Popular support is positively 
associated with terrorist attacks” and rejected the rival one, the H1b which states 
“Popular support is ‘negatively’ associated with terrorist attacks”. 
When compared the effect of vote share on terrorist attacks across elections, 
vote share had the greatest impact on local elections. While a 1% increase in 
electoral support for the PKK increased the log-terrorist attacks by 0.042 in 1999 
and 0.06 in the 2007 general elections, it increased the log-terrorist attacks by 
0.077 in 2004 local elections. It had a quadratic impact on terrorist attacks over 
the 2004 local elections. The Figure 70 and Figure 71 below illustrate how 
electoral support is expected effect terrorist attacks in each election. As seen in 
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the those figures, as electoral support increases, terrorist attacks are expected to 
increase; and similarly as electoral support decreases, terrorist attacks are 
expected to decrease. However, magnitude of this impact varies in elections 
(See Figure 70 and Figure 71). 
 
Figure 70: Impact of an Increase in 
Electoral Support on CountTerrorist 
Incidents per Election 
Figure 71: Impact of a Decrease in 
Electoral Support on Count Terrorist 
Incidents per Election 
 
   
Hypothesis Test for Terrorism in the Pre-election Periods 
 
The second interest of this study is on the relationship between elections 
and terrorist attacks. To remind, our main hypothesis was;  
H2: “Terrorist attacks are associated with elections”.  
With regards to terrorism over the pre-election period, our sub-hypothesis 
was; 
H2a: “Terrorist attacks will increase during the pre-election period”. 
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We have tested our hypothesis in our models through our independent time 
variable that represents the pre-election period. With the exception of local 
elections, we have found evidence for our hypothesis. The table 25 presents our 
findings for terrorism over pre-election period across elections, which were 
explained under each election separately.  
 
Table 25:Pre-election Terrorism across Elections 
Fixed effects Coeff. t-ratio p-value 
Exp{Coeff} 
Rate Ratio 
Pre-election (1999 GE) 0.035774 2.006 0.045* 1.036 
Pre-election (2004 LE) 0.011992 0.33 0.741 1.012 
Pre-election (2007 GE) 0.08153 3.689 0.000* 1.085 
 
To remind, terrorism significantly increased towards the general elections 
(β2=0.035774, p=0.045 in 1999 GE; and β2=0.08153, p=0.000 in 2007 GE). 
Therefore for the 1999GE and 2007GE, we rejected the null hypothesis H02 and 
accepted the H2, which states that “Terrorist attacks are associated with 
elections”; however we failed to reject the null hypothesis H02 for the 2004 local 
elections. In terms of direction, all parameters are positive, indicating a positive 
relationship between popular support and terrorist attacks.  
Furthermore, the rate of change differed from election to election. 
Specifically, log-terrorist attacks increased by 0.036 in the 1999 general election 
and by 0.08 in the 2007 general election per month over the pre-election period. 
In other words, during the pre-election period, log-terrorist attacks in 2007 
general elections increased over twice times faster per month than the 1999 
general elections. In contrast to the general elections, log-terrorist attacks did not 
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significantly increase during the pre-election period of 2004 local elections. 
Terrorism trends in the pre-election periods for each election are illustrated in the 
figure 72 and 73. 
 
Figure 72: Log-terrorist attacks in pre-
election periods across Elections 
Figure 73: Count terrorist attacks in 
pre-election periods across Elections 
 
       
 
In conclusion, we conclude that there is statistically significant increasing 
terrorism trend over the pre-election period in general elections but not in local 
elections of 2004. 
Hypothesis Test for Terrorism in short-term period after the election 
 
Deriving from existing literature, which was pointed out post election violent 
events are quick and short-lived events (Amerasinghe, 1989), for the first part the 
argument we proposed that; 
H2b: “Terrorist attacks will increase abruptly upon the election”. 
The dummy variable “Election” in our model represents the H2b sub-
hypotheses and rate of change in terrorist attacks in the short term after the 
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election. Parameters for the dummy election variable across elections are 
presented in the table below and have been used to test our hypotheses. 
 
Table 26: Terrorism upon the Election in the Short-Term Periods 
Fixed effects Coeff. t-ratio p-value 
Exp{Coeff} 
Rate Ratio 
Election (1999 GE)         0.955136 6.217 0.000 2.599 
Election (2004 LE)          1.571605 5.518 0.000 4.814 
Election (2007 GE)         1.173584 6.238 0.000 3.234 
 
The findings of study revealed terrorism significantly increases abruptly 
upon the election (β3=0.955136, p=0.000 in 1999 GE; β3=1.571605; p=0.000 in 
2004 LE; and β3=1.173584, p=0.000 in 2007 GE). So, we rejected the null 
hypothesis H02b and accepted our hypothesis H2b, which states “Terrorist 
attacks will increase abruptly upon the election”. 
Log-terrorist attacks significantly increased by 0.96 upon election in the 
1999 general elections, by 1.57 in the 2004 local elections, and   by 1.17 in the 
2007 general elections (See Table 26). When compared the elections, holding 
others constant it is the 2004 local elections which had the greatest effect in 
terrorism elevation (See Figure 74 and Figure 75).  
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Figure 74: Log-terrorist attacks upon 
election in the Short-term across 
elections 
Figure 75: Count terrorist attacks upon 
election  in the Short-term across 
elections 
 
   
 
In conclusion, we conclude that terrorist attacks increases upon the 
election in the short run after the elections, but their rate of change differ from the 
election. 
Hypothesis Test for Terrorism in post-election periods 
 
Deriving from the same argument arguing post election violent events are 
quick and short-lived events (Amerasinghe, 1989), for the second part the 
argument we proposed that; 
H2c: “Subsequent terrorist attacks will decline over the post-election period”. 
The post-election variable in our model represents the H2c sub-hypotheses 
and rate of change in terrorist attacks in the long term after the election. 
Parameters for the post-election slope across elections are presented in the 
Table 27 below and have been used to test our hypotheses. 
 
191 
 
 
 
Table 27:Post-election Terrorism across Elections 
Fixed effects Coeff. t-ratio p-value 
Exp{Coeff} 
Rate Ratio 
Post-election (1999 GE)         -0.44356 -12.62 0.000 0.642 
Post-election (2004 LE)          -0.11362 -2.868 0.005 0.893 
Post-election (2007 GE)         -0.48689 -11.13 0.000 0.615 
 
 
Our findings revealed that subsequent terrorist attacks significantly declines 
over the post-election periods (β4=-0.44356, p=0.000 in 1999 GE; β4=-0.11362; 
p=0.005 in 2004 LE; and β4=-0.48689, p=0.000 in 2007 GE). So, we rejected the 
null hypothesis H02c and accepted our hypothesis H2c, which states 
“Subsequent terrorist attacks will decline over the post-election period”. 
 
Figure 76: Log-terrorist attacks in the 
Post-election period across elections     
 
Figure 77: Count terrorist attacks in the 
Post-election period across 
 
   
   
Rate of subsequent change in log-terrorist attacks differ from election to 
election. Specifically, log-terrorist attacks significantly declined by -0.44 per 
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month over the pre-election period of 1999 elections, by -0.11 in 2004 local 
election and by -.049 in 2007 general elections. Among three, the 2007 general 
elections have the fastest rate of decline in log-terrorist attacks over the post-
election period. However, holding constant other factors, 1999 general election’s 
declining trend is very close to trend in 2007elections (see Figure 76 and 77). 
Terrorism declined to its lowest points in several months after the general 
elections but despite its declining trend, it did not end or drop below its level 
during the pre-election period. 
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
 
Introduction 
In this study we have sought answers to two main questions: First, 
whether popular for the PKK was associated with the terrorist attacks; second, 
whether elections had any impact on the PKK’s terrorist attacks. Terrorism trends 
were explored both prior and after the elections. In this section, we discuss our 
findings, compare them to the existing literature, and discuss possible policy 
implications.    
Discussion of Findings 
Popular Support for the Insurgent and Terrorism 
Hypotheses: 
1: Terrorist attacks are associated with its popular support. 
Hypothesis 1 tested whether popular support for the insurgent was related to 
its terrorist attacks and the direction of this relationship. Our analysis found a 
statistically significant positive relationship between them. This finding indicates 
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that popular support for the insurgent increases its terrorist attacks and lack of 
popular support decreases its terrorist attacks. 
The primary interest of this study was on the insurgent’s electoral support. 
In the social movement and insurgency literature there are two leading approach 
to this issue. Taking a relative deprivation approach some scholars argue that an 
expected result and achieved result would create a relative deprivation and this 
relative deprivation lead to political violence. On the other hand, RMT scholars 
suggest that resources of the social movement (or insurgent) are crucial for the 
social movement organizations; thus without sufficient resources, organizations 
fail to achieve their objectives. In this study, electoral support for the PKK is 
assumed to indicate popular support level for the PKK. As explained previously 
popular support is identified as a key factor in the insurgency literature because 
of the fact that popular support from the local population is closely associated 
with logistics, intelligence, and recruitment for the insurgent. Thus, without 
sufficient popular support the insurgent would not survive. The study findings 
shed some lights on this dispute between resource mobilization and relative 
deprivation scholars. The analysis results found a significant positive relationship 
between popular support and terrorist attacks, providing support for the RMT 
approach; however this study found no evidence supporting the RD approach. If 
the findings had found a negative relationship between electoral support and 
terrorist attacks, this would have supported a relative deprivation approach, 
meaning poor electoral support would lead to more terrorist attacks; or relative 
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decline would lead to terrorist attacks. On the other hand, we acknowledge the 
possibility of that poor election results in some provinces might still frustrate the 
insurgent and could lead it to carry out few terrorist attacks in some of those 
areas.  
Our findings on the positive relationship between popular support and 
terrorist attacks are consistent with arguments of leading counterinsurgency 
practitioners and a few scholars. As the flow of resources increases, the 
insurgent will be able to recruit more members, and increase its intelligence, 
logistics, financial support other necessary material (McCarthy & Zald, 1977), in 
return, increasing the level of resources invested in terror would increase the 
success of the insurgent (Mesquita , 2005). From the same analogy as the 
insurgent group loses support, its capabilities and resources to generate violence 
will diminish, because the insurgent are subject to resource constraints that limit 
the insurgent’s expenditures on activities not to exceed its income or resources 
(Enders & Sandler, 1993). Even if the insurgent loses a relative amount of its 
support, the insurgent will be confined to its popular base areas, therefore, it will 
fight for its popular bases for the sake of intelligence and logistical reasons 
(Thompson, 1966; Galula, 2006). Concentrating the terrorist activities in popular 
activities is logical and beneficial for the PKK, because the PKK has limited 
number of militants and limited ammunition and other material that are used to 
carry out terrorist attacks. By carrying out terrorist attacks in less or non-
supportive areas it would not only waste their resources but also decrease its 
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chance to succeed in carrying out those attacks. Each terrorist attacks requires 
some materials, safe houses, intelligence and individuals to participate in. 
Carrying out terrorist attacks in hostile or less supportive areas is easy as it might 
seem to be. Residents of less supportive areas have no sympathy for the PKK, 
thus are more likely to cooperate with the government and inform any suspicious 
activity. In addition to low chance, high risk and waste of resources, in terms of 
popular support, the effect of the terrorist attack would be less compared to more 
supportive areas. 
In conclusion, we conclude that the PKK is more likely to increase its 
terrorist attacks when there is more popular support and to decrease them when 
lacked popular support. 
Election and Terrorism 
H2: “Terrorist attacks are associated with elections”.  
This study reveals that elections affect the insurgent’s terrorist attacks, so 
terrorism trend differs pre-election and post-election periods, indicating that PKK 
is not oblivious to elections.  
Terrorism before the Elections 
H2a: “Terrorist attacks will increase during the pre-election period”. 
With regards to pre-election terrorism, our study found a significant increasing 
trend in terrorist attacks over the pre-election period of general elections only. 
There may be various reasons or a combination of these reasons for increasing 
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terrorism towards general elections. These reasons could include discouraging 
potential voters of adversary political party; increasing popular support among 
the Kurdish population, thus increasing its vote share in the upcoming election; 
generating fear among the population, discrediting the incumbent government 
and replacing it with another party. We do not think the PKK is increasing its 
terrorism to disrupt the electoral process; rather it tries to increase its vote share, 
thus win the elections, because winning general elections provide the PKK extra 
power and status. Once the PKK won the general elections and gained seats in 
the parliament, it will be able to gain also respect and legitimacy both in the 
domestic and international arena. Its parliamentary members will be able to 
oversee policies and government official’s actions. An analysis on the proposals 
submitted by parliamentary members indicate that the parliamentary members of 
the political party affiliated with the PKK were very active; they have submitted 
approximately 30 proposals either to change or make new laws. These proposals 
include changes in anti-terrorism law, and certain laws related to the police and 
army. For instance, on December 13th and May the 15th of 2008, its 
parliamentary members proposed bills to abolish mandatory military service and 
to change tasks of the Turkish army. On December 2nd of 2008, they submitted a 
bill to limit discretion of police in using force. On February 12th of 2009 and June 
24th of 2009, they have submitted bills to make changes in the Anti-Terrorism 
law. In these two bills, they aimed abolish some of the articles regulating trial of 
young people between 15 and 18, propaganda of a terrorist organization and 
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punishment of directors of media organizations. With their proposals, the 
parliamentary members of the PKK’s political party attempted change laws on 
the benefit of the PKK. In addition to these efforts, these parliamentary members 
submitted numbers of proposal regarding the activities of the government’s 
officials. For instance, between 2007 and 2009, they have submitted 602 
proposals requesting either oral or written explanation by the minister of related 
governmental institution regarding an official’s operation. One third (172 out of 
202) of these proposals were related to the law enforcement issues. 5% of them 
were related to prisons or jails. By submitting proposals, these parliamentary 
members were not only putting pressure on government’s officials who fight with 
the PKK terrorism but also proposing as if they were defending the Kurd’s rights 
in the parliament. In addition, as a parliamentary member, they often pointed 
Abdullah Ocalan as the only solution of the Kurdish issue and asked the 
government to negotiate with him. Because of these and many other benefits, the 
elections offer extra power to the PKK, thereby the PKK strive to win the 
elections; as explained its rationales, political violence is a common means of 
acquiring popular support and often used over the pre-election period. Like the 
other insurgents, the PKK resorted violence to win the elections.  
Our findings on pre-election terrorism are consistent with previous studies, 
suggesting that terrorism increases before elections (Dhanagare, 1968; 
Amerasinghe, 1989; “Ever bloodier.2005”; “Can the voters build on success? 
2005”; Gobyn, 2009; Sisk, 2008; Berrebi & Klor, 2008; Gassebner et al., 2008). 
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Most of them focused on the pre-election terrorism were descriptive studies and 
pointed out low turnout rates as a consequence of terrorist attacks prior to the 
elections. For instance, as mentioned previously, the Sinhalese nationalist 
extremist organization) and Patriotic People's Front launched a terrorism 
campaign three months before the elections; as a consequence, due to fear of 
terrorism, only 55.32% of the electorates went to the polling stations  in the Sri 
Lanka presidential elections of 1988 (Amerasinghe, 1989). Similarly, Maoist 
insurgents, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) carried out violent 
nationwide protests and as consequence only 20 percent of the electorates voted 
in Nepal (Gobyn, 2009). Likewise, the Chechen insurgents killed 40 and 
wounded 150 people just two days before the Election Day and as a 
consequence only 55.75% of the electorates voted in the 2003 Duma elections in 
Russia. Similarly, insurgent groups in Iraq launched a terrorism campaign just 
three weeks before the Iraqi elections of 2005, (Ever bloodier.2005); as a 
consequence of these attacks, hundreds of thousands Sunni Arabs scared and 
did not cast their votes (Can the voters build on success? 2005).  
Specific reasons of the PKK are not statistically examined in this study; 
however descriptive statistics on target types indicates that the PKK prefers to 
specifically attack against combatant targets, which include soldiers, police and 
village guards in the dominantly Kurdish populated region (DKPR). We argue that 
by targeting specifically combatant targets in its constituencies—which are the 
DKPR provinces— the PKK aimed to increase its popular support and turn it to 
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electoral support for its political party. As explained in the descriptive statistic 
section of this study, the PKK focused combatants in the DKPR region, over the 
pre-election period, especially in the final lap of the elections, whereas targeting 
more non-combatant targets in the non-DKPR region provinces compared to the 
DKPR region provinces. This findings are partially consistent with the Sisk(2008) 
and the Höglund (2009) studies, which argued  during the election campaign’s 
final lap main common aim of the election violence is to intimidate or influence 
voters through creating insecurity against opponent’s potential supporters, thus 
the pattern of violence shifts from incumbent state official and emerging 
candidates from political parties to potentially adversary electorates and 
candidates. Their study did not make any difference in provinces or regions. In 
our study, although the violence intensified as the Election Day approached, 
violence shifted to noncombatants (in which covers potentially adversary 
electorates and candidates in those studies) only in non-DKPR region provinces, 
however violence was directed against the combatant targets in the DKPR region 
provinces. For instance, in the DKPR region the percentage of terrorist attacks 
against the combatant targets increased from 54% to 73% in 2004 local elections 
and reached to 87% in 2007 general elections. On the other hand, in contrast to 
such a selective or discriminate terrorism strategy in the DKPR region, the PKK 
still targets noncombatant targets in the non-Kurdish region, where it has poor 
popular support.  
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Another factor related to pre-election terrorism is proximity, which was 
mentioned previously. Literature suggested that terrorist attacks starts within a 
short time period prior to the elections. Some studies explicitly pointed out the 
“proximity” of the terrorist attacks. (Dhanagare, 1968; Bali, 2007; Sisk,2008; 
Berrebi & Klor, 2008; Gassebner et al., 2008).Briefly they have argued that as 
terrorist attacks occur near to election time, its impact on the election results 
increases, whereas the farther away from the election, terrorist attacks lose 
impact (Dhanagare, 1968; Bali, 2007; Berrebi & Klor, 2008; Gassebner et al., 
2008). Our finding is also consistent with these studies argument. Similar to 
these studies, our descriptive statistics reveal that the PKK increases its terrorist 
attacks especially within the last three months of the general elections. This 
study shows that the PKK intentionally carries out its terrorist attacks as closing 
to the general elections. 
To sum up, this study indicates that the PKK systematically increased its 
violence over the pre-election period of general elections because of the four 
main reasons:  
First; electorates are short-sighted, terrorist attacks closer to the elections 
have more impact on the electorate’s preferences. It mobilizes the sympathizer 
Kurdish constituents and increase electoral support for the PKK’s political party in 
the upcoming elections; it discredits the incumbent government in the eyes of 
citizens for not being able to protect them from the PKK’s atrocities; thus 
decreases its chances to win in the elections.  
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Second, if the terrorist attacks are successful enough the replace the 
incumbent with another one, most probably a tougher one. If the new 
government would implement harsh counter terrorism measures, especially 
indiscriminate policies against neutral Kurdish population, it could radicalize the 
Kurdish population, alienate the Kurdish population from the government. As a 
consequence of these harsh counter-terrorism policies, the local population 
would sympathize the PKK, thus the government would be doomed to failure. 
Third, by increasing terrorist attacks, the insurgent intends to persuade the 
government that it has capacity to impose serious costs to the government and 
the citizens if the government continues a particular policy (Kydd & Walter, 
2006). So, by resorting violence prior to the general elections, PKK wanted show 
the government it has strong enough to create costs to the government. 
Fourth, targeting especially combatant targets in its own region, not only 
would the PKK increase its popularity among the Kurdish population but also 
propose a considerable threat against non-supportive sections of the Kurdish 
population. By using terrorism tool, as Kydd and Walter (2006) pointed out, the 
insurgent intends to convince the local population it has still power to punish the 
disobedience and the government is not capable of protecting them from the 
insurgent; similarly Galula (2006) argues that support from the population is 
conditional; so as long as the local population is convinced that the government 
has will and power to win, people will not be able to openly support the 
government (Galula, 2006). So, by carrying out terrorist attacks prior to the 
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general elections, the PKK has reminded the constituents that it is strong enough 
to impose cost to the population, so wanted to secure votes for its political party. 
As Weinberg (Höglund, 2009) argues that presence of military wing makes it 
easier for the insurgent to return violence if it does not satisfy the election 
outcomes. 
Terrorism after the Elections 
H2b: “Terrorist attacks will increase abruptly upon the election”. 
H2c: Subsequent terrorist attacks will decline over the post-election period. 
 
Although existing literature does a relatively better job in explaining pre-
election terrorism, it does not provide sufficient insights into the post-election 
terrorism other than arguing poor electoral results. Most scholars have 
considered election outcomes as the main source of the post-election violence;  
some scholars conceived post election violent events as quick and short-lived 
events that starts right or soon after the results are announced and ends in a 
short period of time, such as a couple of weeks (Kydd &Walter, 2002; Mesquita, 
2005) . Our study results suggest that terrorist attacks first abruptly increase 
upon the elections, and then decline in the long run over the post-election period. 
Although our study indicates that argument that post-election terrorism is quick 
short-lived events, we don’t attribute it to poor election results. If we had found a 
negative relationship between terrorism and vote share of the PKK, then our 
findings would have attributed their arguments regarding poor electoral supports. 
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Since there is no evidence for the RD approach in our study, why would the PKK 
increase its violence in the short-run after the election, and then decline in the 
long run over the post-election period?  
There might be many factors relevant to the post-election terrorism, some of 
them could be publicized, whereas some others not. In general terrorism trends 
after elections may stem from the followings: First, indication of political 
willingness to combat terrorism by the incumbent government; second, 
discrediting the government for its election pledges; second showing its power to 
impose cost to the government and discrediting the government in the eyes of its 
constituents. 
Indication of government’s political willingness:  
Since the terrorism increased prior to the general elections, political parties 
that contesting the elections might have touched upon the terrorism issue in 
Turkey and given election pledges stopping terrorism if they get elected. Due to 
their election pledges to stop terrorism and to meet the expectation of the 
constituents, the incumbent governments might have increased the counter 
terrorism efforts and operations in the short run after the elections. In return, the 
PKK might have responded to these efforts by dramatically increasing its 
terrorism thus imposing more costs to the government to stop government’s 
those efforts. This might be a reason for such a dramatically increase right after 
the election. 
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Increasing the Bargaining Capacity and Sitting at the Negotiating Table: As 
some scholars note that if the insurgent wish to affect the government and 
population, they must use costly signs (Kydd, 2005; Riley, 2001). Besides, the 
insurgent has to persuade its adversary (government and target population) that 
it is strong enough to impose serious costs, so the adversary accepts the 
insurgent’s demands (Overgaard, 1994). From this perspective, the greater costs 
the insurgent is able to impose, the more credible its threat to impose future 
costs and more likely to obtain concession from the adversary; and furthermore, 
the insurgent may use resort terrorism directly against the population when the 
government has consistently refused to implement a policy at the insurgent’s 
favor or when its efforts to change the government’s policy appear useless (Kydd 
& Walter, 2006). Similarly, after the election, by increasing terrorism level, the 
PKK may have wanted to indicate how it was able to and still has power to 
instantly increase the costs for the incumbent, thus tried to force the incumbent to 
sit at the negotiating table and make some policy changes favoring the PKK. For 
instance, the PKK may have attempted to force the government to stop military 
operations, or to make some changes in certain laws or some concessions. In 
other words, the PKK may have attempting to push its demands into the political 
agenda by resorting terrorism after the election. 
Discrediting the government in the eyes of the constituents and showing its 
weakness in protecting them from the PKK: By increasing costs to the local 
population through terrorist attacks the PKK would be able to kill two birds with 
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one stone. By this way, the PKK not only would be able to gain obedience and 
support of the local Kurdish population but also discredit the government in the 
eyes of the local population through showing the incumbent government’s 
weaknesses in protecting them from the PKK. In other words, the PKK might 
have been attempting to give a signal to the population that it is the de facto and 
only power in the DKPR region. Having launched a massive terrorism campaign 
right after the election, the population would come to conclusion that the 
incumbent government was a bluffer and does not have capability to stop 
atrocities of the PKK, so they would prefer to hide their true feelings and avoid 
from cooperating with the PKK rather the government. 
With regards to a decline in terrorist attacks in the long run over the post-
election, we think that since the PKK has given its messages to the government 
and population during the pre-election period as well as the short term period 
after the election, so the PKK did not see any additional benefit to keep carrying 
out terrorist attacks in the long-run over the post-election period, thus wasting its 
resources.  
Finally, seasonal factors may have influenced the terrorism trends. Two of the 
elections (April 18th of 1999, and March 28th of 2004) were held in the spring and 
one of them (July 22nd of 2007) was held in the summer seasons. In order to rule 
out impact of the elections, we have included 12 months periods for both the pre-
and post-election periods, so we were able to see a whole year period before 
and after an election. If we had considered only three or six months periods for 
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pre- and post-election periods, then it would have been impossible to rule out this 
alternative explanation. However, it is still possible that the PKK may have 
increasing its terrorist activities in spring and summer seasons. This constitutes 
one of the limitations of this study; however, even if seasons have any impact on 
terrorism trends, it would not affect our conclusions for impact of popular support. 
When considered the time period of the elections in explaining the terrorism 
trends, the PKK might have increased its terrorist attacks after the elections 
because the elections were held in the seasons when the PKK was most active, 
and declined over the time because of the upcoming fall and winter semester 
when the PKK’s militants operating in the rural areas station in shelters or 
sanctuaries and do not move frequently. On the other hand, this argument is built 
on an assumption that terrorist attacks are carried out by only guerrillas who 
operate in rural areas. However, this does not represent the actual situation, 
because the PKK has also cells operating in the urban areas and capable of 
carrying out detonating bombs and conducting armed assaults, kidnapping and 
arsons, which our data include all of them. 
Policy Implications 
 The findings of the study have some policy implications. Briefly, the most 
significant policy implication would be derived from this study is implementation 
of winning hearts and mind policies that target the local population and help the 
government acquire popular support of the local population and win the 
population to government’s side. Since the popular support was positively related 
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to the PKK’s terrorist activities, the best policy to diminish PKK terrorism is to 
isolate it from the local population through well designed good counter terrorism 
policies. These policies are non-military and politician oriented policies; the 
military and law enforcement oriented policies must be subjugated to politician 
oriented policies and play a complementary role. The military should not lead the 
politicians; instead, the politicians must play a central role and coordinate overall 
counter terrorism policies. On the other hand, it should be acknowledged that 
terrorism problem neither can be solved without effective military and law 
enforcement approach. Without neutralizing the armed wing of the population 
and political organization operating at the grassroots of the local population 
winning hearts and mind policies cannot achieve its goals. Without securing the 
population, the government cannot win the population to its own side. 
 Secondary important policy implications are related to terrorism trends 
over the pre-and post-election periods. Unlike long-term, politician oriented 
winning hearts & minds policies, these policies are relatively more tactical 
measures and designed to harden the government affiliated targets, to protect 
civilian population from the terrorist attacks, to predict and prevent terrorist 
attacks before they occur. 
Policy implications for popular Support 
 
Since the popular support is the key factor in counterinsurgency warfare, 
the population is the key component, which the government and insurgent must 
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strive win it to its own side. As explained in previous sections, depending upon 
the sympathy level, the population is usually divided in to several sections by the 
counterinsurgency practitioners and scholars. The findings of the study have 
some policy implications for each section of the population as well as the other 
insurgent and government. Deriving from findings of this study, we recommend 
long-term winning hearts and minds policies for the general Kurdish population, 
especially for those living the DKPR region. For the sympathizers of the PKK, the 
government should develop a combination of nonmilitary repressive and law 
enforcement based policies. Finally, for the PKK’s armed militants the 
government should implement effective military based policies and conduct 
effective intelligence operations on the active supporters who actively help the 
armed militants (see Figure 78 below) 
 
Figure 78: 3-Tiered Counter-Terrorism Policies 
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1. Tier: Winning hearts and mind policies on neutral population 
When the insurgent becomes unable to recruit new members and some 
segments of the population express its hostility against the insurgent, the 
insurgent may end its struggle and violent activities (Weinberg, 1991).  
Therefore, primary aim of the overall counter-terrorism policies is to isolate the 
PKK from the local population.  
According to our study findings insurgent violence varies depending on the 
degree of popular votes for its political party, thereby the government should 
resort on “winning hearts and minds” policies in an effort to win the population 
over to its side and erode popular support for the PKK, because eroding popular 
support for the PKK through good policies will bring an end of backing for the 
PKK, thereby leading the organization to suffer from the absence of resources, 
thus leading to a decline in terrorist incidents.  
As our study pointed out the PKK concentrated its terrorist activities in more 
supportive areas because of the availability of resources. Therefore, while 
implementing good countermeasures especially on insurgent friendly areas, at 
the same time, the government should also position its counterinsurgent forces in 
the provinces where PKK’s political party has retained or increased its popular 
votes due to its potential capabilities of carrying out terrorist attacks. Adopting 
this strategy has three main advantages: first, the government will be able to; 1) 
use its forces more effectively; 2) predict where the most vulnerable provinces to 
terrorist attacks; and 3) discourage current and potential supporters.       
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Winning the local Kurds in the DKPR region is core of counter-terrorism 
policies. As Horowitz and Sharma (2008) pointed out ethnic insurgents fight for 
their core national territories, which they claim; therefore they are likely to be 
pursued with high levels of political will. Causes of insurgency lie in the political 
conflict (Martin, 2010), thereby military conflict is subordinated to political conflict 
(Shaw, 2001). Since the PKK is as an ethnic insurgent and terrorist organization, 
Turkey’s counterterrorism policies must destroy the PKK’s political will and 
causes of this political conflict. Political will cannot be destroyed without eroding 
local population’s popular support for the PKK. As Parker (2007) pointed out 
good counterinsurgency policies erode popular support for the insurgent where 
poor ones contribute to popular support. Thus, by implementing good 
counterterrorism policies not only the government will be able to erode popular 
support for the insurgent but also solve the problems, or grievances that the PKK 
has exploited for years. As our study results have indicated, the insurgent PKK’s 
terrorist attacks are dependent on strength of its popular support from the local 
population; therefore eroding popular support through good counterterrorism 
policies is the main policy implication derived from this study. However, achieving 
this objective is not an easy task and requires long term, politician oriented 
policies that aim to gain the Kurds to the government’s side. 
Such long term policies include social reforms, education, health and other 
civilian policies to win the local population to government’s side. Social reform is 
an attempt to address the grievances of the terrorists and their championed 
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group. Its primary purpose is to resolve and undercut the underlying problems 
that the terrorist organization exploits to acquire popular support and causes of 
the conflict (Martin, 2010). Social reforms can include the improvement of 
economic conditions and public recognition of the validity of grievances (Gus, 
2010).  For instance, when Peru’s insurgency group Shining Path’s leader, 
Abimail Guzman, was captured in 1992, the Peruvian government launched a 
social reform campaign that includes land reforms, political rights, and rural 
improvements. As a consequence, these policies have successfully eroded 
popular support from the peasants for the insurgent Shining Path. Similarly, the 
Turkish government should channel its resources to decrease the gap between 
the DKPR region and other regions. Currently, the DKP region provinces are less 
developed and have worse conditions in almost all areas compared to especially 
the western and south western region provinces. The PKK has exploited these 
grievances over 30 years. Although the Kurds are citizens and posses all political 
rights, still the living conditions in the DKPR region provinces need improvement. 
The government should increase job opportunities by promoting economic 
investments and agriculture, so that employed individuals would find little reason 
to join the PKK.  
Similarly, education should be promoted in the DKPR region. The government 
should increase the number of public schools and promote entrepreneurs to 
invest on private schools through various monetary and tax incentives. 
Thousands of students live in villages and hamlets, which makes it harder for 
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them to get good quality education. In order to promote the education, the 
government should offer them free boarding schools and provide vouchers for 
private schools if they meet the conditions. By this way, the government will not 
only be able to increase the level of education in the region but also protect them 
from exposure of the PKK. The more young people attend schools, the fewer 
individuals the PKK could find to recruit. In addition to increasing the level of 
education on the DKPR region, schools and especially universities will also 
contribute and vitalize social and economic life of the provinces. 
University education is very competitive In Turkey, so majority of the students 
will not be able to get a university education. Therefore, the government should 
open new public universities and promote private universities as well. Especially 
medical and law schools are very popular; prospective students of these schools 
are usually willing to go anywhere to graduate from these schools. Launching 
medical and law school programs in the DKPR region provinces would be a good 
start in order to vitalize the social and economic life in the DKPR region.  
Despite an anticipated increase in the undergraduate level education, still 
thousands of students will not be able attend universities. Therefore, the 
government should also make long term plans to meet middle-person needs in 
the industrial and other areas. In order to meet these needs, the government 
should promote vocational schools and design courses (electric & electronic 
technician, nurse aids, child care, auto mechanics etc) for those who will have 
little chance get a university level education, so having graduated from these 
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schools or courses, individuals would be able to find jobs or start a business. By 
this way, the government will be able decrease their possible deprivation and 
diminish the risk for joining the PKK.  
Health care is another important issue in the DKPR region. Compared to 
western region provinces, there are fewer hospitals, health care personnel and 
medical equipment in the DKPR region provinces. One reason for the shortage of 
heath care personnel is that there is no mandatory service and rotation in health 
care officials. Therefore, not many people are willing to serve in the health care 
facilities of the DKPR region. As a consequence, people of the DKPR region wait 
longer in the lines to see a doctor and less time are allocated due to lack of 
human resources. Besides, due to less sufficient medical equipment in the 
hospitals, people receive a lower quality treatment compared to the Western 
region provinces. 
The areas needs development can be expanded; the DKPR region also 
needs better inter-province and inter village roads. There are still non-motorway 
inter-province roads in this region. This may be affecting the trade in the region 
as well. Some villages and hamlets even do not have roads connecting each 
other.  
In conclusion, by promoting the economic, social, education and other 
conditions in the DKPR region, the government will be able to win the hearts and 
minds of the population and erode the support for the PKK. Eroding popular 
support will diminish resources of the PKK; thereby force it to decrease its 
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terrorism. The PKK has exploited these less favorable conditions in the DKPR 
region over 30 years and claimed that the Kurds are being discriminated in this 
country. Actually, the DKPR region was not the only region with less favorable 
conditions. For instance, the northern region (Black sea region) has less 
favorable conditions compared to the Western regions but the people living in 
this region have never challenged with the government or claimed that they have 
been discriminated. In short, the government should make this DKPR region is a 
better place to live.  
However, as Martin (2010) noted long term, politician oriented policies should 
be used in conjunction with other counterterrorism policies. 
2. Tier: Repressive policies against supporters or friendly population 
Martin (2010) argues that the successful use of nonmilitary and 
nonparamilitary assets to suppress terrorism requires the effective deployment of 
technological and organizational resources. The primary objective is to disrupt 
and deter terrorist organizations and their support apparatuses. 
Counterinsurgency practitioners Galula (2006) and Trinquier (2006) point out the 
active supporters of the insurgent living with the population. They argue that 
when the population is watched by the active supporters of the insurgent, they 
face with a threat of denunciation to the insurgent and prompt punishment by its 
armed militants; thereby without neutralizing these active supporters, the local 
population will not be able support to the government and have to act with the 
insurgent to avoid from such punishment. 
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Martin (2010) divides nonmilitary options four categories: 1) covert operations 
(nonviolent)—which are secretive operations that include a number of possible 
measures such as infiltration, disinformation and others; 2) intelligence—which 
refers to data collection to create an informational database about terrorist 
movements and to predict their behavior; 3) enhanced security— which refers to 
the hardening of targets to deter or prevent terrorist attacks such as security 
barriers, checkpoints,  surveillance and others; 4) economic sanctions— which 
are used to punish or disrupt state sponsors of terrorism. 
Deriving from their arguments, we argue that the government’s intelligence 
and law enforcement organizations must have closely work together for the 
purpose of revealing these active supporters of the insurgent. Intelligence should 
be collected on possible active supporters and their activities in the area. Having 
collected and analyzed the information they have collected to reveal the network 
of active PKK supporters, the intelligence organization work together with the law 
enforcement to prosecute them. Through these repressive policies against the 
active supporters at the grassroots of the population, the government will be able 
to defeat the threat imposed to the neutral population, in return, the local 
population will hot have to support or act with the insurgent. As a consequence, 
the PKK will have less resources, intelligence and logistics to invest terrorist 
activities.  
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3. Tier: Offensive policies against militants: 
These policies include military operations, covert operations and aim to 
disrupt armed band of the PKK. As a military solution, Robert Thompson (1966) 
suggests employing full-time paramilitary forces to protect hamlets and villages 
from the insurgent and tasking the army with conducting clear-hold operations 
and controlling the local population  in insurgent’s popular base areas. In order to 
achieve this goal, the military and intelligence organizations must work in a great 
harmony to succeed in neutralizing the armed militants. Without doing so, fear of 
terrorism among the local population will not disappear and government’s long-
term policies will be doomed to failure. 
Policy implications for Terrorism Trends in Elections 
In addition to policies targeting certain sections of the population and 
insurgents, the government should also implement some defensive policies to 
protect its forces, officials, facilities and the population. Defensive policies 
include: increase of terrorism and security awareness in the security forces, 
officials and population; target hardening; strengthening possible security 
weaknesses. Our study findings have some implications to diminish casualties, 
predict possible terrorist attacks depending upon the election period. 
Revealing an increasing terrorism trend over the pre-election period of 
general elections has significant policy implications for the incumbent 
government and population: The government should increase terrorism 
awareness among its security forces and population towards the election and 
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short term after the election, especially the last three months of the election and 
three months after the election are very important. Within these approximately six 
months period, provinces experience more terrorist attacks. During this period, 
the intelligence agencies should increase their technical and surveillance 
operations against the suspected individuals who could provide places, logistics, 
intelligence and other necessary materials for the members of the insurgent’s 
armed wing. In addition, the police, army, and private security companies should 
be briefed about possible terrorist attacks against possible targets such as 
security forces, political party buildings/workers and candidates and others 
toward the election; protective countermeasures should be revised and their 
efforts to protect possible targets should be increased. 
Furthermore, our data indicates that the PKK strategically direct its violence 
against the combatant targets deployed in the DKPR region. This finding leads 
us to conclude that the PKK focuses and targets combatants in the DKPR region, 
thus we recommend developing countermeasures that designed to diminish 
attacks against government’s forces deployed in the DKPR region and protect 
them from terrorist attacks. Such countermeasure include using jammer devices 
to disrupt radio or cellular phones signals, thus disable possible remote 
controlled bomb devices on the roads during transportation of military personnel 
and materials; preferring air transportation as much as possible; developing 
intelligence networks to reveal possible terrorist plots planning to attack 
combatant targets and their collaborators. 
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Finally, according to our study findings, the PKK decreases its terrorist 
attacks in the long-run. Knowing this information would help the government to 
re-allocate its resources and give rise to non-military initiatives. 
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